 | Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954 |
| | Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954 |
With the takeover of the OMGUS exchange program by the Department of State, the ultimate and long-range objectives "to promote better understanding of the United States" and "to increase mutual understanding between the people of the, United States and the people of other countries,"(1) which governed all other exchange programs, applied automatically to Germany.
First and foremost, however, the German exchange, program continued to pursue the immediate and short-term objectives set by U.S. policy for Germany, that is, to help achieve the goals of the reorientation program. Those responsible for fashioning the Public Affairs Program realized that cultural and educational exchanges offered the most appropriate and also the most promising instrument for a policy of reform by indirection, namely, an effective do-it-yourself approach to reorientation. Moreover, they believed that the six criteria which determined the scope and method of the Public Affairs Program as a whole (see pp. 83-86) were singularly applicable to the exchange of persons program. The time for a middling, haphazard, trial-and-error effort depending largely on the good will of private contributors had passed. The exchange program had to be placed on a firm and regular basis, and had to involve enough persons moving in each direction to assure broad impact. In short, what was needed was a massive breakthrough sustained by governmental instrumentalities and supported by adequate funds from the Congress. In fact, governmental capabilities had to be tested beyond precedents set by OMGUS and the worldwide exchange program.
The groups in the Department which met under the chairmanship of the author in the fall of 1949 decided to aim at an annual total of 3,500 persons coming and going, the highest figure ever proposed for any country exchange program.(2) To realize this expansion, the budget had to be increased accordingly, i.e., to $6,619,049 in 1950 and to $7,489,686 in 1951, i.e., the equivalent of one-third of the worldwide total for exchanges.
The criteria used in shaping the Reorientation Program as a whole applied with special relevance, to the exchange program. It had to be massive, that is, a multiple of the OMGUS model. To avoid scattering of funds, however, it had to be target oriented, to wit, sharply focused on specific individuals and groups who by virtue, of their position or potential of leadership or in view of their critical role in German society could be expected to use the benefits derived from their exchange experience to maximum advantage.
The approach involved a major risk. Emphasis on leadership could have reintroduced traditional criteria of elitism still prevalent in Germany. But, as noted earlier, in order not to cater to such tendencies, the program had to be stratified and made multidimensional; it had to be extended to all segments of German society regardless of political affiliation (with the exception of ultrarightist or extreme leftist elements), economic or social status, religious belief, sex, or age. In other words, it had to demonstrate democracy by its very process of selection.
At the same time the program could not be permitted to institute exchange for exchange sake. It had to be innovative in the sense that it not only introduced new features in the exchange program itself, but provided the returning participant with a series of options for innovative action at home-through follow-up programs.
The participatory nature of exchanges inherent in the very concept of the program was to be reaffirmed by the proviso that the responsibility of German nationals was gradually to be applied beyond more assistance in the selection of candidates to areas of program planning and execution.
Finally, with the accelerating trend toward political unification of Western Germany, operating programs solely within the confines of occupation zones had to give way to interzonal arrangements permitting German nationals from the British and French Zones to compete on an equal basis for participation in the U.S. Government exchange program,(3) and vice versa.
The basic terms of reference for the Exchange of Persons Program under HICOG, aside from the Smith-Mundt Act, were laid down in the, Directive to the U.S. High Commissioner, in the instructions to the Public Affairs Officer, in the HICOG Manual of Organization, Section 5, and in the language of the GOAG (Government in Occupied Area of Germany) budget justifications. They were later supplemented by the provisions of the Fulbright agreement and by a special delegation of authority to the chief of the Exchange, of Persons Branch, as authorized in Section 4 of Public Law 73 (81st Congress).
The Directive to the High Commissioner was explicit. It assigned to the exchange program a central function in pursuit of U.S. policy to end the political and cultural isolation of Germany by restoring binational relations and to encourage, democratic reconstruction. It instructed the High Commissioner to
"stimulate and facilitate direct contact between civic and professional groups in Germany and corresponding groups abroad, notably in the United States, [to] make use of such private resources, in the United States and elsewhere, as your Government may enlist for the purpose of actively supporting the reorientation program [and to] develop a broad and effective program of cultural exchange, aiming especially at the participation of those groups which are likely to promote the future democratic leadership in Germany."(4)
The January 1950 issue of the HICOG Information Bulletin recognized specifically the exchange program as a vital and integral part of the HICOG program. It said:
"The Exchange of Persons program is one of the most important activities of the Office of Public Affairs. The, program is conducted in cooperation with all offices of HICOG in order to make sure that promising individuals and influential persons from all walks of life and occupations in Germany are, given the benefit of seeing democracy at work in the United States."(5)
Accordingly, the instructions given to the Public Affairs Officer placed the exchange program directly within the context of HICOG's overall mission. They defined the program
"as a means of stimulating and promoting the development of a democratic German state and society, fostering in the German people a feeling of community with other democratic countries, increasing American prestige and the respect for American traditions and achievements, and overcoming antidemocratic tendencies and influences."(6)
The HICOG Manual and Technical Instruction 11, issued by the Office of Public Affairs in 1953, sharpened the focus by emphasis on the political and social aspects as the, primary objectives of the program. They declared the program's fundamental purpose to be that of
"giving exchangees an opportunity to experience a democratic environment which contributes to a cooperative way of life, and to stimulate the free interchange of ideas between free nations."
The instructions made it equally clear that it was not the purpose of exchange visits to serve the personal interest of the individual through the acquisition of academic or cultural knowledge or technical skills, nor to help reestablish family or business contacts. If such benefits were derived incidentally, so much the better. They did not justify, however, consideration under the program and, if found to constitute the primary motive of prospective participants, could actually jeopardize their candidacy.(7)
The above terms of reference set the tone of the program. They established its character as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. They also described its structure and format.
HICOG had inherited from OMGUS some of the categories which identified principal groups sharing certain interests and characteristics. They were: Germans going to the United States, specifically German leaders and specialists,(8) and German students and trainees; and American specialists going to Germany.(9) (Exchanges with European countries were discontinued during the first 2 years of HICOG but later resumed in response to a change of emphasis in overall policy.)
These were the key types of participants that were maintained and substantially expanded in number. The expansion was a deliberate effort to ensure a maximum return on the U.S. investment within a relatively short period.(10) But expansion in the number of persons coming to the United States demanded that there had to be appropriate differentiation among the thousands of participants according to their age, status, occupation, professional interests, and personal qualifications. The "project approach" now came into its own. Special projects were developed for different categories of participants. Categories, in turn, were divided in two major groups: competitive, e.g., teachers, students and teenagers, and noncompetitive, i.e., leaders.
In terms of optimum political impact the leader exchange was without doubt the most significant of all programs. It was aimed at those persons in public life and in the professions who by their very position could be expected to have an immediate as well as a long-range influence on the German scene.(11)
In accordance with the comprehensive character of the exchange program as a whole, the definition of leader was kept intentionally broad to permit selection of representatives from all social and professional strata. Leaders were therefore defined as "persons of outstanding leadership, influence and prominence, [including]:
---those holding high official positions in federal or Land (State) governments;
---those leading or representing on a national level, groups or professions of critical importance in democratic reorientation and reform;
---other outstanding persons in unique fields of endeavor in which the number of qualified candidates is limited."(12)
Subsequently, HICOG's Office of Public Affairs refined and broadened the definition by adapting it to the primary target list developed for the Reorientation Program as a whole.(13)
Leader exchanges remained the largest single program with slight variations throughout most of the HICOG period. The climax came in 1950 when it rose (from 557 in 1949) to 1,181. In 1951 it decreased slightly to 981, climbed back to 1,058 in 1952, to drop again to 725 in 1953. Thereafter, it declined sharply to 450 in 1954 and to 364 in 1955. These figures do not include German leaders going to other European countries. Available data indicate that of the latter, 681 went in 1951 and 1,074 in 1975 (Appendix III).
Leaders were grouped according to their professions and interests. The HICOG budgets for 1951-1953 list 14 categories of German leaders and specialists: namely, in order of magnitude, education (885), politics and government (819), labor (679), information media (368), youth (314), cooperative action teams (288), agriculture (260), women's affairs (259), community activities (233), law (185), public health (123), libraries and museums (67), religion (52), and social workers (24).(14) These were pivotal groups expected to shape the future of Germany. Their representatives sat at the political controls, were the managers of national institutions, and were the heads of various professional and civic organizations. Many of them were engaged in activities aiming at fundamental reform and were therefore believed to be on the lookout for new ideas and models applicable to domestic problems. They operated on different levels of authority and in a variety of political and social settings. They comprised, for instance, members of the Cabinet, top-level administrators, legislators and judges, trade union leaders, social agency executives, school administrators, teachers on all levels of education, women leaders, and youth leaders. As a rule, leaders came in groups formed on the basis of common interests.
The "project approach" recommended itself as a particularly effective method in programming leader visits. By trimming the itinerary down to the bare essentials it allowed leaders to concentrate on problems of direct interest to them, often of critical importance to political and social reform in Germany, and to study institutions and resources developed in the United States to determine their applicability to identical or similar domestic problems. Leaders were extremely busy people. Their stay in the United States was relatively short, as a rule, no more than 45 to 90 days. By definition they were persons in high level, sensitive positions with pressing obligations and tight schedules. Prolonged absence from Germany could easily create major problems for them and their colleagues and constituents at home. To make the visits profitable, they had to be planned with particular care and related as closely as possible to the specific situation or preoccupations of the visitors.
The exchange program for 1950 listed a total of 156 project titles with nearly two-thirds (96) in education, including religious education, followed by food and agriculture, government and civic affairs, labor, law, and information media. In 1951 the total number of titles declined to 95 with the largest bulk, more than one-half, still in education.
By and large, HICOG found the list of project proposals developed by OMGUS useful and adopted much of it---but with a difference. Whereas OMGUS had relied heavily on foreign consultants, American as well as European, to guide and implement the projects, HICOG, in line with the new policy directive, shifted the emphasis to German participants as the responsible agents of project execution. The various leader projects were sponsored by most of the major offices and divisions of HICOG and their subunits, that is, by the Office of Political Affairs, the Office of Economic Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of Labor Affairs and, the largest number, by the Office of Public Affairs which organized no less than 10 out of a total of 14 leader categories, involving 2,613 out of a total of 4,556 persons for the, years 1951-1953.
The change of emphasis as between OMGUS and HICOG on German participation was particularly evident in the area of education where the ratio of foreign (American and European) experts---not counting OMGUS officials---to German leader and specialist exchangees had been on the order of two to one in favor of the former. Under OMGUS American officials had instructed German authorities how to reform the school system, how to write new textbooks, what textbook and teaching material to use or not to use, how to teach or not teach certain subjects. Americans had run education service centers, conferences, and workshops where German teachers were introduced to new methods and techniques developed in Western countries, e.g., for teacher training, counseling and guidance, classroom education, and the like. Only a limited number of German teachers had gone to the United States in 1949. Their visits had been arranged in instances where American institutions had achieved professional breakthroughs and where on-the-spot observation promised the best results.(15)
With the arrival of James M. Read,(16) the new chief of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, the situation changed radically. In the introductory statement to his first budget proposal, for fiscal year 1950, Read stated, ". . . It is hoped to impress individuals at all levels of community and professional endeavor with the need of democratic reform and the recognition of modern concepts and techniques in the fields of education, social welfare, youth work, community organization, religious affairs, women's affairs, public health, and the operation of information and education centers and libraries. To accomplish this, a continuing program has been devised to expose national leaders and qualified persons from various areas of civic life to democratic experiences and training in the United States and European countries under the HICOG Exchange Program."(17)
There were other significant changes. The program was larger not only in number of persons but of projects as well. It was more clearly structured. The projects were adapted to the HICOG programs concerned with education, community activities, information centers, religious affairs, women's affairs, and public health and welfare are. Not all projects called for the use of exchanges, but a. very large number did.
A series of new projects was added to those previously proposed by OMGUS. The organization and administration of school libraries which involved radical changes of traditional concepts was an example. On the premise that child development was not the monopoly of formal education, greater emphasis was placed on child guidance, preschool education, and out-of -school treatment of children. The traditional German system of education made little or no allowance for any one of these programs. Not all projects of HICOG were original. What distinguished them from those of OMGUS was less the choice of subject matter or problem area than the broader gauge, and degree of sophistication employed in their selection and application.
This group included, first, members of the executive and legislative branches at the federal and state level, as well as a goodly number of municipal and county officials, all selected on a nonpartisan basis. Projects corresponded to the statutory functions or major area of competence of the candidates.
The first group of legislators, for instance, was intensely interested in studying the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Lack of a similar institution in Germany had made the German Parliament unduly dependent on the resources and the cooperation of the executive branch even in matters which were its primary responsibility under the Constitution, namely national legislation. The creation of a library and research facility under the jurisdiction of the Bundestag (House of Representatives), the legislators hoped, would materially strengthen the position of the legislative vis-a-vis the executive branch of government. It would thereby correct an historical imbalance of power which, in the past, had led to excesses of the executive.
Another group was the Security Committee of the Bundestag, which was engaged in drafting a law for the new German defense forces. The group wished to study the American system, specifically the way in which the United States had dealt with the problem of civilian control over the military. This project was without doubt one of the most significant projects undertaken under the auspices of the exchange program. Among other things, it brought outstanding figures in German political life in touch with their American counterparts, policy makers, and administrators. Further, it produced a most progressive piece of legislation in Germany. (For details on the results of the above two visits by members of the German Bundestag, see Chapter VIII.)
Aside from such special projects, Bundestag members were given ample opportunities to observe Congress and state legislatures in action, the purpose of these arranged visits being to aid German legislators in their efforts to increase the prestige and authority of the German legislature on the Federal and Land (State) level and to improve the efficiency of legislative processes. Over the years a very substantial portion of Bundestag and Landtag (State legislatures) members availed themselves of this opportunity.
In the case of public administrators representing various levels of the executive branch, a principal objective of the Department of State and HICOG was to assist with ongoing efforts to overhaul and modernize the German civil service, which in the past had long resisted attempts at democratic reform. While its members were not necessarily Nazis, many exhibited the traditional traits and trappings of German bureaucratic authoritarianism. This group of visitors was introduced to American methods of training and education for public service in a number of ways, through visits with their American counterparts, lengthy discussions with officials of the Bureau of the Budget, frequently including a period of training.
By and large, the HICOG projects demonstrated a deliberate attempt to provide information in specific problem areas. For instance, projects for the government and political leaders included the study of "Legislative Organization and Procedures" (devised in 1950 for a group of 31 members of the German parliament), "State and Federal Governments," "Liberalization of the Civil Service System," "Political Parties and Electoral Systems," "Training for Public Administration," "Local Governments," "City Planning," "Civil Liberties," and "Citizen Participation in Government."
Special attention was given to police officials, a sector of the German administration which had had in many states a history of strongly authoritarian practices. A project entitled "Police Policy and Administration" had the purpose of showing German police officials "the advantages of a system which limits the authority and jurisdiction of the police and which protects the individual citizen from arbitrary police action." The observation and training programs organized in the United States were thus assigned to give police officials a perspective on American police administration and to acquaint them with current U.S. techniques of organization, operation, and training. In 1950, for example, a group of 12 police officials attended a 4-month course on police methods and administrative procedures at Michigan State University with one month devoted to class instruction and 3 months to field inspection where the Germans worked with the local police on a day-to-day basis.
The selection of a relatively large number of labor leaders was not accidental. It represented a well-organized effort to help restore relationships between the American trade union movement and its counterpart in Germany, interrupted by 12 years of Nazism. The title "labor leaders," incidentally, was somewhat misleading since the group included managers as well. Another purpose of the program was therefore to acquaint both industrial and labor leaders with American principles, techniques, and procedures governing the "Organization and Administration of Trade Unions," "Standards and Methods of Collective Negotiation," "Labor Management Relations," "Public Service in the Labor Field," "Labor Education and Occupational Training," and "Fact Finding and Research Methods in the Labor Field," to name the most important projects sponsored by HICOG in 1950 and 1951. Two-thirds of the 156 leaders sent to the United States in 1951 were members of the German Trade Union League (DGB). The rest were representatives of the German Employees Union, labor educators, industrial managers, and officials of the labor ministries of the states and cities. A substantial number were young trade unionists. Some of them were grouped in teams of ten, composed of local officers, work counselors, women, and youth belonging to the same industry. Their visits were scheduled to last 90 days. Special programs were planned for 50 young labor leaders not over 25 years of age, who were sent in groups of 25 each to the United States for 9 or 10 months of study at universities, such as Wisconsin and Cornell, which had schools or departments of labor-management relations. They took regular courses, visited industrial plants, and attended union meetings. Similar groups were sent in the following years. The director of HICOG's Office of Labor Affairs considered the exchange program "as the most important part of the labor reorientation effort."(19) (See trainee program, below.)
This program represented a deliberate and careful attempt to strengthen the newly-created democratic press and radio as well as to open to the German people through the German media a steady flow of accurate information about the United States. The media had to be rebuilt practically from the ground up. They needed contact, professional advice, and technical assistance. Visits to the United States were to provide just that. Totaling 368 from 1951-1953, journalists and broadcasters constituted one of the larger groups of U.S. Government-sponsored German visitors. Practically every editor-in-chief and radio station director participated in the program. They were among the first to visit this country. They came for a variety of reasons. In the early days under OMGUS they had come to plead the case of a democratic press starved for newsprint in an effort to get General Clay's restrictions lifted and they were successful. Later groups were interested in learning more about American methods and techniques in running newspapers and radio stations. The American Press Institute at Columbia University in 1954 arranged a program for 25 journalists which provided for seminars with leading members of the American press and short internships with various leading newspapers. The Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University organized a program for 40 radio broadcasters, announcers, program directors, and the like, which included seminars and observations at network headquarters and local stations. Another project was planned for five German opinion pollsters by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.(20)
But, most important, nearly all were given a full opportunity to converse with officials of the Truman Administration, Representatives and Senators, and other prominent political figures, such as governors and mayors. The talks were extensive, covering not only German-American relations but other key issues as well. Conversations and interviews were profitable for both sides. They did not always result in an agreement but they produced broad and, on balance, favorable coverage in reports and commentaries for the benefit of the German public. (See also trainee program, below.)
A substantial part of the exchange program was aimed at farmers and rural community leaders (260 from 1951-1953). The reason was not so much a strongly-felt need to familiarize Germans with American farming techniques, many of which would not have been applicable to conditions in Germany; it was rather an attempt to extend the benefits of international contact to the rural population, a stronghold of conservatism and often of political isolation and reaction, and to explain to the rural population its role in participating in a democratic society. Projects were therefore oriented toward political, economic, managerial, and some international aspects, addressing such problems as the "Functioning of Free Farmers' Organizations in the U.S.," "Administration of Marketing Regulations in the Field of Food and Agriculture," "Farm Organization, Management and Mechanization," "U.S. Programs for Rural Welfare," "Development of Social Sciences in Agricultural Education," and also "International Aspects of Agrarian and Forest Planning." A number of projects were devoted to the study of "Home Economics" with emphasis on research, extension, and teaching. The educational and technical parts of the study program may have been a success, but surveys taken after their return showed that the political impact was less significant than in the case of other groups. Not altogether surprisingly, farmers still appeared to be a core of resistance to democratic reform (see Chapter VIII).
Women in postwar Germany outnumbered men by substantial percentages, according to HICOG counts by 18 percent, reflecting the loss of manpower in World War II. But while women had the vote, many of them had entered the professions and even politics (women were members of the Bundestag), and, while, above all, more German women than ever had become wage earners, the average woman continued to lack the interest, the preparation, and especially the social recognition which could have enabled her to compete successfully with men in civic and professional life. HICOG's objective, as set forth in the program proposals of the Education and Cultural Relations Division (ECRD) for fiscal year 1951, was therefore declared to be:
"to help equip German women to play a more effective role as citizens fully participating in civic life through leadership in community activities, in women's organizations, in professional and religious organizations and in political parties, and as an active individual citizen in rural areas, small towns and cities."(21)
To accomplish this purpose, ECRD proposed to provide opportunities for German women leaders for study and for personal experience in the United States and to invite prominent American women leaders to go to Germany to share their knowledge with their German counterparts. Among the problems singled out for special attention was the legal status of women, which involved a revision of the Civil Law Code, and participation of women in political life, in journalism, in adult education, in voluntary organizations, in voluntary and professional social work, in citizen safety programs, in social action, in the teaching of civics, in United Nations affairs, and the like. Serving such purposes were projects on "Women's Participation in Trade Unions," and "The Preparation of Women as Effective Citizens in Economic Life," the latter a subject of considerable urgency in view of the increasing number of women breadwinners. Another project, titled "Assistance in Improving the Position of German Women in Higher Education," was designed to help German women redress the unfavorable balance in academic life where the proportion of women students was little more than 20 percent and that of faculty members scarcely 4 percent. A third project, "German Women's Organization," addressed the need for women to get organized and to increase the effectiveness of their organization by studying and, wherever appropriate, by adopting some of the methods used by American women's groups. Among the first 50 women who came to the United States under the HICOG program, 28 were members of the Bundestag.
In subsequent years programs became more ramified, extending to areas such as "Labor-Management Relations," and "United Nations Specialized Agencies," and giving special attention to the training of young German women in politics and citizenship. Each of these projects was carefully organized, with well worked out itineraries, including briefing sessions by the sponsoring agency---chiefly the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor---and ample opportunities provided for consultation, discussion and observation on the spot. Participation, as a rule, was limited to women between 20 and 40 years of age who had completed high school education and had had work experience in their specific fields of interest. A modest follow-up program was foreseen upon their return to Germany.
This group was somewhat amorphous. Moreover, many of those in the above categories had engaged in community action, and had become community leaders. By definition, its members represented voluntary groups and institutions concerned with informal education of adults and young people for enlightened citizenship. The purpose of the Group Activities Branch of the Division of Education and Cultural Relations which sponsored these visits was "to encourage the, development of voluntary and public organizations which provide programs of education for responsible citizenship ... [and] to encourage the development of cooperative planning programs and projects to achieve a maximum of citizen participation in public, affairs." It was another and perhaps the most general of HICOGs many efforts to enlist greater citizen participation at the grass roots in the democratic process in an attempt to supplement its approach to top level groups. At least in the beginning this group included a large number of youth leaders. The rest consisted of adult education specialists and community organizers concerned with cooperative, planning and leadership training. Community activities projects, aside from those devoted to youth programs, included, among others, "Aid to Local Adult Education Organizations," "Adult Education Programs in Rural Areas," "Family Advisory Centers," Community Councils and Citizens Councils," "Community Recreation and Sports," etc.
The study and practice of law in Germany has always been considered an "open sesame" to executive positions in government, industry, and management. It was simply a matter of political judgment for HICOG to choose jurists as another leader group deserving special attention.
Practically no attempt was made to persuade the German legal profession of the virtues of Anglo-Saxon and American law in preference to German or continental codes. One of the few exceptions was a project, launched in 1950, which provided for ten German jurists to study U.S. antitrust legislation and practices for 3 months. Selected for participation were senior members of the bar experienced in antitrust and decartelization matters and some outstanding young law graduates who received a thorough briefing by American attorneys and by the Decartelization Division of the Department of Justice. The project had political implications in view of the traditional structure of German industry and business.
Most other projects dealt with the administration of justice rather than with the practice of law. For example, one project was intended to introduce members of the legal profession to American principles of justice and law enforcement; another was to provide German prison and parole officials with an opportunity to study American methods used in prison administration, social welfare programs for prisoners, rehabilitation services, and measures to combat juvenile delinquency.
Special attention was given to the training of young lawyers and legal trainees (Referendare), the group most likely to enter key positions in the public service, business, and industry. As a rule, that is, with the exception of law students, lawyers were not brought here to enroll at U.S. universities for regular study. Instead, they were attached to courts, various legal authorities (district attorneys and the like), and law offices where they were assigned to auxiliary duties. (See also trainee program, below.)
OMGUS had included several projects concerned with health and welfare in its 1950 program proposals. Under HICOG these projects were placed in an independent branch of the Education and Cultural Relations Division. The primary purpose of the new branch was to help bridge the gap created by the 12-year cut off from developments abroad where steady progress had been made in professional fields dealing specifically with the social and psychological needs of women and children. Never a public priority in Germany, these problems had now reached significant proportions as a result of war devastation and postwar deprivation which had produced a sharp increase in infant mortality and communicable diseases. Projects developed under this title were concerned with the modernization of "Maternal and Child Welfare Services." They involved greater emphasis on the preventive and mental hygiene, aspects of maternal and child care through appropriate training of physicians, nurses, midwives, and welfare workers. Other projects promoted modern programs on "Mental Health Practices."(22) Their purpose, was to develop principles and practices in the field of mental hygiene, psychiatric social work, and related fields. Progress in these areas had been seriously retarded by the Nazis but it had now become an urgent necessity to deal with thousands of borderline psychiatric cases---a legacy of World War II.
A third type of project dealt with "Medical and Public Health Practices," a field that far from being deficient had had in fact a proud tradition in pre-Nazi Germany. The principal problem here was to bring German institutions and practices up to date. A total of 123 German leaders in these fields visited the United States between 1951 and 1953. Some of these visitors studied in public health schools, and obtained field training in local, state, or federal institutions.
In pre-Nazi days organized religion had been a significant factor in German political life. Under nazism many churches of various denominations either went into internal exile or into resistance. No wonder then that at the end of the war the churches emerged as one of the least contaminated and discredited elements in German society and reasonably well-equipped to aid in the work of reconstruction. In recognition of their record and potential, the Religious Affairs Branch of HICOG declared as its objective to "utilize the spiritual and moral resources of church organizations and interfaith groups in the establishment of a free society based on social justice, [and] a recognition of the dignity of man;" and to assist and encourage "German elements promoting freedom of religion, interfaith understanding and cooperation in international religious relations. "(23)
Church leaders, as noted earlier, were among the first to visit the United States---just as American churches were among the first to sponsor these visits. OMGUS had started the program. Under HICOG the exchange of church leaders became one of the most important, if not indeed the most important, activity in the, field of religious affairs. Its primary purpose was "to integrate, German religious activities into those of the world community" and also "to afford the. present and the future German leadership an opportunity to learn of new trends in world church affairs and new methods and techniques which have developed elsewhere . . . "(24)
Projects organized for religious leaders were therefore not focused on religious subjects per se, but on civic responsibility and on interfaith relations. Examples of the former were: "Development of Leadership and Improvement of Program Content in Religious Adult Education," "Development of Religious School Action in Relation to Individual Responsibility and Community Needs," "Development of Mass Media of Religious Interpretation," "Development of Leadership and Improvement of Program Content in Religious Youth Work," "Vitalization of Jewish Community Leadership," and the like. Examples of the latter were such projects as "Education for Democratic Interfaith and Intergroup Relations through Councils of Christians and Jews." The, establishment of councils was aimed in the main at combatting anti-semitism, eliminating interreligious tensions, and training citizens "in the use of modern techniques of intercultural integration."
Youth leaders were at first part of the larger category of Community Leaders; thereafter in view of their special significance as the logical reservoir for future leadership, they received special attention. In 1952, a program was organized for young people 14-25 years of age. This group constituted about 15 percent of the population in the U.S. Zone.(25) It presented serious problems for the Germans as well as for the occupation powers. Most of the young people had completed their formal education, whatever it might have consisted of apprenticeships, baccalaureate (Abitur), or graduation from universities. Many of those who had been uprooted by the war had returned from military service or prisoner of war camps or were refugees from East Germany. More than 10 percent were without gainful employment. Many were still imbued with the vestiges of National-Socialist indoctrination; others were apathetic, demoralized, or totally adrift.
HICOG sponsored a large-scale diversified program for youth in Germany and, in recognition of the tradition of German youth to "do their own thing" in autonomous organizations, permitted the restoration of certain pre-Nazi youth groups. Directives were issued which listed as objectives:
"to help youth realize the interrelationship between individual freedom and social responsibility . . .
"to generate among German youth active resistance to totalitarianism of both the Right and the Left . . .
"to stimulate interest and confidence in democratic governmental and political institutions and practices . . .
"to interpret and increase the understanding of the American way of life . . .
"to develop and strengthen the cultural, political, economic and social ties between Germany and Western democratic countries . . . "(26)
To help accomplish these objectives, especially the last two, HICOG developed exchange programs which were aimed primarily at the, current leadership of organized youth but, beyond this, at young persons likely to emerge as future leaders in politics, civic life, and the professions. The latter programs involved the inauguration of a substantial exchange program for teenagers.
In keeping with American practices of youth work, but somewhat contrary to German tradition, the youth leadership exchange had a strong professional social work accent(27) and was, in fact, organized and supervised to a large extent by social agencies and social workers. It encompassed such projects as "Civic Education," "Social Group Work Training," "Leisure Time Recreation Programs," and "Youth Publications." The purpose of the project on "Civic Education" was "to observe and analyze the role. played by American youth and youth leaders in civic and community services," and "to understand the importance of self-government within youth organizations." The Social Group Work Training project was intended to help Germans engaged in group leadership. to "analyze, and learn methods, techniques, science and philosophy underlying group work," as it was taught at graduate schools of social work in the United States, and to "observe its practical application toward the development of a cooperative social structure."
In truth these youth-oriented exchanges were more in the nature of a social training than a leadership program. Participants in the civic education projects were young persons between the ages of 21 and 35 years who had completed their education and had been either professionally or voluntarily engaged in "group leadership" programs. Contrary to the usual requirements for leader exchangees, those undergoing social group work training had to commit themselves to a two-semester study (270 days) program at a university in the United States offering graduate courses in group, work. Those selected for civic education projects would enroll for the, same period at universities offering courses in government, political science, or social philosophy.
Both groups had to do a certain amount of field work. Social group work trainees observed group work programs as practiced in public and private social agencies. Those studying civic education visited citizens councils, political parties, labor unions, consumer cooperatives, youth leagues, and the like, to learn how civic and political institutions in this country were launched, programs activated, and information disseminated. In particular, they observed the organization and operation of political parties, their relationship to the government, the effect of political pressure, neighborhood initiative on city hall, and the like.
Upon their return to Germany, youth leaders who had been trained for social group work jobs, in particular, were expected to train other group workers, work with youth leadership centers, and contribute to the program of professional (socio-pedagogic) institutions. Those trained in civic education, it was hoped, would serve as leaders of public forums and civic committees, train volunteer leaders in civic and political education, undertake public speaking engagements, and assist in organizing youth events, including international camps and European youth rallies.(28) With a total of 314 participants between 1951 and 1953, programs for youth leaders were one of the more significant segments of the exchange program.(29)
In 1951-1952, HICOG added a new leader category to the existing ones: the so-called "Cooperative Action Teams." The inauguration of this project has been described occasionally as signifying a departure from the reorientation purposes toward more general objectives.(30) The point is debatable. The Cooperative Action Teams had, at least implicitly, a reorientation purpose, namely, to demonstrate and stimulate nonpartisan citizen initiative in community affairs. German municipal administration has often been characterized by a high degree of bureaucratization and politicization. Party politics had dominated appointments and decisions. The influence of voluntary elements in the community had been relatively weak, if not totally missing. So had been cooperation based on citizens' participation. The objectives for the Cooperative Action Team project, as stated in an evaluation study of 1953, were:
"to afford carefully selected German leaders representing various areas of community interest the opportunity to observe and study the operations of citizens' groups in American cities comparable in size to those cities from which the various teams originate in Germany."(31)
The ultimate purpose of the visits was to promote cooperation between civic authorities and citizens and to strengthen the hand of voluntary groups in exercising, through cooperative action, a modicum of influence in community affairs. It was hoped, as this study put it, that,
"through the experience gained . . . these teams upon their return to Germany may stimulate their respective communities to take cooperative corrective steps through democratic community action to solve civic problems, such as housing, public welfare, public health, education, city government, and other facets of community life."(32)
In short, these teams represented still another approach to developing democracy at the grass roots.
To achieve broadest community participation, teams consisted, in addition to members of city administrations and city councils, of representatives of labor (trade unions), management, business, press and other information media, churches, education, social welfare, women's groups and other citizens' associations, youth, farmer groups, and political parties. Not each of these elements was included in every team. On the other hand, individual team members generally represented more than one civic group. As a rule, fewer than ten persons composed a team.
Altogether, 50 Cooperative Action Teams were sent to the United States between 1951 and 1955. Between September 1952 and April 1953 alone, 135 community leaders from 16 German cities visited the United States in teams. They were men and women with a wide range of interests, representing all age groups (with the bulk between 30 and 50 years of age) and the three major political parties, and coming mostly from the middle to upper socioeconomic strata. The first six teams arrived in the spring of 1951. They were chosen from six cities in the three western zones. They included men and women constituting a cross section of each community.
Their program in the United States was planned and organized by the Governmental Affairs Institute(33) under direction of the Department of State. Three localities were selected by the Institute to serve as study centers---a large city in the East, e.g., Philadelphia; a rural area in the Midwest, e.g., the Grand Traverse area of Michigan; a university town on the Pacific Coast, e.g., Berkeley, California. Each team spent 3 weeks at each center to observe various facets of citizen participation in community activities and, as the Institute stipulated(34) to gain a broader understanding of citizen responsibility in community affairs. Eventually the projects were trimmed down from 90 to 60 days with visits limited to two instead of three centers. The curtailment permitted the inclusion of a higher caliber of community leaders who because of pressure, of business at home would otherwise have been prevented from participation.(35) Initially most: groups spent several days in Washington, D.C., for general orientation purposes, and for a final session at the end of their trip. At the centers, members of the team, depending on their interests and functions, would visit city halls, schools, newspaper headquarters, industrial plants, civic, labor and youth organizations, churches, and similar institutions, where they interviewed the principal officials. Each, team member received a per diem of $10. Transportation between cities was arranged and financed by the Governmental Affairs Institute which received the necessary funds from the Department of State. In addition, sponsoring agencies in each of the three centers were given a sum of $300 to help cover local expenses.(36)
On balance, the Cooperative Action Teams proved to be an innovative feature that was well received by German and American participants alike. Its effectiveness was incontestable as far as its public relations aspects were concerned. To what extent it helped to accomplish the avowed purpose of civic reform in German communities, is less certain (see below, Chapter V111).(37)
HICOG's reports and budget proposals listed a number of additional types of persons who fell into the category of specialists rather than leaders. These included social service workers, librarians, and museologists. Social service specialists were small in number (24), but performed a mission which in postwar Germany filled a sensitive void. Social work had been practiced in Germany largely on a voluntary basis. Existing institutes for "social pedagogics," corresponding roughly to our own schools of social work, did not have academic status. Modern social work techniques, notably case and group work, which had been developed in the United States to a high level of professionalism, were widely unknown. With such problems as juvenile delinquency, the breakdown of social institutions, including the family, mass uprooting of persons of all classes, and economic distress dominating the German scene in the late forties and fifties, social service workers faced a seemingly unanswerable challenge. American social work with its professional approach and tested techniques provided valuable assistance. It helped increase the efficiency of the German welfare apparatus. (See also trainee program, below.)
Librarians were anxious to reform the antiquated German libraries and found at least part of the answer in the "open shelf " system. Models could be observed in the libraries of the America Houses in Germany, and the American Memorial Library in Berlin, where the system was introduced primarily on the. initiative of the late Edgar Breitenbach, a consultant to HICOG on loan from the Library of Congress.
Two summary statements may be made about the visits of German leaders to the United States under the exchange, program: (1) they helped restore and strengthen German capability of self-rehabilitation, and (2) they assured the infusion of new ideas and methods into critical sectors of German society (for further details, see Chapter VIII).
The Student Exchange Program accented youth as one of HICOG's primary target groups.(38) OMGUS had recognized the importance of student exchanges but, as was pointed out previously, had failed to provide the organizational and, above all, the financial resources needed to give its intentions substance and reality. The OMGUS proposal for fiscal year 1950 had foreseen supplementary assistance in the amount of $206,680 at an average rate of $218 per student for 943 students receiving scholarships from private institutions. The Institute of International Education, as noted earlier, under its contract with the Department of the Army was unable to obtain more than 125 full or partial scholarships. Supplementary assistance in the amount of $600 per German student was necessary to enable them to take advantage of the program.
The Department of State, accepting the recommendation of the Survey Mission of 1949, proposed a total of $550,000 to cover the expenses of 250 German students and of $1,100,000 for so-called junior experts and trainees.(39) The amount requested permitted an average grant of $2,200 for each student, covering tuition, maintenance, books and incidentals, travel in the United States, shipboard maintenance, and head tax. This "minimum" number of grants had to be supplemented by scholarships offered by American institutions and organizations. Those were the 1949 proposals. An earlier initiative by the Army to send so-called junior experts for special study programs to the United States at a cost of $4,000 per participant had been rejected as extravagant and likely to provoke harmful repercussions in Congress and from the American public.
In actual fact, the number of students and trainees going to the United States differed slightly from earlier estimates (see Appendix III). The total for students was about 239 in 1949. It nearly doubled in 1950, dropped by 10 percent in 1951, and by another 50 percent in 1952, then remained through 1955 at an annual level of about 180. Trainees, on the whole, stayed below the number of students, except from 1951 to 1953 when they exceeded the latter by substantial amounts. Altogether, approximately 1,891 students and 1,823 trainees came to the United States between 1949 and 1955 under HICOG, with the largest groups, e.g., 1,055 and 1,253, respectively, in the three HICOG years 1950 through 1952. The peak year for German students was 1950 and for trainees 1951. After 1952, students came under the Fulbright program (discussed in Chapter VII, below).
The distinction made between the two groups was not always evident. Both students and trainees studied at various accredited institutions in fields of declared preference. Essentially, the difference was one of age and state of advancement. By HICOG's definition, students were "young people already studying or about to enter universities who were given a year's scholarship to an American college or university." Trainees, on the other hand, were "young men and women who had completed their formal education and were just beginning their chosen careers."(40) They were given an opportunity "to become acquainted with special cooperative and/or group concepts and techniques, as practiced in a democratic setting through practical experience in the United States."(41)
Both student and trainee programs were carefully designed to fit the students' needs and interests and, at the same time, to provide exposure to the American scene outside the academic field. Apart from that, student exchange programs were intended to make up for deficiencies in the academic training of all students and in the case of graduates and postgraduates to help prepare them for certain critical professions.
Among the student projects, the study of student government and of nonacademic student activities by selected teams figured most prominently. The idea sprang from a series of assumptions, namely, that there was a notorious lack of organized student participation in German university affairs; that this fact, in turn, tended to indulge the authoritarian habits of the university administration and faculty; that there was little emphasis in the academic training on social issues and studies; that the very concept of "campus life" allowing for a variety of extracurricular activities was missing; and that, as a result of all these deficiencies, there had always been a total lack of democratic tradition, to say nothing of the indoctrination of faculties and students under nazism.
Conditions in German universities, it was believed even after denazification, reaffirmed and perpetuated a system which produced topnotch professionals, highly qualified to perform with distinction in their field of specialization, but rarely inclined and ill-equipped to shoulder the broader responsibilities of citizenship. The projects, developed as early as 1950, were intended to stimulate student initiative in university reform, using American models as far as practicable. As spelled out 'by HICOG their purposes were :
---to help German youth to understand the effectiveness of student government activities;
---to orient German university student leaders in aspects of community concepts of university life;
---to permit German youth leaders to discover the place of extracurricular activities as a part of the broad educational program;
---to enable German university youth leaders to study designs, functions, and youth uses of student union buildings with particular emphasis upon student participation in management and administration, (and)
---to gain ideas concerning the development and administration of scholarship and student welfare programs.(42)
Contracts concluded between universities and the Department of State stipulated as their purpose "to introduce German student leaders to student activities as they exist on an American campus, to provide an opportunity for German students to participate in these activities and learn, first hand, the functioning of a democratically organized student life."(43)
As the projects developed under HICOG, their focus became broader and more sophisticated. The University of Minnesota, which hosted one of the most mature and most critical student teams, adopted the earlier formula. which was to introduce German students to the philosophy behind student activity programs and to foster a closer working relationship between faculty adviser and student. But, beyond this, the objective was defined as one of providing the visitors with clearer concepts of the purposes and role of higher education in the United States, the mechanisms by which these goals are approximated, and the relationship between both classroom and out-of -class experience in attaining these goals."(44)
A number of universities and colleges participated in the program, including Antioch, Carnegie Tech, Florida, Harvard, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Syracuse. Organization, content, and approach varied. In most cases faculty members, e.g., the Dean of Students, with the assistance of the student body and advisory committees, developed, administered, and operated the project, a fact which some of the German visitors found difficult to accept (see Chapter VIII). In other instances, e.g., at Harvard, the Student Council assumed full responsibility for the administration of the program. Some universities appointed "coordinators" to supervise the project.
As a rule, the German visitors were considered as "special students." They were expected or at least encouraged to enroll in regular courses, generally in fields of their personal interest. Their academic load, however, was kept lower than that of their American classmates, so that few were able to complete full course requirements. Consequently, with some exceptions, their class performance was not graded.(45) One such exception was Harvard where students were not only graded, but attendance was prescribed for selected courses in government and the social sciences (e.g., American constitutional development, American foreign policy, international law, growth of the American economy, etc.). Even here the academic program was second in importance to the study of campus institutions, such as the student government, student union, assembly, and extracurricular campus activities, and participation was urged, wherever practical, in such activities. The balance of the students' time was devoted to field trips to visit community institutions, civic organizations, industrial plants, neighboring campuses, and the like. Finally, provision was made for regular consultations and discussions with faculty members and students to sort out and to evaluate impressions gained.(46)
Whether the student government project accomplished its objective is hard to tell. To be sure, it was more successful in some universities than in others---Minnesota being an example of lesser impact. Given the different and often conflicting philosophy and conditions prevailing in American and German universities, it was unrealistic to hope for complete success, if "success" was understood to mean a wholesale transfer of American models to the German situation. On balance,, the results were better than could be expected, considering the open criticism and resistance exhibited by some of the German participants. A number of German universities introduced a series of innovations in their structure, although caution must be exercised in tracing these changes to the influence of former exchangees.
An undeniable benefit of the project was a better understanding, even where the visitors were critical, of American campus life. A number of students, moreover, carried away very positive impressions along with the resolve to apply their experience, with appropriate adaptations, to the situation at home.
Other projects that were focused on specific technical subjects were highly successful. This applied especially to studies in such fields as law, industrial relations, journalism, agriculture, agricultural economics, and home economics. Requirements were similar to those mentioned above but course selection was, as a rule, highly specialized with emphasis on technical rather than on broader liberal arts subjects. Nevertheless, here, too, the, exposure to American campus life was strong enough to make an impact upon the visitors far beyond the acquisition of technical knowledge. It led to positive impressions of the American educational system, the American political scene, and the value of international contacts.
The bulk of students, i.e., those placed individually by the Institute of International Education, did not participate in group projects but pursued special academic studies on an individual basis. Yet, even in these cases policy prescribed that, regardless of the subject of specialization, the program had to include courses in the humanities and the social sciences, with special emphasis on political science, history, and sociology. Moreover, students were expected to participate in extracurricular activities, e.g., student government and other student functions, and to mix with American students. Arrangements to visit with American families were also made.(47) Among the students who participated, a number reached later positions of great prominence. Harvard student Klaus Schuetz was until recently the Governing Mayor of Berlin. Another who attended Harvard, Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher, became State Secretary in the Federal Government and an active promoter of educational reform.
More important and, perhaps, more successful were the projects developed for so-called trainees. They served basically two major purposes. The first, started by OMGUS and revived by Dr. Charles R. Cherington, professor of government at Harvard University, with the encouragement of the author in 1949,(48) was to. supplement the highly specialized training received in German universities by postgraduate students about to enter government careers or other pursuits involving broad social and civic responsibilities. Participants were to be enrolled in courses in the social sciences and, on a selective basis, in courses related to their chosen professional careers. In addition, special seminars and field trips would be arranged. The second and overriding objective of these projects was to train a cadre of future leaders in professional fields which were of critical importance to the solution of some, of Germany's postwar problems but for which German universities did not provide training opportunities on a sufficiently broad academic level, e.g., political and social sciences.
Quite consistently, HICOG Technical Instruction 2 of September 18, 1950 defined trainees as "persons who have completed all formal education necessary for entrance upon their field of activities but have not yet achieved positions of influence, who will go to the United States for periods from 3 months to a year for supervised study and training at one institution but with the opportunity for observation of activities in their field outside that institution."(49) Later the definition was broadened to include persons who "may have already practiced their vocation for a few years." Trainees, in fact, were described as "selected mature persons."(50) While this revision was meant to separate trainees from the bulk of students, though not necessarily graduate students, it blurred somewhat the lines of demarcation that separated them from young leaders and specialists, notably youth leaders.
The trainee program focused on a number of groups whose contributory role to democratic reform was of singular importance. The first group included the so-called "Referendare," that is, German law students who had passed their first state examination and were about to enter-or already had entered---3 years of practical internship.(51) Since as noted before, in Germany legal training has always been and still is considered as the normal preparation for the higher brackets in government, industry, and commerce, Referendare were potentially Germany's future administrators, executives, and managers. As such they constituted a priority group of great significance and required a tailor-made type of training. The Department of State, therefore, insisted and the office of the General Counsel of HICOG wholeheartedly agreed that this was not a student project, but a training project with high reorientation potential. Referendare were therefore not to be enrolled as regular students at legal institutions to work toward academic credits. Instead special programs were to be arranged for them in general jurisprudence, philosophy of law, public and comparative law, legal education, legal organizations and institutions and legal practices, as well as political theory, comparative government, and international relations. Special faculty advisers 'were to guide them in research in fields of special interest to them and related to reorientation objectives. HICOG subsequently recommended that this program be broadened to include younger judges, prosecutors, and other legal functionaries.(52)
The second group involved young professionals who had undergone training in Germany but who were anxious to catch up with developments outside that had occurred during 12 years of self-imposed isolation. Among them, journalists ranked most prominently. During the Empire and the Weimar Republic, German journalism had attained a level of excellence on a par with the best of the world press. It had been totally corrupted by nazism and needed to be rebuilt from the bottom up. OMGUS and HICOG had spent a great deal of effort and funds on resurrecting a democratic press and other media. Nevertheless, certain flaws persisted, such as the tendency to mix editorializing and straight news reporting. Furthermore, shut off from outside contacts during Nazi days, German journalists had not been able to profit from recent technical advances in printing processes, paper manufacture, and the like. An implicit purpose of this project was to provide German media specialists with a true and, it was hoped, favorable image of the United States so crudely distorted by Nazi propaganda.
A number of universities., e.g., Columbia, Kentucky, Missouri, Northwestern, and Oregon, organized special programs for groups of eight to ten journalists.(53) Again, these study programs were not limited to technical subjects, e.g., copy editing, composition, and modern printing techniques, but included a wide variety of academic disciplines, such as political science, economics, history, psychology, literature, art, speech, and languages. Requirements differed slightly at various universities but, as a rule, involved course enrollment, special seminars, and practice in professional writing. By its very design, the program enabled participants to form first-hand impressions of American journalism in action, of American institutions, and of American life in general.
Another group which added an innovative feature to the exchange program was the training project for social workers. As noted earlier the need for skilled professional performance in a country harassed by the breakdown of social relations and institutions was self-evident. The resources in Germany were scarce, social work and social services were largely the monopoly of public agencies and private charity. None of the training schools in existence were fully accredited by academic institutions. Accordingly, the training lacked certain basic features endemic to the social work profession in a democratic environment. Casework methods, staff supervision, interagency cooperation, and the like were largely unknown, certainly unpracticed.(54)
The basic purpose of the training project was to enable German social workers showing potential for leadership to observe American institutions, philosophy, methods, and techniques with a view to adapting them as far as practicable to German conditions. The study program was carefully worked out by an Advisory Committee of the National Social Welfare Assembly under the leadership of the late Bernice Bridges. It foresaw regular study at nine accredited schools of social work, including the New York School of Social Work (Columbia University), St. Louis University, and Western Reserve University, and field visits to social agencies. The training ended with an intensive evaluation session of participants with sponsors to discuss prospects of applicability of the exchange experience to the situation in Germany.
Other trainee projects included study programs in industrial relations organized for young trade union leaders and potential managerial leaders. While Germany had a strong labor movement dating back to imperial days and flourishing in the Weimar Republic, it, too, had been destroyed by the Nazi regime. It was felt that American practices, specifically in the field of industrial, i.e., labor-management, relations might offer an adaptable model to German labor and industry in reviving a system of relationships appropriate to their own needs. The study program was worked out by the Department of State with universities such as Chicago, Cornell, Illinois, and Wisconsin, which had special courses in industrial relations. Selected for study were courses in industrial management, methods of collective bargaining, handling of grievances, trade union organization, and the like. Again, special care was taken not to limit the program to classroom study of technical subjects but to include, though with somewhat minor emphasis, courses in American culture, history, political institutions, economics, education and minority problems, and to arrange field trips to industrial plants and the now customary visits with American families.(55)
Programs for youth below college level started in 1949, when a group of 100 rural teenagers were invited to the United States upon the initiative and with the assistance of the Brethren Service Committee. Within the next few years the total increased substantially.(56) By 1956 a total of 2,283 German youths had participated in the program, their visits financed from public and private funds. The number of teenagers coming under governmental auspices was 2,246 (including 155 tentative openings for fiscal year 1956). Cost estimates foreseen or listed in HICOG budgets for fiscal years 1951 to 1953 ran to $1,113,880 (actual expenditures for 1951 were $383,400). The governmental program peaked in 1950 with a total of 495, then declined gradually through 1953, dropping in 1954 to less than half the 1950 figure (see Appendix III).
Participants in the teenage program were boys and girls of not less than 16 and not more than 18 years of age, generally secondary school students, from both urban and rural areas. Each was expected to spend a year in the United States living with American "foster" families, attending high schools and participating in the programs of local youth groups and community activities.(57) The original purpose of the teenage program had strongly humanitarian as well as practical purposes. The stay in the United States, it was hoped, would "heal the wounds of the war;"(58) but other purposes had specific reorientation aims, namely, "to instill a knowledge of and respect for the democratic way of life in the youth of those countries [Germany and Austria] who had been indoctrinated under the National Socialist regime and were isolated from [indeed had never been exposed to] democratic practices and thought." Subsequently, with the relaxation of Allied control and Germany's gradual return to independence and sovereignty, the program objectives shifted from reorientation to "increasing mutual understanding,"(59), with the expectation that life in a typical American environment might help the youngsters correct prejudices and form new views of the United States, thus laying the groundwork for a mutually beneficial relationship between America and Germany.
The teenage program has been widely acclaimed as one of the most successful ventures in the history of exchanges. Whether it was or not (for details on its effectiveness see Chapter VIII), it was by all accounts highly popular. American sponsors, host families, and HICOG officials were enthusiastic, urging continuation from year to year despite the cost. A large part of the latter had to be borne by the "foster" parents and the private sponsors, such as the American Field Service, the Brethren Service Committee, the National Grange, the National 4-H Club Foundation, the, National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Kiwanis Club of Georgia, Rotary International, the Ann Arbor Council of Churches, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and other service oriented organizations. The Department of State accepted what appeared to be a general desire to proceed with the program but eventually proposed a gradual transition from partly governmental to fully private sponsorship, with the Department providing some assistance in the form of temporary grants-in-aid and logistic facilitation.(60)
Admittedly, the teenage program had a number of flaws which were partly technical defects and occurred mostly at the beginning. There were genuine complaints at first about faulty selection and careless placements.(61) Most of these difficulties were eliminated with growing experience on the part of the sponsoring organizations and the "foster" parents. Others, more fundamental, appear to have lingered on. Teenagers were enthusiastic admirers of the United States and equally enthusiastic reporters. They formed friendships and strong affinities to their host country. But their very enthusiasm created problems. For many, readjustment to life in still war-devastated Germany was difficult. The cultural shock of returning home proved too much for some. Of the 217 German participants in the exchange program who emigrated after their return to Germany, one-third were teenagers and two-thirds of the latter came to the United States.(62) Some of those who tried to tell the American story at home found it hard to get it across. Often adopted mannerisms, invidious comparisons, or sheer exuberance exhibited by them in their travel accounts caused misunderstandings and led to accusations that they had become "Americanized." In other instances, the tendency of German adults to put down the young denied them a bona fide audience altogether.(63)
On balance, however, the positive aspects of the program appear to have by far outweighed the negative. The teenagers proved to be good ambassadors of their country. On their return they were, in the judgment of HICOG officers, "constructive forces in their local communities in breaking down and preventing misunderstandings and misconceptions about the United States and its citizens as well as in promoting democratic processes in their own spheres of influence, such as their homes, schools and social organizations."(64)
At the beginning HICOG's program for American specialists visiting Germany was more or less a mere continuation of OMGUS' consultants' program, except that HICOG's consultants and specialists were expected to deal directly with their German counterparts rather than with HICOG officials. A HICOG instruction of September 1, 1950 defined U.S. specialists as "citizens of the United States highly qualified and professionally prominent, whose services are desired in Germany to confer and advise with German agencies on pertinent questions in their specific fields in conjunction with projects planned, according to indicated need, by various HICOG substantive divisions."(65) Reorientation remained the essence of their assignment, but it now became an auxiliary and advisory rather than an authoritative function. Consultants, or specialists as they were increasingly referred to, were to furnish "additional American expert assistance" and to "work with" German institutions and organizations for limited periods of time and to bring their expertise to bear on specific problems or projects. Within the confines of their mandate they were "to demonstrate the value of democratic concepts and techniques" for the benefit of their German counterparts. Beyond this, they were to assist "in establishing effective relationships between German and other Western groups and organizations."(66) No longer semi-employees of the U.S. Government, as they were, under OMGUS, specialists were selected by the Department of State with the concurrence of HICOG's Exchange Division and subject to review by the German agency concerned. Projects on which specialists were to work were as a rule initiated by German agencies, but had to be approved by the HICOG exchange staff at headquarters.(67)
The program was different from that of OMGUS, but it certainly was not massive. By comparison with the number of Germans going to the United States, that of U.S. citizens traveling to Germany remained rather modest. The total of specialists from 1949 through 1955 was 689. In 1952 this number was increased by 330 so-called lecturers, scholars, and teachers, all but 27 of whom were Fulbrighters. (See Appendix III.) The rationale of this "exchange" reflected the lopsided nature of German-American relations in the early fifties when the United States still acted in the role of adviser and sponsor and Germany in that of client and recipient, but with the Americans performing their part on a steadily diminishing scale. Emphasis now was increasingly being placed on self-reorientation, so that Germans going to the United States in effect supplemented the American experts by providing their newly acquired knowledge to their fellow citizens upon their return.
The new arrangements required careful selection of subject areas and individuals. As far as the former were concerned, little if any difference was made between the areas of priority selected for Germans and American specialists. The first HICOG proposals of the Education and Cultural Relations Division for 1951 list between 70 and 80 American consultants distributed among education, community activities, information centers, women's affairs, public health, and welfare.(68) (The actual number processed was somewhat smaller, i.e., approximately 55). Other fields(69) included politics and government, youth activities, labor, information media, social services, law, agriculture, religious affairs, and libraries and museums.
Education remained the most important field, outnumbering the next highest category by nearly two to one. The rationale for selection of individuals was different from the one that governed the selection of Germans going to the United States. The emphasis for the latter was on study, observation, and training; in the case of American specialists the burden was, in accordance with established policy, on teaching, lecturing, counseling, and training, and on assisting the new leadership in Germany with the planning of political, administrative, and educational reforms and with the preparation of basic materials.
The American specialists' program had come under heavy fire when it was under OMGUS auspices. Under HICOG, voices of criticism were occasionally still heard. But, by and large, it gained in prestige and effectiveness, due primarily to the high caliber of American experts who were invited to participate.
A complete list of American specialists selected in the early HICOG years is no longer available, but a few samples for 1950 and 1951 give a good cross section of the level and scope of the selection made. In the governmental affairs area, the list included, among others, the names of Roger Baldwin, Chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union; Arnold Brecht, Professor of Political Science, Now School for Social Research; Taylor Cole, Duke, University; Harold Dorr, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan; Pendleton Herring, Director of the Social Science Research Council; Karl Loewenstein, Professor of Jurisprudence, Amherst College; Franz Neumann, Professor of Government, Columbia University (who was instrumental in promoting the study of political science at the Free University of Berlin and assisting with the, creation of the new Institute for Political Science in Berlin) ; Sigmund Neumann, Professor of Sociology, Wesleyan College; James Pollock, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan; Richard Scammon, at that time Chief, Division of Research for Western Europe, Department of State; Roger Wells, Professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College; and Quincy Wright, Professor of International Law, University of Chicago, to name just a few. Some of them had previously served on the OMGUS or HICOG staff. Among them were some distinguished German scholars in the United States who were exiles from Nazi Germany.
Those in religious affairs included Willard Johnson and Sterling Brown, both of whom served at one time as General Directors of the, National Conference of Christians and Jews; Rev. Gilbert V. Hartke, Head of the Speech and Drama Department, Catholic University; and Rev. John LaFarge, Catholic Inter-Racial Council; in labor and agricultural affairs, S. Earl Grigsby of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture; in legal affairs, Max Rheinstein, Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago; and Richard A. McGee, Director of the California Department of Corrections. American women interested in helping in German women's affairs included Margaret Hickey, editor of the, Ladies Home Journal, and a member of the executive board of the American Red Cross; Lilian Shapley of the Community Division of the YWCA; Mrs. Harold Dyke of the League of Women Voters of the United States; Mrs. Arthur Anderson, president of the National Board of the YWCA; Dr. Dorothy Ferebee, Medical Director of University Health Services at Howard University; and Dr. Minnie Maffett, surgeon and gynecologist, and former president of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs.
American specialists in education included George A. Selke, Chancellor, University of Montana; Chris A. DeYoung, National Education Association; Hazel Hatcher, Professor of Home Economics, Pennsylvania State University; Edward G. Olsen, Supervisor of School and Community Relations, State of Washington; and Lucile Allard, supervisor and psychologist, New York Public Schools.
All consultants submitted reports to HICOG and to the Department of State upon their return which summarized, often quite critically, their major findings and concluded with specific recommendations. Unfortunately, most of the reports were subsequently lost or destroyed. Even more regrettably, there appears to be no record of the use that was made by HICOG of the recommendations. Undoubtedly, given the investment made in the program and the high quality of some reports, it is safe to assume that many of them were put into practice by HICOG or by German policy makers, administrators, civic leaders, and educators to whom they were addressed. But, aside from a few instances (see Chapter VIII), the influence of American experts cannot be documented.
There were practically no American student exchanges during the first HICOG years. A program of notable scale started only after the Fulbright agreement came into effect in 1953, which is discussed fully in Chapter VII, below. American students who attended German universities prior to the, Fulbright agreement did so under private auspices.(70)
While the so-called project method was followed only to a degree in the, case of Americans going to Germany, there were exceptions which deserve special mention. Among the first to volunteer assistance was a group of young men and women organized under the auspices of the Experiment in International Living who wished to participate in reconstruction work.
Nearly all other projects were in the field of art and music. As such, their reorientation value inlay have seemed negligible, at best indirect. But their projection of America as a center of artistic creation had an impact second to none. The major occasions were the Berlin Arts or Cultural Festivals in 1951 and 1952. The Department of State and HICOG decided to send to Germany some of the best musical and theatrical productions that were available at the time. HICOG provided the facilities and the Department contracted with the American National Theater and Academy (ANTA). It was the beginning of a long and useful relationship with that organization, which selected, managed, and presented, subject to the Department's approval, the individual events.
The idea underlying this singular undertaking was to demonstrate the high standards of American performing arts achievements and, by implication, to refute Nazi and Communist propaganda, clichés of American cultural insensibility and sterility. The selection was done with skill and imagination. It included in 1951 a performance of "Medea" with Judith Anderson in the title role, guest appearances of soprano Astrid Varnay with the Berlin Opera Company, the Juilliard String Quartet, a presentation of "Oklahoma". with Celeste Holm, the Hall-Johnson Choir, a violin recital by Maurice Wilk, and Angna Enters, dance-mime. The American participation was a success. Ernst Reuter, then Mayor of Berlin, spoke of the "superb" American contribution to the festival.
Yet the success of the American presence in the, following year (1952) was nothing short of spectacular. The author decided to send Gershwin's "Porgy and Bess" to the festival, whence it was to go to other European capitals. Well-meaning friends advised against it. So did prominent members of the American black community, who feared that German or even any European audiences were not ready to appreciate the message and that the sordid misery of Catfish Alley would be taken to portray the normal life of the American black community. Yet the performance, of a 65 all-black member cast was a triumph. It literally overwhelmed the Berlin audience. Comments in West Berlin were lyrical and not one critical note was heard from the Communist press in East Berlin. The success was similar in other cities. It was a major breakthrough of American black culture upon the European scene.
Other American participants in the festival were, the New York City Ballet, Eugene Ormandy, and sopranos Astrid Varnay and Polyna Stoska. The combined effect of these contributions, according to HICOG, "did more to elevate American prestige in one, month than anything else attempted in Germany in the past seven years."(71)
During the same year the Boston Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Charles Munch and of Pierre Monteux played in Berlin and Frankfurt; as did the Paganini Quartet.
Nearly from the very start of the exchange program provision was made for the travel of Germans to other Western European countries and for the use of European consultants, as noted in Chapter 1. OMGUS policy was dictated largely by reasons of expediency, e.g., economy, cultural affinities, geographic proximity, and language. But during the first two HICOG years few Germans went to other countries. They were mostly sponsored by German agencies such as the European Exchange Service (Europaeischer Austauschdienst) and the International Council for Youth Self-Help (Internationaler Rat fuer Jugendselbsthilfe). In 1951 HICOG revived the program but this time for reasons of policy dictated by the new trend toward European unification (see Chapter VI).