Henry J. Kellermann Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954

Following the defeat of the German armed form in 1945 and the end of National Socialism, Germany became an occupied country, consisting of four zones, each controlled by one of the four victorious powers---France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each zone was headed by a Supreme Commander subject to the instructions of his government, all four cooperating through the Allied Control Council, and issuing joint and separate (for each zone) directives.

The years 1945 and 1946 were the punitive period. The principal Nazi leaders were brought to trial. Nazi activists and militarists were rooted from public life. Fraternization between occupiers and occupied was forbidden. Military Government was installed to exercise supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority. The Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945(1) defined the purposes of the occupation as "disarmament, demilitarization" and the destruction of all remnants of Nazism.(2) But it left the door open to "the eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany."

To the authors of the policy, the last objective may have seemed a distant prospect. There was certainly no agreed plan of the Allies as to how this ideal objective should be pursued nor when it might be attained. It was, as the record shows, the inability of the Allies to achieve a modicum of agreement on this objective that led eventually to the breakdown of quadripartite policy and of the control mechanism. Previously, the Berlin Declaration of June 5, 1945(3) i.e., the Declaration Regarding Defeat of Germany and Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers, issued by the four occupying powers (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) had authorized Allied representatives "to impose on Germany . . . political, administrative, economic, financial, military, and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany."(4)

The first directive issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces of Occupation in April 1945 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1067) (Lb.)(5) had contained no promise of redemption. In terms as harsh as appeared appropriate to the occasion, JCS 1067 declared defeat, not liberation, the reason for the occupation. It stipulated as the principal Allied objective "to prevent Germany from ever becoming a threat to the peace of the world," and it prescribed a system of rigid political, economic, and other, including educational, controls to be exercised by the Control Council as the supreme organ of control over Germany, in support of this objective.(6) Addressed to General Eisenhower as the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, the directive was to guide him in governing the part of Germany occupied by U.S. forces. At the same time, he was directed to urge the adoption of the policies set by JCS 1067 upon the Control Council for enforcement throughout all of Germany.

JCS 1067 was a stern reminder to Germans that they had lost the war, had surrendered unconditionally, and had to bear the consequences. It declared as the objective of Military Government that "it should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves."(7) Denazification and demilitarization and the prosecution of Nazi criminals were keystones of U.S. policy incorporated in JCS 1067. Disarmament implied not only military but industrial disarmament as well. Agricultural output, on the other hand, was to be maximized. Living standards were to be kept to a level required to prevent starvation, widespread disease, or such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. Germans were made responsible for providing for themselves. The Directive did not contain any demands for reparations pending final agreement of the Allied powers, which was never reached.

Latter-day critics have characterized JCS 1067 as "a heavy millstone around the neck of the American Military Government," showing the United States as a "short-sighted country motivated largely by revenge, and with little appreciation of the fundamental problems of an occupation."(8) Their criticism was warranted by hindsight only. JCS 1067 was soon overtaken by subsequent developments, notably the deterioration of quadripartite relations which necessitated a gradual revision of policy, at least on the part of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes delivered an address in Stuttgart, Germany,(9) which marked a. turning point in U.S. and Western Allied relations and policy toward Germany. Referring specifically to the reconstruction stipulation of the Potsdam Agreement "to start building a political democracy from the ground up", Secretary Byrnes asserted that it "never was the intention of the American Government to deny to the German people the right to manage their own internal affairs" and, furthermore, that "the purpose of the occupation did not contemplate a prolonged foreign directorship of Germany's peacetime economy." Byrnes proposed, then and there,. that there should be "economic unification of Germany" and that "the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs." "All that the Allied governments can and should do," Byrnes said, is "to lay down the rules under which Germany can govern itself." This involved, according to Byrnes, among other things, clarification of the essential terms to the peace settlement and the early establishment of a provisional German government which, in turn, would prepare a draft of a federal constitution for Germany. Byrnes concluded:

"The American people want to return the government to the German people. The American people want the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world."

One of the first steps taken, still in 1946, in conformance with the Byrnes proposal, was the decision to transfer legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the Laender (States) within the U.S. Zone by March 1, 1947.(10) Also, before the end of the year, the German Economic Council was established, which prepared the economic fusion of the American and British Zones, confirmed by the military governments of the two zones on May 29, 1947. But it was only after the failure of the third Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow (March-April 1947) that the trend toward German self-government gained real momentum.(11)

The time had come for a second phase in German-U.S. relations. General Clay, then Deputy Military Governor, later Military Governor, himself favored a change. In a message to the War Department of September 16, 1946, he suggested "that a revision of JCS 1067 into a new policy statement is desirable and that this statement should be positive in character." He further suggested that Secretary Byrnes' Stuttgart speech be taken "as a basis for a Positive political stand."(12) A directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1779), issued on July 15, 1947,(13) and superseding JCS 1067, initiated this new phase. While it still maintained disarmament, demilitarization, and denazification as objectives of U.S. policy, it now placed major emphasis on the physical, political, and cultural reconstruction of Germany as part of and prerequisite to European recovery. In pursuit of this objective, the task of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief was declared to be that,

"of helping to lay the economic and educational bases of a sound German democracy, of encouraging bona fide democratic efforts and of prohibiting those activities which would jeopardize genuinely democratic developments."

In fact, the severe restrictions of JCS 1067 had already been relaxed as regards the German economy, first because of the impact of large quantities of foodstuffs to stem the threat of nationwide famine, followed by a "Level of Industry Plan" and a subsequent "Revised Plan for Level of Industry in the U.S.-U.K. Zones of Germany" in August 1947. The latter confirmed the new U.S. policy of promoting economic growth by doubling the production of steel, raising industrial production generally to 75 percent of prewar levels, and removing many restrictions on German exports.(14) The issuance of JCS 1779 coincided with the coming into force of the Marshall Plan of which West Germany eventually became a full beneficiary.

Actually, JCS Directive 1779 merely reaffirmed and made operative the earlier "Long-Range Policy Statement for German Reeducation" of June 5, 1946, which had been drafted by a group of American educators under the chairmanship of Archibald MacLeish, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations, in May 1945. It was released on August 21, 1946, by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) as Policy Statement 269/5.(15) The statement placed reeducation squarely within the framework of the total reconstruction effort. It declared that,

"the reeducation of the German People can be effective only as it is an integral part of a comprehensive program for their rehabilitation. The cultural and moral reeducation of the nation must, therefore, be related to policies calculated to restore the stability of a peaceful German economy and to hold out hope for the ultimate recovery of national unity and self-respect."

After having devoted much of its effort in the initial phase of control to the elimination of National Socialist and militaristic doctrine, U.S. Military Government was now directed to complement its policies and programs by initiating "a program for the reconstruction of German cultural life." Moreover, SWNCC 269/5 postulated that, "the reconstruction of the cultural life of Germany must in large measure be the work of the Germans themselves," and, furthermore, that "the Nazi heritage of Germany's spiritual isolation must be overcome by restoring as rapidly as possible those cultural contacts which will foster the assimilation of the German people into the society of peaceful nations." SWNCC 269/5 had laid the groundwork for the elevation of reeducation to a priority aim of U.S. policy intimately related and, in a sense, pre-requisite to political and economic recovery.

JCS 1779 now followed through and instructed the U.S. Commander-in-Chief that "the reeducation of the German people is an integral part of policies intended to help develop a democratic form of government and to restore a stable and peaceful economy." To that end, the Commander-in-Chief was directed "to encourage and assist in the development of educational methods, institutions, programs and materials designed to further the creation of democratic attitudes and practices through education."(16) Finally, as a means of encouraging German participation in the work of cultural reconstruction. and of overcoming spiritual isolation, JCS 1779 opened the doors to the restoration of international contacts. It told the Commander-in-Chief "to permit and assist the travel into and out of Germany of persons useful for this program within the availability of your facilities." This was not yet the authorization of a full-fledged exchange program, but a first barrier had been removed.

JCS 1779 had been preceded a few weeks earlier by an Allied Control Council Directive which called for fundamental reform of the entire system of formal education. Allied Control Council Directive 54, issued on June 25, 1947, spelled out the ten "Basic Principles for Democratization of Education in Germany."(17) It demanded equal educational opportunity for all: free tuition, textbooks and other scholastic materials and maintenance grants for the needy; compulsory full-time school attendance for all between the ages of 6 and 15; a comprehensive educational system eliminating the so-called "two-track system"; emphasis on civic responsibility in education; promotion of international understanding; provision for educational and vocational guidance; health supervision and health education; teacher training at the university level; and full participation of the public in educational reform, organization and administration.

The Directive was followed in October 1947 by a second one, setting forth five "Basic Principles for Adult Education." Reeducation had become one of the few policies that had quadripartite endorsement although the meaning of many of the terms was quite different as between the Western powers and the USSR.

Reeducation has been a concept never entirely free of controversy. To be sure, it was denounced by unreconstructed German nationalists and conservatives who were infuriated by the intrusion of outsiders into the classrooms of the nation and who questioned the competence of the latter to sit in judgment over the moral and social codes of German society. But even more moderate elements were offended by the imposition of reforms that went beyond denazification and attacked time-honored standards and institutions on the assumption that the vanquished was subject to total rehabilitation by the victor.(18)

There can be no doubt that reeducation had certain moral, even moralistic, overtones. Social scientist Hans Speier, himself one of the architects of American postwar policy for Germany, contended and not without justification, that "American policy toward Germany was initially conceived in military and moral terms rather than as a political issue." Being moral, U.S. policy at times sounded almost chiliastic, for instance, when it proclaimed its intention to prevent Germany from "ever" again -becoming a threat to peace. The expectation to turn around a whole people---from "evil to good,'' from Nazism to democracy---moreover, may have impressed and, in fact, did impress many critics as somewhat naive or at least unrealistic. Yet, as Speier rightly emphasized,(19) there was an element of strong realism in U.S. and Allied policy. Reeducation was never conceived as an end in itself---to remake German man---but as an in-depth defense of U.S. national self-interest. Reeducation was to provide long-range protection against a recurrence of aggression by building a psychological foundation on which political and economic reform could rest with hope of survival---the assumption being that neither reform would be of much avail nor long duration if each was not grounded in basic changes in values, attitudes, and institutions. Again, this proposition may have sounded presumptuous to some and unrealistic to others. Subsequent developments have shown that they were neither. Those who did the planning in 1946 were in dead earnest about it. Their principal spokesman, Archibald MacLeish, insisted that reeducation had to be the governing principle of all policies toward Germany, including those governing political and economic reconstruction. He did not fully succeed. Reeducation did not emerge as the supreme goal of Allied or even U.S. policy. But SWNCC 269/5 made it at least an "integral" all-pervasive part of rehabilitation directly related to political and economic reform.

The elevation of reeducation to priority rank was not the result of government initiative alone. The U.S. educational community can take major credit for having played a decisive role in the development and execution of U.S. policy. It took its cue from a school of thought which emphasized a positive long-range approach to the problems of postwar reconstruction---a concept which actually antedated the end of hostilities. As early as 1944, an "Interdivisional Committee on Germany" of the Department of State had warned that:

"in the long run ... a purely negative program can result only in chaotic educational procedures. The elimination from the schools of the ultranationalism and militarism and related doctrines . . . can be accomplished only by supplanting the perverted concept of the Hitler regime by a constructive set of beliefs and objectives based on the best elements of the German tradition and offering the German people hope for the future.

"The problem. . .," the recommendation concluded, "consequently is (1) to decide what kind of teaching in Germany would be most conducive to world security, and (2) to determine what means should be employed to foster that teaching."(20)

In August 1946, the educational community, jointly with Military Government, took the initiative by sending to Germany, upon OMGUS invitation, a Mission of 11 prominent members, under the chairmanship of George F. Zook, President of the American Council on Education.(21) The Mission traveled through the U.S. Zone for a month studying conditions and developing recommendations for a report which was filed with General Clay, the Department of State, and the War Department. It returned from its visit profoundly impressed with the urgent need for prompt and systematic assistance on all levels of education and convinced of the grave responsibility of the U.S. Government to respond to this need.

"The reeducation of the German people," the report of the Mission stated, "is an undertaking of the greatest magnitude, which can be accomplished only if, on the one hand, Germans draw upon their own residual resources and, on the other, are given adequate direction and aid by those who have, by the exigencies of history, achieved control over German life."

The Mission, shocked not only by the chaotic conditions caused by wartime destruction and the total corruption of standards by the Nazi regime, but also by the undemocratic structure of the traditional German school system, which predated the Nazi period, proposed a thorough reform of all aspects of education. But it felt strongly that this task had to be performed by Germans themselves. The members of the Mission found some Germans eager to establish cultural contacts with the United States and called the attention of Military Government to what they considered "a unique opportunity to influence the fundamental reorientation of the national educational program in the direction of democratic goals and procedures." They pointed out, however, that in order to discharge this long-term obligation, "the combined resources of the U.S. Government, of voluntary agencies, and of private individuals must be utilized and coordinated." Here was indeed the first preliminary sketch of things to come. The Mission spelled out some of the details. It endorsed the incipient OMGUS program of sending American experts to Germany for direct personal contact and discussion with their German colleagues. It mapped out some of the areas needing urgent attention, such as classroom management, student government, curriculum building, teaching of social studies, training of teachers and youth leaders, and universities in general

But the Mission took a significant step beyond the scope of OMGUS policies. It recommended that OMGUS' expert program be supplemented by the provision of funds for bringing carefully selected German students to the United States for a period of training. "This is essential," the report said, "to enable those Germans showing promise of leadership to study in the United States and to receive the benefit of our experience for the training of their youth, the rewriting of their school books, and the preparation of cultural material for adult education." The Mission even recommended extension of the provisions of the Fulbright Act to Germany to include German students, teachers, and intellectual leaders, "as soon as conditions permit,"---a recommendation which proved to be premature by 6 years.

The Mission was aware of the fact that the resources available to Military Government for carrying out its program were at best modest. It concluded with commendable insight that the staff of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch "should be double its present size if a thorough job is to be done." Yet, with curious inconsistency it failed to carry its proposal to its logical conclusion. Instead of urging OMGUS or, for that matter, the U.S. Government to assume full financial responsibility for a more adequate program and staff support, it simply suggested that the budget "should remain at least [sic] its present size." Moreover, it relieved OMGUS of much of its burden by calling on the U.S. private sector to come to the aid of its government. "The official program of the U.S. Government," the Mission said, "is only one of many sources of education that must be tapped ..." Private individuals and organizations, such as churches, trade unions, youth organizations, and professional societies were suggested as the logical elements to open cultural channels between the United States and Germany, thus constituting "a supplement to the governmental program." Official authorities, the Mission proposed, were to assume a new kind of responsibility, namely, to act as a "service agency" of private individuals and organizations, with appropriate administrative adjustments being made in the United States and in the field. Only cooperative action by government and the private sector, the Mission concluded would insure a full measure of American influence.

This would have been sound advice had it been. conceived and interpreted as opening an avenue of enlisting auxiliary aid. But in effect, it provided OMGUS with a convenient rationale to avoid any significant changes in the program and to take on the kind of responsibility that the authorities ought to have exercised. The Mission had performed a valuable, in many ways truly pioneering job, but the caution it observed in not demanding drastic changes in the organization, scope, and budget of the program enabled OMGUS to proceed more or less on its previous scale, and delayed the emergence of an effective program by nearly 3 years.

On the other hand, the Mission's call for a contributory role of the private sector produced remarkable results. Given the more limited resources available to the private sector, it did not achieve the breakthrough of scale that was needed. But it succeeded in moving education into the proper focus and- in clarifying the long-term nature of the U.S. commitment in Germany. It endorsed and expanded the pattern of all U.S. Government educational and cultural programs and of government-private partnership as a vital instrument to carry out the overall objectives of U.S. policy. And it helped build up a broad base of organized citizen support which was not only a windfall for OMGUS, but which continued to prove enormously useful when the Department of State and HICOG assumed responsibility for a program then substantially planned, conducted, and financed by the Government.

The reaction of OMGUS to the report was strongly affirmative in language, but weak in action. General Clay's comment to the War Department was to the effect that provisions had been made for the recruitment of American personnel in educational fields; that the services of 40 experts would be obtained before mid-1947; that co-ordination of educational aid and exchanges was heartily supported and that an agency should be set up in the United States parallel to a central agency in the U.S. Zone to bring about such coordination; that "no recommendation would be more supported than the recommendation that German students, teachers and school officials should spend a period of training in the United States," and that permission had already been granted a number of German theological students to pursue their studies in Switzerland and Italy. All this, OMGUS said, could be done "as soon as foreign exchange has been established for Germany."(22) There was no further word on how this exchange could be "established," certainly no suggestion that government funds should be used or procured. There was, in fact, no immediate, follow-up.

The winter of 1946-1947 was a time of extreme austerity with food and coal in very scarce supply. Europe was in the grip of a severe cold wave. General Clay had made clear that reeducation of the German people to a liberal philosophy of life and government was an objective of his policy,(23) but he did not believe that democracy could be either taught or learned on empty stomachs. Quite consistently, he refused for some time to spend his funds on paper and newsprint for textbooks and newspapers. Between education and the necessities of life, named as the prerequisites to the growth of democracy, Clay, understandably, assigned priority to the latter. "We realize," he wrote in a letter of May 1, 1947, to the Secretary of State, "that there is no limit to the funds which could be expended for reorientation in Germany. However, we believe that with the appropriations which have been made in the amount of $1,025,433 and with the continuation of the services enumerated above furnished by the War Department during the past year, we will give our reorientation program a status proportionate and comparable with our overall program."(24)

Clay was reluctant to ask more money of Congress for a number of other reasons. He had reached rather early the conclusion that responsibility for the punitive as well as the positive aspects of rehabilitation had to be turned back to the Germans. Moreover, he was critical of the visiting expert program and even more so of proposals to extend the program to U.S. specialists and to students. As regards the former, he considered the short visits of American and European experts a failure and preferred the alternative of having them serve as members of his staff, at least on a semi-permanent basis. As for students, Clay hesitated to accept the Education Mission's proposal of having them go to the United States and of underwriting the expense out of OMGUS funds. In his letter to Major General Daniel Noce, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, Clay expressed the "hope to see German students ... visit the United States," but suggested that such travel would have to be financed from private sources.(25)

As a result of his letter, only four major categories of German citizens were given permission to travel to the United States, namely, (1) displaced persons and persecutees (by Presidential Directive of December 22, 1946) ; (2) theological students (upon endorsement by General Clay) ; (3) clergymen and educators traveling on visitors' visas to attend conferences and the like (upon clearance by the European Command) ; and (4) scientists traveling in the interest of War Department research (upon clearance by the War Department and the Department of State).(26)

Eventually it was Washington rather than OMGUS that responded affirmatively to the recommendation of the Education Mission. Under direct reference to the Long-Range Policy Statement on German Reeducation (SWNCC 269/5), which had declared that "the reconstruction of the cultural life must be in large measure the work of the Germans themselves," and in accordance with the policy established by that SWNCC directive that Germany's spiritual isolation had to be overcome by a restoration of cultural contacts, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, on March 31,1947, issued its Directive 269/8 which announced the decision of the U.S. Government "to permit and encourage the revival of visits of Germans to the United States and of persons from the United States to Germany."(27)

The new policy, which was given wide media coverage, contained a number of innovative features. It defined the categories of persons eligible for participation in exchange visits between the United States and Germany---namely, leaders in formal and extracurricular education; leaders in religious activities; leaders in informational and related fields of activity, such as press, radio, and films; leaders in civic and welfare organizations, youth and other social organizations; leaders in occupational and professional organizations; leaders in art, letters, music, and the stage; students from recognized educational institutions, and trainees;. and persons of outstanding promise who were about to enter upon or who were in the early years of their active careers in the above fields.

Next, the policy established the criteria of selection of candidates, such as: concern with educational, religious, scientific, informational or cultural affairs and interest in the reorientation of the German people toward peace and democracy; willingness to further through their trips the work of Military Government in the reeducation of the German people; proficiency in the language of the country to which they were going; intent not to use the trip for commercial purposes; a satisfactory record as regards past and present political activities and affiliations to meet established security requirements; preference to he given to persons who had demonstrated their opposition to Nazism and their belief in democratic principles; and, finally, a written statement affirming their understanding that they were required to return to Germany upon the expiration of their permission to visit the United States (or another country).

Furthermore, the policy established criteria of sponsorship in that the trip of each individual had to be recommended or sponsored by a recognized American nongovernmental organization or institution or by an agency or institution of the U.S. Government.

With respect to candidacy, the eligibility of each person and of his sponsor, the length of his stay, and the program of his visit had to be approved by OMGUS in Germany, the War Department in Washington, and, finally, before the issuance of passport and visa, by the Department of State---approval depending in turn on the completion of a thorough security check giving no cause for reasonable doubt that the above criteria had been met.

Except for the explicit criteria relating to reeducation and reorientation of the German people, many of these criteria. were riot so different from those already in use for foreign students, professors, scholars, and leaders who had been coming here during the previous 6 to 7 years from Latin America. They, too, were to be chosen with great care as regards influence among significant social groups at home, academic qualifications, and ability to speak and understand fluent English.

As regards money, the program was to be financed from private and public funds in the United States and, whenever possible, from German public and private sources, subject in the case of private sponsorship to the approval of the War Department and the Department of State. As a practical matter, the number of travel permissions was made contingent upon the availability of suitable placement facilities and financial resources of each traveler. The study of American students in German educational institutions of higher learning was deferred until conditions at German universities appeared sufficiently stabilized. Directive 269/8 of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee constituted marked progress toward the attainment of the comprehensive U.S. objectives. It provided a tool for reeducation that left no longer the whole onus nor the exclusive responsibility with U.S. authorities. For the first time, in this Directive, Germans were assigned a participatory and supportive role, though still largely as beneficiaries and only to a very limited degree as cosponsors.

Although announced in press releases and widely welcomed amongst persons concerned as a "cooperative venture of the United States Government and private institutions and organizations interested in furthering democratic reeducation and reconstruction in Germany,"(28) SWNCC 269/8 hardly got off to a flying start. The policy itself had cautioned that participation would depend on the availability of funds. Such funds were, in fact, provided for U.S. experts and specialists; but for Germans, sources for financial assistance to defray the cost of transportation, study, and daily living depended, as heretofore, on the generous, albeit limited voluntary contributions from the private sector. Appropriations by Congress were neither allotted nor, indeed, yet requested.

Considering the stringency of conditions for approval of each German who was to travel, the difficulty of finding private sponsors and, even more so, the paucity of money for implementation, it was small wonder that the program started with a mere trickle of 81 persons traveling on government funds during fiscal year 1947 (i.e., July 1, 1946-June 30, 1947). Most of these (50) were specialists going to Germany. The rest consisted of German leaders going to European countries (21) or to the United States (8) and of European specialists to Germany(2).(29) No students or trainees traveled on U.S. Government money, although according to War Department estimates, 50 German students attended a variety of American institutions under private auspices. Among the first students permitted to visit the United States was Benigna Goerdeler, daughter of the former Lord Mayor of Leipzig who had been executed by the Nazis for participation in the 1944 plot against Hitler. She had been invited by Briarcliff College.

Aside from its modest volume, it was the composition of the sample that made the program in the early years less than satisfactory. Since participation depended largely on private contributions, the program included primarily those Germans who either had relatives and friends in the United States or were members of politically untainted organizations with affiliates in the United States. Since most secular organizations had either been destroyed or corrupted by the Nazi regime, the churches emerged as logical and qualified sponsors of exchanges. Indeed, during the first years of any kind of "exchanges," religious organizations and colleges assumed major responsibility for sponsoring, stimulating, facilitating, and financing the. travel of individuals and groups.(30)

The preponderance of persons meeting OMGUS and State Department criteria for travel because of personal relationships and/or religious affiliation left out large numbers of qualified candidates. More seriously, as long as the program remained truncated and unbalanced, it could not possibly be expected to perform its assigned function as a vehicle and supplement of educational reform. Indeed, the latter itself was now running into trouble, weakening the rationale for educational exchange. The attempts of Military Government to revamp the German educational system on all levels began to meet 'with increasing resistance on the part of members of the educational bureaucracy and educational traditionalists in certain Laender (States).

In accordance with the proposals of the Education Mission of 1946, U.S. policy called for fundamental changes in the philosophy and structure of German education, including the elimination of the so-called "two-track" system. This system separated children after the fourth grade with a mere 10 to 20 percent moving on to secondary school and more than 80 percent staying behind in elementary and vocational schools and thousands dropping out before graduation from even these low-level institutions. The "selection out" process favored in effect and largely by intent the sons and daughters of the upper middle class who upon graduation from the secondary schools were entitled to enter the universities and technical academies and thereafter the ranks of the higher civil service, the professions, and academia.(31)

German conservatives rose to the defense of the system which they believed had produced, and they hoped, insured, the resurgence of a professional elite and, with it, the return of the standards of excellence that, in the past, had established Germany's international reputation in science, technology, and the professions. They argued that there was no need for studying, and even less for imitating foreign models. Near the end of 1947 resistance reached a crescendo, nearing outright sabotage in the form of deliberate foot-dragging by Land authorities, and rumor-mongering, distortion of and active opposition to U.S. intentions on legalistic and plainly political grounds by recalcitrant elements. In a report summarizing the situation in the U.S. Zone of Occupation in 1948, the author reported that military directives proposing ten principles of educational reform had not been implemented and that general agitation was fast approaching a point where not just the policies but the authority of Military Government was called into question.(32)

What had brought such a situation about, considering the generally benign attitude of the military toward the former enemy? For one thing, external resistance and perhaps an overcautious attitude on the part of Military Government combined to delay a vigorous, broad and imaginative educational exchange program. Observers found the OMGUS program lacking in substance and focus, middlebrow in its approach, aiming at an amorphous mass audience or low level functionaries instead of concentrating on the potential leadership, still harping on negative and restrictive measures rather than promoting positive reconstructive objectives, and lagging behind that of our Western Allies. The caliber of the OMGUS staff was questioned, especially by German authorities and educators who began to challenge the credentials of their American tutors. Some of the criticism was justified. In contrast to the British, and especially the French authorities, who at a very early stage began to cultivate the more sophisticated elements in German society and who flattered them by sending outstanding members of their own intellectual elite to Germany, American military authorities exhibited for a while a curious indifference towards catering to the tastes of the intelligentsia.

Except for certain cultural areas, namely, theater and music, in which under the direction of Eric T. Clarke, formerly Secretary of the Metropolitan Opera Association, and other highly competent experts in the field of music such as Benno Frank and John Evarts, who were successful in restoring intercultural contacts by the display of artistic capabilities of high quality, there was no sign of any significant or systematic effort of the U.S. Military Government to recreate relations between the intellectual leadership of both countries.

Many of the arguments leveled by German and American critics, especially against the caliber of U.S. personnel and against the validity of U.S. policies, were neither fair nor correct nor indeed substantiated by the response, of their own compatriots. There were many extremely able officers in the ranks of OMGUS whom HICOG later was glad to accept and assign to key positions. It should also be recorded that, notwithstanding mounting resistance to educational reform, there were notable exceptions. School reform in Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg was progressing substantially along the lines of U.S. proposals for a "one-track" system. Furthermore, democratic elements within the German educational community welcomed Allied policies throughout Germany and endorsed wholeheartedly the purpose of Control Council Directive 54 of June 25, 1947 which had set forth the "Basic Principles for Education in Germany." The U.S. program, in particular, had found a loyal constituency among German teachers which continued into the fifties. It was not U.S. policy so much as the implementation of U.S. policy that caused growing concern in Germany and in the United States.

Thus the time seemed to have come for Washington to intervene directly and to draw General Clay's attention to the simple fact that the objectives of SWNCC 269/8 were not being achieved and that, to the extent to which the policy was implemented, it appeared to operate chiefly for the benefit of the fortunate few who had family, friends, or other personal connections in the United States. Some Pentagon officials, alarmed about the lack of progress actively argued for a "retention of controls . . . over the mechanism of education," and advised the General to that effect.(33) The time had passed for restrictions of this sort.

The Department of State chose a different approach. In an internal briefing paper(34) the author suggested that any prospect of realizing the purpose of SWNCC 269/8 depended on full compliance of interchange programs with the objectives of this directive, that such coordination, in turn, was possible only if the Government determined the use of funds for such programs and if the Department of State, the Department of the Army, and OMGUS assumed exclusive or chief responsibility for the selection of persons and projects. Such funds, moreover, would have to be provided by Congress. Any alternative, such as the exclusive use of private funds, would be possible but less likely and doubtless less effective. A systematic effort by the Departments of State and the Army was required to enlist the active interest of U.S. private individuals and organizations in the support of this policy. But an appeal of this kind could be successful only if the private sponsor were convinced that its money and facilities would be used in such a manner as to guarantee a maximum effect of a long-range and well-defined program and of procedures which would insure an effective selection of projects and persons over a specified period of time. At the same time the sponsor had to be granted, for reasons of fairness and expediency, a reasonable measure of responsibility in the recommendations and, if feasible, in the formulation of individual projects. Flexibility of conditions governing priority, type and length of programs, availability of accommodations, and travel facilities would give the Government some, but hardly adequate, leverage for decision, and still provide an effective inducement to the individual sponsor.

General Clay should, therefore, the author noted, be asked whether he would agree to request, or to support a request for, Congressional appropriations for purposes of cultural interchanges, over and above current requests for the program of visiting experts. Furthermore, the Department of State should ascertain whether General Clay would be prepared to extend existing time limits of 3 months for visits of American experts and use of facilities, if such limits would prove to constitute a serious handicap to the effective accomplishment of the mission or endanger the purpose or result of the project. Finally, the briefing paper pointed out that General Clay should be willing to assure private sponsors that their interests regarding purpose, type and length of project, accommodations and travel facilities would be considered. An appendix to the memorandum. proposed that OMGUS be queried specifically regarding the number of persons going in each direction under the exchange program, facilities for travel and accommodations, types of trainee programs, establishment of priority areas, length of projects, organization in the field, e.g., coordination and administration under OMGUS and German auspices, selection of candidates, types of private sponsorship desired, coordination with British and French occupation authorities and with other countries, and the like.

The event which finally broke the impasse and provided the needed momentum for educational reform and, with it, for the educational exchange program, was the appointment by OMGUS of Dr. Herman B Wells, President of Indiana University, as Educational and Cultural Adviser to Military Government. Wells' mission, as described by General Clay to Major General Daniel Noce of the Civil Affairs Division of the Department of the Army, was to "participate in formulating internal policy under our broad policy directives ... with particular attention to work on information control and education branches." General Clay added: "I do not need to stress to you the importance of the assignment."(35)

In briefing sessions with Dr. Wells prior to his departure for Germany, Department of State officers emphasized the points made by the earlier survey mission, stressing in particular the need for elevating the status of educational and cultural activities to a level on a par with other OMGUS functions and for integrating the reorientation effort which had now become the paramount civil function of OMGUS, with all other OMGUS activities rather than choosing a parochial and compartmentalized approach separating educational, religious, and informational programs. Military Government should furthermore be urged to avoid doctrinaire overtones, and, in dealing with Germans, to place maximum reliance upon identifying, encouraging, and supporting sound leadership and democratic initiatives in all phases of German life.(36)

Messages from Washington to OMGUS expressed satisfaction with the choice of Dr. Wells and underscored the importance of his mission by restating the need for a vigorous reorientation program, making the point that such a program should provide the, means of free expression now in scarce supply, such as book paper and newsprint.

In November 1947, Dr. Wells went to work. Taking much encouragement from his discussions in Washington he set out to reorganize the educational and cultural activities. Within the organizational structure of OMGUS, the education program was raised from branch to division level. Its scope was enlarged to include the fields of community activities, women's activities, youth, health, and welfare. The concept of reeducation was no longer to be confined to technical reform of the institutions of formal education but was to include cultural exchange in the widest sense.(37) Although budget cutbacks had been ordered across the board, Dr. Wells managed not only to protect the new Division of Education and Cultural Relations from any retrenchment, but actually to increase its responsibilities.(38)

The exchange program was Dr. Wells' special concern. Largely due to his efforts, a number of changes were effected which changed the character and scope of the program. Dr. Wells was convinced that cultural and educational exchange was indispensable to the achievement of the objectives of educational reform. "For more than a decade," he summarized, "Germans were barred by the Nazi dictatorship from the thought and culture of the rest of the, world. Today they are unaware of many of the advances that have been made in such fields as education, social science, medicine, art, and literature. It is not enough to say that success in reeducation will be aided by the importation of new ideas and methods through the exchange of textual matter, teachers, students, and leading personalities in the professions; it should rather be said that success is not possible without this exchange ... In conclusion ... Cultural Exchange, is one of the keystones in the reeducation program. . ."(39)

In making his proposals Dr. Wells foresaw a truly two-way program although, for the time being, the emphasis was on Germans going to the United States. The selection of persons who might qualify extended across all sectors of cultural, professional, and civic life, with preference given to those concerned with educational, religious, scientific, informational, and cultural affairs, such as students, teachers, religious leaders, and young administrators in education and religion.(40) While his public appeal was addressed to private institutions for support, especially in the form of scholarships, Dr. Wells was personally convinced that without funding from public sources, the program would never achieve the impact needed to promote and sustain an effective reorientation effort. Yet he found General Clay still reluctant to request funds from Congress.

Moreover, Clay had other misgivings. He was concerned that German students would be harassed on American campuses---an apprehension which later proved to be wholly unwarranted. Eventually he gave Wells the green light, telling him that if he thought that he could get the money out of Congress, to go ahead and launch the program.(41)

Dr. Wells' efforts resulted in an almost immediate increase in funds and exchanges. Whereas in 1947 the total of exchanges sponsored by the Government was 81, it rose in 1948 to 354. Of these, 232 were Germans going to the United States, and 14 to other European countries. The balance were Americans (82) or Europeans (26) traveling to Germany. Significantly, the largest single group were German students (214) visiting the United States (see Appendix 1).

Quite aside from raising the level and scale of exchanges, the major effect of the Wells mission was the emergence of an exchange program elevated in level of responsibility and with an identity of its own. Coordination with other programs of OMGUS provided breadth and sharper focus. Finally, Dr. Wells' interest in augmenting sources of support, both public and private, not only widened the base but insured continuity of the exchange program.(42)

The Wells mission ushered in the final phase of the OMGUS exchange program and, in some respects, laid the ground for the climactic developments under the U.S. High Commissioner. The grand design which determined the framework for all OMGUS activities during 1948-49 was drawn by General Clay himself in a speech which he delivered on October 13, 1948 at Berchtesgaden, Bavaria, to the staff of the Division of Education and Cultural Relations. He assigned to what then became known as the "reorientation" program, the long-range responsibility for assuring that the German (industrial) potential not be used again for aggression but for the common good; and he singled out the exchange program as the one phase of the OMGUS effort that, if properly conducted, could produce the needed changes in the German mind.

In a similar vein, Dr. Alonzo Grace, former Commissioner of Education in Connecticut, who after Dr. Wells' departure had been made Director of the Division of Education and Cultural Relations, described the objective of the cultural exchange program "to restore an intellectual, social, and cultural life based on the principles of freedom and social justice, humanity, and the recognition of the dignity of the individual." In a foreword to the draft of a handbook summarizing his philosophy on cultural exchanges, Dr. Grace accepted General Clay's thesis as the basic rationale, for the exchange program. "Because the mentality of a people and the principles upon which its society is based," Dr. Grace, wrote, "are fundamental factors in determining the economic and political course of that people, the success of the, objectives [of the, cultural exchange program] is vital to the security of the world."(43)

The joint efforts of Dr. Wells, SWNCC, and the, Department of State had borne fruit. Reorientation and, implicitly, educational and cultural exchanges had become policy priorities on a par with and, in a wider sense, prerequisites to political and economic rehabilitation. The exchange program itself, in turn, had come to be recognized as an integral part of the reorientation effort. Summarizing the new trend, the cumulative report of OMGUS, covering the period from May 1, 1948 to April 30, 1949, defined the aim of OMGUS' cultural affairs activities as "the moral and spiritual reorientation of the German people through international exchange of persons and materials [and] the development of cultural relations between Germany and foreign countries."(44) Underlying the new trend was a growing recognition that with the accelerated pace toward the restoration of self-government, controls had to be relaxed and eventually abandoned altogether. In addition, alternatives had to be found to continue the task of democratic reform by persuasion and indirection, rather than by fiat and indoctrination, and by drawing increasingly on German's cultural resources and on German initiative. Cultural and educational exchanges which afforded Germans an opportunity for participation on a gradually rising level of responsibility, offered a most appropriate and logical instrument of continuing the reorientation policy by these means.

Soon after the release of SWNCC 269/8, the Secretary of War submitted to the Secretary of State for approval a standard operating procedure which was to govern the basic plans for the 1948 exchange program .(45) This procedure, which in line with SWNCC 269/8 was to regulate the exchange of persons between Germany and the United States (and Austria and the United States), made a distinction between two types of persons involved, namely, "United States visitors to occupied areas" and "foreign nationals to the United States." The first consisted of two groups, "experts and specialists (going to Germany) financed by the War Department," and so-called "volunteer projects," i.e., persons sponsored by private institutions and organizations. The second group included "experts and specialists from occupied areas" and "students from occupied areas" going to the United States.

On August 12, 1947 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, in an amendment to SWNCC 269/8 (SWNCC 269/11), added two further categories to the above, by permitting the "visits of Germans to countries other than the United States and of persons from countries other than the United States to Germany."(46) Procedures for travel and selection governing the aforementioned categories were the same for the. new ones. In fact, the amendment merely confirmed a practice already in effect regarding interchanging persons between Germany and other European countries. Eventually, these categories were supplemented by the addition of trainees and teenagers going to the United States.

The type of persons falling within this category had been identified in SWNCC 269/8, October 24,1946, as had been the criteria of selection, conditions of approval, chains of authority, and processing procedures. The standard operating procedure issued in May 1947 refined and elaborated the rules laid down in the SWNCC Policy. Criteria of eligibility were defined in considerable detail. General qualifications as set forth insisted on the consideration of such factors as personality and adaptability, English speaking and reading facility, untainted political background, education and professional attainment, and "probable ability to derive benefits from the sojourn in the United States which in turn would enable individuals to contribute to the program of democratic reorientation in their native country upon their return."(47) Security requirements were especially strict. Aside from the. obviously necessary biographical data, statements had to be supplied covering political affiliations and organization memberships, both past and present; community contacts; denazification record, if any; and criminal record, if any. Moreover, the absence of any derogatory information had to be confirmed by officers of the G-2 [U.S. Military intelligence] Center in Berlin and by the, office of the U.S. Political Adviser, also in Berlin.

Subsequent procedures issued in 1919,(48) relaxed some of the earlier requirements, stipulating that no rigid standards were to be applied with respect to education and experience, except that candidates had to be well qualified in their particular fields. Command of the English language now became a matter of guaranteeing preference, other qualifications being equal. Age likewise was no longer made a firm criterion, though younger candidates were to receive preferential treatment provided they were mature enough to benefit from their visit. Personal qualifications, however, were spelled out with greater care with emphasis being placed on vitality, enthusiasm, and ability to pass on exchange experiences to others upon their return. To insure impact on the German community, evidence of "leadership," "progressiveness," and "initiative" was declared desirable. So was a reasonable expectation that the candidate would and could continue his previous employment in his field of specialization. But as far as the political requirements were concerned, OMGUS maintained throughout the rigid standards set forth in its earlier procedures. Excluded from eligibility were, reasonably enough, persons who had been convicted of a felony by an Allied Court or by another competent, criminal court recognized by the Occupation Authorities; persons who were members of any organization designated as criminal by the International Military Tribunal (i.e., the Nazi Party, SS (Schutzstaffel [the Elite Guard]), SA (Sturmabteilung [the Brown Shirts]) ; persons who were classified by a denazification tribunal as Major Offenders, Offenders, Lesser Offenders, or Followers; persons who were members of the Communist Party or any of its affiliates; and persons who by their conduct or actions had demonstrated their opposition to democratic practices and principles.

Sponsors in the United States were selected from established and reputable organizations and institutions throughout the country.

Their credentials were checked mainly for "financial liability and responsibility" and they were asked to submit specific statements describing the program or course of study offered and the length of time involved, and to disclose their source of funds. Precautions of this nature were intended not merely to bar unqualified institutions and substandard programs, but equally to protect the integrity of the program as well as the interests of the Germans coming here.

As one example, the program procedures stipulated that in the case of professors invited to teach at American institutions the subject fields had to be such "as to contribute to the reorientation program" and also that "the actual teaching load could not exceed 50 percent of the normal teaching schedule." Most universities and colleges complied punctiliously with these requirements, but there were a few instances in which sponsors tried to exploit the visitor and the program by supplementing their own staff "on the cheap," using the services of a visiting professor in excess of the permissible 50 percent. The author, who at that time, was responsible for passing on cases on behalf of the Department of State, denied or withheld approval pending clarification in several such instances. On similar grounds the author refused approval of applications from an industrial firm which proposed to send some of its employees to its branch in Germany for training purposes, claiming that the provisions of the exchange, program applied.

Procedures governing the selection of candidates were quite specific, in fact, exacting. Considering the bureaucratic machinery needed to achieve a measure of coordination among the various authorities involved, a certain amount of red tape was to be expected. Selection of candidates was a multi-staged process. Selection boards were established throughout the occupied zone which included "representatives of (German) democratic elements." Their function was to sort out suitable candidates and nominate them to the Theater Commander. The latter had the final responsibility for approval and also for the obligatory security check.

Names of approved candidates with supporting documentation were then forwarded to the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department (and subsequently to the Department of the Army) in Washington. The Reorientation Branch of CAD would accept the Theater Commander's recommendations and submit them to the Department of State for policy check and security clearance on the basis of information supplied by the Theater Commander. Upon approval by the Department of State, the Reorientation Branch would notify the Theater Commander who in turn would certify to the appropriate consulate that the visit of the applicant in question was in the national interest.

Consular officers in Germany thereupon would issue nonimmigrant visas under Section 3(2) of the Immigration Act of 1924 if they found that the applicant met the requirements of the law. The process was completed with the Theater Commander's issuance of travel orders, as a rule limited to the use of military carriers, and giving CAD advance notice of the departure date. Responsibility for admission of the visitor to the United States rested with the Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service) which also kept track of him during his stay and saw to it that his departure occurred on the day his "permit to stay" expired. Arrangements of programs of study and of all related administrative functions involved were handled by the International Exchange of Persons Division of the Department of State with the use of funds transmitted to the Department of State, for such purposes by the Reorientation Branch of CAD.

In the case of projects originating with private U.S. sponsors, procedures were somewhat simpler. Here all offers of placement had to be addressed to CAD with appropriate information on the sponsor's qualifications and nature and length of the project, as noted. The, Reorientation Branch of CAD would forward the proposal to the Department of State for a decision on the eligibility of the sponsor and the desirability of the project. The Department would then send its decision to the Reorientation Branch of OMGUS. All costs would be charged to the sponsor who would pay for transportation and grant a per diem of $12; however, if room and board were provided by the sponsor, per diem would be lowered correspondingly.

The strictness of these requirements had to be understood in view of the highly sensitive nature of the program. Only 3 years after the end of hostilities, visits of Germans at U.S. taxpayers' expense, some feared, could evoke misgivings and even protests from domestic critics who contended that the experiment was premature and invited unnecessary risks. Most of these fears proved unwarranted. On the contrary, the program quickly gained surprising approbation, especially in the Congress, where year after year appropriations were granted in the requested amount during the OMGUS years. Such criticism as was occasionally heard came from rather unexpected quarters and was directed against the harshness of conditions which, it was claimed, excluded the participation of "nominal" young Nazi party members, thus "prevent[ing] educational reconstruction of the very group of young students and faculty [members] who are in a position to influence most widely the rebuilding of democratic ideas and methods in Germany."(49)

Partly as a result of the stringency of conditions of approval, partly for lack of funds, the leader-specialist programs had a some what inconspicuous start. The number of travelers to the United States in 1947 on Government funds was no more than 8. There were 18 in 1948 (see Appendix 1). But those were not the only German leaders to come to this country. American churches, colleges, and nongovernmental organizations, such as Moral Rearmament, were among the first to sponsor visits of prominent Germans. Their choices were often haphazard and not always happy ones. Some, in fact, were highly controversial, such as that of former naval officer Pastor Martin Niemoeller, an anti-Nazi to be sure, but also an unreconstructed nationalist who used much of his time in the United States defending the cause of German nationalism. The Department of State had actually warned that it would be unfortunate to inaugurate the program with such dubious candidates as Niemoeller.

The first visitor under governmental auspices was a woman, Mrs. Strecker, an employee of OMGUS, who in 1946 attended a convention of the International Assembly of Women. Although at that time the new policy on exchange of persons had not yet been formally announced, the Department expedited approval of Mrs. Strecker's visit at the urgent request of General Clay. The project was obviously suited to further the objectives of reorientation, inasmuch as the Assembly was to discuss means of achieving a more active role of women in a democratic and internationally cooperative society, a key item on OMGUS' priority list.(50)

From its modest start, the number of leaders and specialists coming here soon soared to major heights to become eventually the largest single group of visitors, growing from 79 in 1947-1948 to 557 in 1949 (see Appendix III). In January 1949 alone, 189 German experts departed for the United States for visits ranging from 30-120 days. Most of them were sponsored by, these Divisions: Education and Cultural Relations (137); Civil Administration (37) ; Legal (9) ; and Food and Agriculture (6). There were considerable variations in the number of visitors chosen from the different Laender (states), not always proportional to the size of the population. Bavaria led with 70, followed by Hesse with 42, Wuerttemberg-Baden with 32, Berlin Sector with 30, and Bremen with 15.(51)

In time the German leader-specialist exchange became not only the largest but, as regards impact on the German populace, the most significant and effective program. The secret of its success lay in the careful and calculated selection of the best participants, but, perhaps even more so, in its project-oriented nature. OMGUS started the so-called "project approach" which reached its peak under HICOG (see Chapter TV). Leaders and specialists were sent in small groups that were either professionally homogeneous or interested in studying problems of common concern. Teams of teachers, government administrators on all levels,(52) lawyers, journalists,(53) public health officials,(54) city planners, and eventually the first group of women leaders, visited the United States; the last, under the sponsorship of the Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund of the League of Women Voters, came to study "practical techniques for enlarging the woman's sphere in government and politics."(55)

The caliber of these groups enhanced the value of the project idea, giving it sharper focus and greater effectiveness. Whether such group projects also intensified the long-range impact of the total program is more difficult to gauge, although there was evidence to that effect in cases where teams stayed together and took joint action upon their return to Germany.

The directive SWNCC 269/8 had also granted permission to students from recognized educational institutions and trainees to travel to the United States. The objective of these programs was "to give a maximum number of young Germans on the secondary school, undergraduate, and graduate level the chance to study at an institution in a democratic country and, at the same time, to receive a first hand demonstration of democracy at work and to participate in community living."(56) Procedures developed by the War Department to determine eligibility of candidates, sponsors, and projects were, by and large, the same as those established for leaders and specialists with only a few added provisions to meet the special needs of students.

In the case of students financed from U.S. Government funds, the Reorientation Branch of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, formulated the program which was then submitted to the Theater Commander for approval. Lists of opportunities for placement in American institutions would likewise be transmitted to the Theater Commander with requests for nominations.

For the administration of the program and for funds for regular graduate and undergraduate students (e.g., grants from private donors) and for placement, the War Department employed the services of the Institute of International Education (IIE), a private organization in New York with which the Department of State had had contracts for years. Names of student candidates nominated and security-checked by the Theater Commander were forwarded through channels (e.g., Reorientation Branch, CAD) to IIE for Placement. IIE, after placement had been secured, would notify the Reorientation Branch to that effect and, through it, the Theater Commander. In the case of private sponsorship in the United States, all offers had to be addressed to CAD along with information including name of institution and organization, source of funds, nature of the course or training offered, extent of financial liability to be assumed by the sponsor, and type of individual desired. If the arrangements offered were acceptable all around, the Reorientation Branch would submit the program to the Department of State for approval. Subsequent to the approval by the War Department and the Department of State, the offer would be referred to the Theater Commander for acceptance. For the protection of students receiving fellowships, it was stipulated that teaching duties be limited to German language teaching but not for more than 10 hours per week. Compensation, if any, was to be given in the form of tuition grants and maintenance, but not in cash.(57)

Transportation to the United States was provided by official carriers (Army transport ships) on a space-available basis with a charge to the students (but reimbursed by OMGUS) for meals while en route. Sponsors could be asked to guarantee transportation for the return trip if no government transportation was available at the time the student's visa expired.(58) Visas for study were granted for one year but could be extended if the sponsor guaranteed the continued support of the student and if the government agencies concerned were in agreement that such an extension would be of value to the reorientation program.(59)

The standard operating procedure for student exchange issued on October 28, 1948 by the Cultural Branch of the Education and Cultural Relations Divisions of OMGUS (60) describes in considerable detail the application, review, and selection process as administered by the Land (State) Office or, in the case of applications from other zones of occupation, by the Cultural Exchange Office, and by the Land Student Exchange Committees. The latter were appointed in all Laender by the Interchange of Persons Officer (later called the Land Cultural Affairs Officer). These committees were composed of educational and civic leaders, representatives of cultural activities outside of formal education, and labor union members, all of whom, however, served in an individual capacity and not as delegates of their organizations. The Committees themselves acted only in an advisory capacity by reviewing applications and making recommendations.

Offers of scholarships received from IIE were few and hence were distributed on a quota basis, i.e., 5 for Bavaria, 3 for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 3 for Hesse, and 1 each for Berlin and Bremen. Land Cultural Affairs officers would fill their quotas with two nominations---a first and second choice for each opening.

The screening process itself was most carefully devised, with maximum attention paid to the background of the candidate. University students were interviewed by university presidents (Rektors), young teachers by the heads of teacher training institutes, youth leaders by members of Land or Kreis (County) youth committees.

Interviews covered security and were conducted on the basis of references supplied by school authorities, teachers, civic leaders, and religious personages who would attest to the candidate's scholarship, leadership potential, character, capacity to work, and ability to profit from studying abroad.(61) Health was also a prime consideration.

The reluctance of U.S. Military Government to use available, or request additional, public funds for student exchange and a corresponding apathy by Congress were chiefly responsible for the late start of the student program.(62) There is no record listing any significant student exchange by numbers under governmental sponsorship in 1947. HICOG charts (see Appendix III)(63) show student exchanges in 1947-1948 totaling 219. Nearly all of these, according to available information, went to the United States in 1948. Indeed, 1948 appears to have been the turning point. In 1949, there was a slight increase to 239, including 81 trainees and the first 65 teenagers. But the big jump was to come a year later under the aegis of the U.S. High Commissioner.

Visits of private American citizens to Germany preceded SWNCC 269/8. Military Government called in experts rather early in the occupation, mostly as consultants to assist its staff in critical areas, such as education on all levels, libraries, public welfare, social services, women's affairs, legal matters, religious and church work, and youth activities. For instance, Professor Herta, Kraus of Haverford College was called in to aid in the rehabilitation of social work teaching and practices; Dr. Bernice Leary of the Milwaukee Public Schools to assist in the preparation of children's books; and Dr. Burr Phillips, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, to aid in school textbook writing. Upon completion of their assignments, these experts submitted reports, normally containing specific recommendations to the Theater Commander. Some of the reports were highly critical of public attitudes and professional practices, deploring not so much the perpetuation of Nazi doctrines as a relapse into traditional patterns of education with overemphasis on specialization and little regard for the social sciences and the liberal arts. Many reports contained a wealth of positive, often very technical recommendations, some of which had great practical value to OMGUS officials and were seized upon eagerly for application to current programs.

Procedures developed to regulate the visits of American experts and to implement SWNCC 269/8 were understandably far less complex than those applied to Germans going to the United States. SWNCC 269/8 contained only a brief reference to the effect that the U.S. Government should "encourage" such visits, whether under governmental or private auspices.

The procedures distinguished between "experts and specialists financed by the War Department" and so-called "volunteer projects," i.e., those sponsored by private institutions and organizations. In the former case, all that was required was a request from the Theater Commander to the Reorientation Branch of CAD identifying the expert by name or by indication of qualifications and the assignment to be performed. The Reorientation Branch after approval of the request would forward it to the Personnel and Training Branch of CAD for recruiting and processing.

In the case of private U.S. sponsorship, the project had to be submitted likewise to the Reorientation Branch of CAD by the responsible institution or organization with full information on the kind of responsibility to be assumed by the sponsor, the sources of funds to be used, the name of the person to be sent, and a description of the type of service to be performed with indication of the length of time needed for completion. Once the project was approved by the Reorientation Branch, it was forwarded to the Department of State for a decision on the political and financial responsibility of the, sponsor, on the individual to be sent, and on the desirability of the project. Upon approval by both the War and State Departments, the project would be sent by the Reorientation Branch of CAD to the Theater Commander for acceptance or rejection. In case of acceptance, the latter would furnish transportation, accommodations, rations and other facilities as needed to maintain the experts while in the area and to help them achieve the purpose of their visit. The Reorientation Branch, upon approval by the Theater Commander, would refer the project to the Personnel and Training Branch of CAD for processing, which, in turn, would arrange with the Intelligence Division for a security investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, the prospective expert going to Germany would be officially invited to participate in the program.

The number of this group was always substantial but gained measurably in scope after it had been given recognition and encouragement in official policy. In 1947 a total of 50 experts went to Germany. In 1948 the number had increased to 82. In 1949 it nearly doubled to 157 (see Appendix I). As the numbers grew, so did the quality of participants, and soon included leading representatives of academe and of the professions, including persons like Professor Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan University who examined the status and progress of the social sciences at German universities; Mrs. Chase Going Woodhouse, who studied the situation of German women and recommended, among other things, a renewal of international contacts, especially between German women leaders and women's organizations in other countries; Alice Hanson Cook, a specialist in German labor affairs, who investigated workers' education programs; and Dr. William Constable, curator of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, who made a survey of German museums and developed a three-point Program for the revival of that form of artistic life.

Nevertheless, to judge from the report of the, 1949 Survey Mission the experts appear to have been rather uneven in performance. While some did excellent work with German groups, others either went with no clear conception of their task, or departed too early, or devoted their time to self-serving study projects without benefit to the reorientation program as a whole. The failure seems to have been due to faulty selection, inadequate briefing, and inadequate supervision.(64)

A feature, of the program which evoked unqualified acclaim and introduced an effective stimulant into U.S.-German cultural relations was the appearance of the American performing artist on the scene. Under procedures established in May 1948 American artists were given special treatment. Indeed, the standard operating procedure stipulated that they were to visit Germany "to give performances for the reorientation of the German people," and incidentally also for the benefit of Allied personnel. In fact, they were "cultural ambassadors" who projected a fresh image of American art. In the beginning, the artist program was limited to a small number, not exceeding 25, and to a total period of 6 months. They had to be, of "front-rank" quality and, to satisfy these requirements, were selected by a special advisory committee established by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department .

The artists exchange was in the truest meaning of the word a voluntary program. The participants were expected to donate their services. Expenses which they incurred, e.g., travel costs, were to be covered by private sources. A sum of $10,000 was collected and placed in a revolving fund. The artists were to be considered as "Category I personnel", i.e., persons entitled to appropriate accommodations, billeting, mess privileges, and the like. On the other hand, performances for German audiences were not free but were arranged "in accordance with standard commercial procedures."

Overall responsibility for the administration of this program was assumed directly by European Command Headquarters and by OMGUS headquarters. OMGUS delegated certain responsibilities to subordinate offices. The Information Control Division was charged, inter alia, with selecting artists and arranging their transportation, scheduling their appearances in the allied zones of occupation, preparing publicity, and providing escort officers with dollar instruments. The Land directors and the director of the Berlin Sector were given the job of selecting and supervising the German agencies which would then make the necessary arrangements for performances, including local publicity, and for collecting the proceeds which were to be sent to the information Control Division of OMGUS.(65)

The arts program was a success. During 1948 outstanding musicians, actors, and writers visited Germany upon the invitation of Military Government. Not all of them were U.S. citizens, but many of them were. Among the most notable were conductors Leonard Bernstein and Otto Klemperer, concert violinist Patricia Travers, harpsichordist Ralph Kirkpatrick, composer and ballad singer Tom Scott, and author Thornton Wilder.

In retrospect, it must be recorded that the visits of U.S. citizens to Germany little resembled those of Germans going to the United States and hardly made the program a two-way affair, but such was not their purpose. Few Americans went to Germany under OMGUS to study for their personal benefit. Most of them went, as before, to assist Military Government and to lend their expertise for the achievement of specific reconstruction objectives. In terms of direct or personal benefits derived, there was no equivalence between the purposes pursued or experiences gained by German and American visitors.

Yet, Dr. Wells himself was persuaded of the importance of the program and would have preferred to see it substantially increased. In a letter to the author in which he commented on the future of the exchange program, he said: "I believe it is important that cultural exchanges continue on a two-way basis. In fact, I consider it essential that more Americans go to Germany in the future than have been going in the past."(66) His reasons were twofold: first of all, he felt that their stays being of short duration, the program for American experts needed to be supplemented by a broader effort permitting them to create a fuller understanding of the United States and its institutions, thus bringing the two countries and their peoples closer together; second, he, believed that thorough personal observation of conditions in Germany would make American visitors better and more authentic interpreters of Germany, thereby sustaining interest and concern of the American public about the problem of postwar relations with Germany. Dr. Wells thereby foresaw a return to more "normal" programs based on reciprocity and serving the traditional purpose of projecting the American image as a prerequisite to better mutual understanding. It was not, however, until the advent of the Fulbright program in 1952 that this concept was more fully realized.

SWNCC 269/8 had placed a temporary embargo on the visits of American students going to Germany "until conditions at German educational institutions appear sufficiently stabilized." As a result, visits of American students to Germany during the occupation never reached proportions that added up to a full-fledged program. It was not until the conclusion of the Fulbright Agreement that student exchanges in the real meaning of the term came into existence. The reasons were obvious. Because of physical destruction of the university buildings, depletion of faculty staffs by war and the denazification process, scarcity of objective study materials and in some cases any materials, plus general uncertainty regarding their functions within the educational system, German universities, to no one's surprise, did not attract foreign students in the early postwar period. Universities, moreover, were overcrowded by German students seeking to start or resume their academic careers delayed or interrupted by the war. Thus, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department discouraged American and other foreign applicants, pointing out that German institutions could not even take care of their own.

Nevertheless, in the spring and summer of 1948 a number of universities, such as Marburg, Munich, Heidelberg, and the Technical Academy of Darmstadt began to organize special courses for foreign students, ranging from 3 to 6 weeks. The "International Holiday Courses" arranged by the Universities of Marburg, Munich, and Heidelberg jointly with the U.S. Military Government provided for the enrollment of 100 foreign and 200 German students each .(67) The faculties were international, including Italian, Swiss, Swedish, French, British, and American professors, as well as some Germans with untainted political records. No tuition costs were charged. Students studied and lived in dormitories and student houses. Courses were offered in political science, economics, sociology, comparative religion, and other subjects. But while the, major emphasis was obviously on the social sciences, the ultimate purpose of the course was "to foster international understanding." All lectures, workshops, discussions, and field trips were therefore organized around the central theme: "Man in Today's World." In addition, two International Youth Conferences were held in 1948 at Munich, where 800 foreign students met with 2,000 German students to study current problems.(68)

In April of 1948, Military Government revised its policy by granting permission to foreign students to study at German universities, up to a total of one percent of the total student enrollment, and in August 1948 by approving German universities for study under the G.I. Bill of Rights. Each Land university office was held responsible for not letting the quota be exceeded. American students had to obtain formal admission from the university they planned to attend as well as a certificate of permission from local authorities to reside in or near the university town. Proof of both and a recommendation from the university officer had to be submitted to the Education Branch of the Education and Cultural Relations Division at OMGUS headquarters. After all conditions had been met satisfactorily, the students would then be entitled to German ration cards subject to presentation of further proof to the Food and Agriculture Land Office of Military Government that dollar instruments had been exchanged in sufficient amounts to defray expenses for food, rent, tuition, and other fees for the duration of the authorized stay.(69)

SWNCC 269/11 of August 12, 1947, which authorized exchanges between Germany and other European countries, did not introduce a new program but merely sanctioned a practice that had been in operation for some time. Criteria of selection and approval governing exchanges with the United States were declared applicable to the exchange program with Western Europe. The program achieved some momentum in 1949 and again in 1951-1952, though for reasons rather different from those prevailing in earlier years, but it never quite equaled in scale or importance German-American exchanges. A total of 21 German leaders were sent in 1947 and a mere trickle of 14 in 1948.(70)

OMGUS did not discourage the idea of sending Germans to other European countries per se. But it did not favor the use of dollars, because it was convinced that "the limited amount available for cultural exchange could be more appropriately used," and with better prospects of Congressional approval, for financing the visits of Germans to the United States. It was thought, furthermore, that American funding of such programs might stunt or altogether stifle the growth of European interest in German reorientation, thus prematurely closing potential third sources of support.(71) As an alternative OMGUS proposed, therefore, the use of foreign exchange revenues derived from tourism and from "compassionate" travels up to an amount of $50,000 to finance German representation at international and other conferences held in European countries, such as those sponsored by the World Health Organization or the International Union of Local Authorities.(72) In fact, other countries showed themselves quite receptive to the OMGUS proposal, notably the United Kingdom, which, under the Education Branch of its Control Commission, began to arrange exchange visits of various kinds of persons. While most of these projects did not materialize until 1950, Great Britain had accepted in 1948-1949 a sizable number of German nationals, including nine economists, to attend a 2-week conference at Oxford; 38 to work on educational projects; and 40 to help with harvesting. Switzerland employed no less than 220 in harvesting.

Like most American experts who went to Germany in the early days of the occupation, European specialists were part-time employees of OMGUS and assisted their American colleagues and German clients in working toward democratic reform. The Standard Operating Procedure of September 29, 1948 indeed states explicitly that "the European Consultant Program can be considered as the European counterpart of the U.S. Expert Consultant Program."(73)

Procedures for project approval and administration were largely similar to those applied to American experts and consultants. Projects had to be submitted to the Special Projects Section of the Cultural Affairs Branch, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Nuremberg, Germany. Information had to be supplied on the purpose of the project; the office or individual supervising the project; place of operation and an explanation of the way in which consultant services would be used; dates, duration, and location of the project; evidence of cooperation by a responsible German agency or institution; endorsement by the OMGUS counterpart, i.e., the division or office supervising the, project; and the name, address, and nationality of the person desired. Upon receipt of all required data, the Cultural Affairs Branch would procure invitational travel orders and the supervisor of the project would furnish briefing and background data to the consultant. Responsibility for the administration of the project rested with the competent initiating division or office acting through the project supervisor. The rate of payment for each person was to be, not more than $35 per day.(74) Subsequent procedures(75) were sharpened and updated by adapting them to certain internal organizational changes. Approval of the project became the responsibility of the Inter-Divisional Reorientation Committee (IRC) . A detailed account of the qualifications of the consultant and a resume of the job requirements were requested. Later, the payment rate was raised to $40 per day. A memo of July 26, 1949 (76)

The program had a modest and somewhat uncertain beginning. Official records list a total of 2 participants for 1947 and 26, in 1948. The figure for 1949 was 119 (see Appendix 1) on the basis of a budget request of $168,240, of which $60,000 was earmarked for the Education and Cultural Relations Division, $64,800 for the Civil Administration Division, $30,000 for the Manpower Division, and $13,440 for the Food and Agriculture Division.(77) The consultants selected were from a variety of countries, e.g., the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Belgium.(78) The program had obvious advantages. Travel arrangements were easier, and money outlay was less than for trans-Atlantic trips Far more important, however, was the relative absence of cultural barriers, due to greater similarities in institutional systems, geographic conditions, languages, and general European cultural background.

The marked increase in size from 1948 to 1949 was due to a decision by Dr. Alonzo Grace, head of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, who recognized the importance of cultural affinities in the selection of foreign experts. At the second Berchtesgaden Conference in October 1948, Dr. Grace announced that it would be his policy in the future, to bring to Germany fewer American experts and to rely more heavily on experts from surrounding European countries, thereby drawing more directly on the great wealth of resources available on the Continent.(79)

Chapter Two

Table of Contents