 | Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954 |
| | Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954 |
The transfer of authority from military to civilian control had been achieved by the establishment of the U.S. High Commission in 1949. The next step was the gradual shift of power from the Allies to a renascent German government, culminating in the termination of the occupation and the restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic. The transition was implicit in the mandate of the Allied Commission. What was not contemplated and indeed not foreseen, however, was the speed with which this process developed. In 1945 no one had the temerity to predict that 10 years after the end of hostilities Germany would obtain not only national independence but full political, economic, and military partnership with the West; yet this is precisely what happened.
The precipitation of events was due, in large part, to circumstances beyond the control of the Allies. They had been set in motion by Soviet unwillingness to accept quadripartite agreement except on their terms, clinched by the Russian walkout of the Allied Control Council, by the breakdown of the quadripartite control machinery and finally by the outbreak of the cold war. On the positive, side, spurred by the Marshall Plan, the phenomenal recovery of the German economy and the success of the reconstruction effort on all levels of national life deserved some measure of recognition. They were acknowledged in the form of a series of diplomatic and political initiatives by the U.S. Government which were designed to accord the Federal Republic a status of greater responsibility and equality. They determined the course of U.S. policy under HICOG and left their mark on all aspects of the HICOG program, including cultural exchange.
Among the changes that were made, those that had the most immediate impact were the replacement of the Occupation Statute by contractual arrangements,(1) and the acceptance of the Federal Republic to full and equal membership in the European community and its various institutional bodies. Previously, it had joined such international organizations as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This trend was climaxed in May 1955 by Germany's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).(2) Another factor of considerable weight was the progressive recovery of Germany's economic position as well as the new regulations for currency conversion which eventually permitted financial cosponsorship of exchange programs, at least on a modest scale.
The most significant of these milestones was the agreement reached on September 14,1951 at Washington by the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, and the United States. The agreement established the basic principles which were to guide the High Commissioners in their future negotiations with the Federal Republic with respect to contractual arrangements. The latter were to supplant the Occupation Statute and prepare the way for final decisions which, it was hoped, would be reached within the following few months. This was no decision taken overnight. Work on a revision of the Occupation Statute had begun as early as May 1950. In September of that year the Foreign Ministers met in New York and instructed the Intergovernmental Study Group to review the 1949 Agreement on Tripartite Controls and the Charter of the Allied High Commission, although no plans were then made for fundamental changes in relationships. As HICOG pointed out correctly,(3) the Washington conference merely epitomized a series of steps toward liberalization of policy adopted at Foreign Ministers conferences at Paris (1949), London (1950), New York (1950), and Brussels (1950).
The Washington conference was followed in November 1951 by a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Paris with Chancellor Adenauer. The participants agreed then and there to draft a "General Agreement" which would set forth the main principles that were to determine the future relationship between the three Allies and Germany. The draft agreement, in turn, became part of the Contractual Agreements which were signed at Bonn in May 1952. They consisted of a basic agreement, three conventions and supplementary annexes, and an exchange of notes. The basic agreement restored to the Federal Republic full authority over its internal and external affairs, once the convention had come into effect. Sovereignty was withheld only in matters of security, the stationing of armed forces, and the peace settlement.
The progressive change in overall policy demanded corresponding adaptation in public affairs policy. Fortunately, the existing organizational structure of HICOG which provided for a high degree of managerial integration, both in the United States and in Germany, facilitated greatly a coordinated adjustment of policy between the public affairs office and its counterparts on the political, economic, legal, and other substantive levels.(4)
In March 1951, i.e., half a year before the Washington conference, but in anticipation of the events that it was to set in motion, the author prepared a policy paper, which attempted to bring the Public Affairs Program abreast of general developments.(5) The opening paragraph presented the rationale for a change in emphasis, format, and content of the program. It stated:
"The approaching end of the occupation and the impending transfer of. United States operations in Germany to Embassy status require an immediate examination of the Public Affairs Program. Any evaluation of the program must be undertaken with a view to determining the need for such adaptations, both in content and volume, as appear indicated in the face of changes in policy. A vital principle of this policy is to remove, the major vestiges of the occupation and to restore to Germany the status appropriate to a member of the free association of Western nations and to a potential participant in their common defense effort. While this does not imply immediate or necessarily early return of full sovereignty, it calls for arrangements which reflect recognition of widest possible control over domestic affairs by the responsible German authorities."
The removal of "the major vestiges of the occupation" under the terms of the proposed new policy required, first of all, a change in method and emphasis. So far, the policy paper pointed out, the Public Affairs program of HICOG had been "reformist," that is, designed primarily to eliminate or correct certain deficiencies in German society. Accordingly, "reorientation" or "democratization" had provided the common denominator and the rationale for most of the activities carried on under the label of Public Affairs. True, many of these deficiencies persisted and demanded continuing and vigorous remedial action. However, with the restoration of sovereignty such action could no longer remain the predominant responsibility of third parties. Instead, the task required at an increasing pace the participation of German nationals in all phases of the program. Yet, while the HICOG program, as against that of OMGUS, no longer rested on authority by fiat but on "advice. and assistance," even the proffering of advice and assistance appeared inherent in the authority of the occupying power, and with the diminution of such authority could no longer be rendered without prior solicitation by the recipients.
Most importantly, however, not only methods and protocol had to be adapted to the change of pace but, above all, the objectives of the Public Affairs Program had to be attuned to the new priorities of the United States or, for that matter, of tripartite Allied policy, which in the words of the declaration of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France, issued at Washington on September 14, 1951, aimed "at the inclusion of a democratic Germany on the basis of equality in a continental European community." The Public Affairs Program, the policy paper stated, could make a singular and very specific contribution to this aim. Whereas German membership in the Council of Europe, in the European Coal and Fuel Community, and in the European Defense Community was to achieve integration on the political, economic, and military levels, respectively, the Public Affairs Program would lay the psychological and cultural ground ("create understanding and support") for Germany's association with the West and for a "United Europe." Rather than continuing the reorientation effort through unsolicited advice, the Program would endeavor to support the work of democratic reconstruction by indirection, that is to say, by assisting democratic forces within Germany. As a new objective, in line with new overall policies accentuating the exigencies of the cold war, the Program was to encourage militant rejection of any kind of totalitarianism.
In its final recommendations, the, Department's 1951 policy paper proposed, therefore, the following overall objectives:
1. to help integrate Germany into Europe and into the community of Western nations;
2. to help establish, stabilize and protect a truly democratic order in Germany and to foster the realization of those principles upon which such an order is based; and
3. to help eliminate, counter, contain and, wherever possible, roll back all totalitarian influences whether from the Right or Left which aim at subverting and destroying the democratic order and at preventing Germany's association with the free nations.(6)
As the normalization of Germany's relations with the United States and the Western European community proceeded apace, the U.S. Government's exchange program with Germany was gradually assimilated to the characteristics of the State Department's worldwide educational and cultural exchange program under the Smith-Mundt and Fulbright Acts. Two years later, the "Guiding Principles" issued by the Chief of the Exchange of Persons Branch(7) no longer referred to reorientation directly. Instead, they defined the purpose of the Exchange of Persons Program as that of "giving (exchangees) an opportunity to experience a democratic environment which contributes to a cooperative way of life and to stimulate the free interchange of ideas between free nations." The tutorial approach had disappeared, but not the underlying political purpose. The "Guiding Principles" made it quite clear that the German program still differed from "normal" exchange programs. "The primary purpose of the Exchange of Persons Program," they stipulated, "is not to increase academic and cultural knowledge or professional and technical skill, or to enable participants to visit a particular area to make business or personal contacts," but to maintain its targeted approach aimed at individuals "who will, upon their return to Germany, contribute the most toward realization of democratic principles."
A series of so-called "transition papers" prepared by working teams under the direction of Albert D. Sims, deputy director of the Office of German Public Affairs in the Department, to prepare the orderly transition from High Commission to Embassy status, defined the general objectives of the program along the lines of the 1951 policy paper. "Joint participation and mutuality" wherever feasible and to the greatest extent possible, were declared to be the predominant features of a trend away from unilateralism and leading eventually toward binationalism.(8) The exchange program, in particular, was to focus more than ever on educational institutions, community life, and the arts, and directed toward leaders, youth, labor, women, and others whose participation would further these U.S. policy objectives.(9)
In order to achieve these objectives, the 1951 policy paper had proposed a series of major modifications for the exchange program, namely, a correction of the existing imbalance of exchange categories with its preponderance of German participants and greater stress on the two-way character of the program; emphasis on the mutuality of national interests in the conduct of the program through the early inauguration of a binational Fulbright exchange agreement; a higher degree of responsible participation by Germans in the administration of the program, notably in the development and financing of projects; greater emphasis on younger age, groups and women; intensified follow-up; and extension of the program through a revival of inter-European exchanges as a means of achieving greater impetus and support for the idea of a "United Europe." In conclusion, the policy paper recommended the incorporation of the total Program in a "Cultural Treaty" which would "symbolize and implement a policy which, in the future, will govern the relationship not merely between the U.S. Government and the German Government but between the American people and the German people."
The new departure proposed by the policy paper and the transition papers had unquestionably strong political overtones. It was a concession to growing demands in the United States and elsewhere to accord Germany a place within the Western community appropriate to its newly gained political and economic status. At the same time, Germany's prospective membership within a "community of strength," itself resolved to resist aggression from totalitarian quarters, was clearly a reflection of the. exigencies of cold war confrontation. As such it was intended not merely to adjust public affairs policy and programs to the new political realities in Germany, but, beyond that, to assimilate them to the changing postulates of the Department's worldwide policy.
By the fifties, the cold war between East and West had become global. Soviet propaganda attacks on the United States grew more bitter with every passing day. The "Campaign of Truth" was launched by President Truman in 1951. It was a hard-hitting propaganda response to the "hate America" campaign unleashed by Soviet propaganda and, in the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, intended "to counteract the vicious lies about this nation and its objectives as perpetrated by the Communists, and to build a positive psychological force around which the free world and freedom-loving people everywhere can rally."(10)
In this atmosphere, the U.S. Government's worldwide educational and cultural exchange program underwent modification "to serve immediate needs more effectively." These considerations, after, several years of delay, spurred the passage by Congress of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (the Smith-Mundt Act), which, as noted earlier, authorized for the first time a, worldwide information and educational exchange program under the, sponsorship of the Department. Appropriations for the program increased annually in the early fifties, especially for that part of the program concerned with the dissemination of U.S. information overseas. The "Campaign of Truth," injected a decidedly political element into the U.S. information and educational exchange programs, not unlike that introduced prior to and during World War II to counter Nazi propaganda. The purpose of the campaign was to strengthen the unity of the free nations and to emphasize, the coincidence of their interests with those of the United States; to build up the image of the United States as an enlightened and strong power; and to develop and maintain psychological resistance to Soviet propaganda against the United States.(11)
The exchange program was considered a suitable vehicle for carrying this message, and within its framework the leaders and specialists program, having the highest potential for molding public opinion, appeared to be the most logical category on which to focus attention. Considering their close exposure to a constant barrage of Soviet pressure and propaganda, German leaders were believed to be particularly sensitive to the need for cooperative counteraction. Moreover, with the end of the occupation and national sovereignty rapidly approaching, closer association of the German exchange program with the U.S. worldwide policy appeared to be a foregone, conclusion. The time had come to create a stronger psychological foundation for Germany's impending partnership with the West. Hence the need for an intensified effort to acquaint German leaders with "the basic principles governing American life in the, political, economic, social, cultural and educational fields," and a more systematic attempt to familiarize them with American ideas, attitudes, and institutions, and with the objectives of American domestic and foreign policy. The early fifties, thus, saw an increase in the number of invitations to cabinet members, Members of Parliament, government officials, party leaders, and other politicians on various levels of authority. Among them were Walter Scheel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, now Federal President; Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of the Interior, later Minister of Labor; Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Ludwig Erhard, both later Federal Chancellors; Franz Josef Strauss, later Minister of Defense, and many others.(12) The resulting presence of important German personages in Washington necessitated special arrangements for their orientation, in the form of weekly briefing sessions for leaders and specialists in the Department of State as a regular feature of the Washington orientation program. These were generally conducted by the author with the assistance of other Departmental officers.
The cold war was to continue, but after the mid-fifties the worldwide educational and cultural exchange program of the Department moved into an era in which these political requirements subsided, and cooperative educational and cultural relations reemerged as the predominant consideration in the conduct of the educational exchange program worldwide, with which the German program was now closely identified.
The Cultural Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany which came into effect in 1953, two years after it had been proposed in the policy paper of 1951, was intended to epitomize and to give formal recognition to the trend toward full bilateralism in the field of cultural exchange, The idea of a cultural treaty or convention appeared to be a logical corollary to the decision of the three Western Foreign Ministers. taken in December 1950 at Brussels, to replace the Occupation Statute with a series of contractual agreements. Although the Occupation Statute had retained no special powers in the cultural field that needed to be abandoned or modified, it nevertheless seemed good politics to divest the "reorientation" program not only of its tutorial pretensions but of any residues that smacked of unilateral intervention, even if only by way of moral suasion. Also, whereas U.S. policy remained devoted to the accomplishment of its earlier objectives to assist in the creation of a democratic society in Germany, the accomplishment of these objectives should now become a matter of mutual consent with the United States showing its willingness to move toward a reciprocal type of relationship resting on cooperative undertakings. "A cultural treaty," the policy paper of 1951 had argued, "would demonstrate visibly the changing character of U.S.-German relationships and would lend force and credence to our declared intentions for inviting German consent and contribution in an area of foreign affairs which is normally governed by the principles of mutual acceptance and reciprocity."
The instrument of agreement had been envisaged in the policy paper as a regular treaty, with some of the language of earlier educational and cultural exchange legislation and agreements concluded with other countries serving as a model. It was to consist of a. covenant in which the two contracting parties, adopting the language of the UNESCO charter, pledged "to develop and increase the means of communication. between their peoples and to employ these means for the purpose of mutual understanding and truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's life." It was furthermore to contain a specific stipulation "to continue, within the limits of available funds, a program of cultural assistance to Germany." It was, finally, to define categories of activities, specifically authorizing "the initiation, conduct, and support of programs concerning the production, distribution, or exhibition of informational and cultural materials, the exchange of ideas and persons, and the inauguration of binational or multinational programs, such programs to be sponsored by either public or private agencies and to be organized and conducted, whenever possible, on a basis of reciprocity."
The details and language of the agreement were worked out in close cooperation with the German Chargé d'Affaires and later the first German Ambassador, Heinz Krekeler, and with the cultural counselor of the Embassy of the Federal Republic, Dr. Bruno Werner, both stout advocates of democratic reform and sincere friends of the United States. They cleared the text with their government in Bonn. The document was then to be signed by President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer at a public ceremony in Washington on the occasion of the forthcoming visit of the Chancellor in April 1953.
The proposal was warmly welcomed, and approved in the Department and transmitted through channels to the White House. The President, on April 7, signed the formal authorization paper directing Secretary Dulles "to negotiate, conclude, and sign a cultural convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, the said convention to be transmitted to he President of the United States of America for his ratification by and with the advice and consent thereto of the Senate of the United States of America." All was in readiness when to the consternation of all parties concerned the formalities were rather dramatically delayed by a last-minute veto of Secretary Dulles who objected to the "paternalism," in fact, what he termed back-door "socialism" implicit in the concept and format of a cultural treaty or convention and specifically in the idea of continued "cultural assistance." The text had to be hastily revised and the legal status of the instrument changed to that of an "Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany." It was effected by an exchange of notes and signed in a brief ceremony by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer on April 9, 1953 in the Department of State.(13)
As stipulated in two identical notes, one in English and one in German, both governments declared their intent to join efforts cultural cooperation and to foster mutual understanding of the intellectual, artistic, scientific and social lives of the peoples of the two countries." To this end, they pledged to encourage the extension of mutual knowledge of their history, civilization, institutions, literature, and other cultural accomplishments, to accord favorable treatment to their citizens engaged in activities pursuant to the agreement, with respect to entry, travel, residence, and exit; to promote and facilitate the interchange of prominent citizens, specialists, professors, teachers, students and other youths, and qualified individuals from all walks of life; to favor the establishment of scholarships, travel grants, and other forms of assistance in their academic and cultural institutions; and to endeavor, whenever desirable, to establish binational committees to further the purpose of the agreement.
In deference to the newly-acquired sovereign status of the Federal Republic and specifically to Secretary Dulles' concern about undue interference in the internal affairs of either country, the agreement postulated specifically that the responsibilities assumed by each government under the agreement were to be executed "within the framework of domestic policy and legislation, procedures and practices defining internal jurisdiction of governmental and other agencies within their respective territories."(14) The agreement was made applicable also in the territory of Berlin upon delivery of a conforming declaration by the Government of the United States of America. The declaration was formalized by note of October 2, 1953 from the German Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State. True, the agreement did not change the cultural exchange program in substance nor even alter the modalities of operation, but it gave official sanction and legal status to the de facto bilateralism that had characterized U.S.-German cultural cooperation for quite some time, pronouncing the new relationship as one based on equality and consent for mutual benefit.
With the return to normal relations, the Public Affairs Program and, with it, the exchange program, could have been reduced in size to the level of other country exchange, programs. Actually, the reduction was gradual, and did not start before 1953. The 1951 and 1952 fiscal years proved to be peak years in terms of budget expenditures for public, affairs and of the total number of persons actually exchanged with the allied countries (3,319 in 1951, and 3,922 in 1952). It was only in 1953 that exchanges begun to drop sharply (see statistics in Appendixes I and III, which differ slightly but closely present the approximate figures). In point of fact, exchanges between the United States and Germany had already started to diminish slightly in 1951 and 1952 (from 2,643 to 2,539 in 1951, and to 2,377 in 1952). The decline in German-American exchanges, however, was made up for by the resumption of exchanges between Germany and other European countries (780 in 1951, and 1,545 in 1952) reflecting the new emphasis on European integration.
The extension of the program to European countries required special delegation of authority to the Chief of the Exchange of Persons Branch of HICOG. It was quickly forthcoming. Pursuant to the authority contained in section 4 of Public Law 73, 81st Congress, the Exchange of Persons Branch was empowered by the Department of State "to make, amend or terminate grants, (a) to German students, trainees, teachers, guest instructors, professors and leaders in fields of special knowledge or skills, (b) to teachers, guest instructors, professors and leaders in fields of special knowledge and skill from other European countries, and (c) to German private or governmental agencies or institutions, for the purpose of carrying out exchange of persons programs between Germany and other European countries administered or serviced by the Office of the U.S. HICOG under authority vested in the Department of State."(15)
This extension was terminated in 1953, after Germany's progressive integration into Europe had been consummated through its membership in the, European Payments Union, the Council of Europe, and the Coal and Steel Community, and its pledged adherence to the European Defense Community, then in the planning stage. But as long as the European extension program was in effect (during 1951 and 1952), 1,755 Germans went to European countries and 241 European specialists to Germany. An interim analysis of a sample of 476 cases made by HICOG in November 1951(16) shows that most of the German visitors went to Great Britain (301) and, in descending order of magnitude, to Scandinavian countries---Sweden, Denmark, Finland (79), Switzerland (49), Holland (35), and France (12). They were selected from the fields of education (211), food and agriculture (58), community activities (55), political affairs (36), public health and welfare (28), and legal affairs (18).
The program was organized on a project basis with the visitors either participating in specially organized training courses and conferences or observing institutions and practices related to their professional concern. Projects were sponsored by such authorities as the Educational Interchange Council (EIC) and the German Educational Reconstruction (GER), in Germany; the British Council and the Civil Service Commission in Great Britain; the Ministry of Agriculture in France; and the City of Zurich; or by high level officials of the host government, members of the diplomatic, corps, and the like. As a rule., visits were of relatively short duration, shorter in any event than visits to the United States.(17) Prompted, as it were, by considerations of policy that served urgent political objectives, and conceived as a stimulant to spark German initiatives along similar lines, the European exchange program lacked the depth and the complexity of the U.S.-Germany exchange program. It was, nevertheless, far from being a mere series of junkets. Nor was it an academic exchange program in the conventional sense. The subject areas selected for study projects were carefully chosen, again with a view to helping German political leaders, educators, legal experts, and the like, deal more effectively with critical domestic problems. Courses included such themes as the "Liberalization of the German Civil Service," "Political Science and Public Administration," "Western European Integration," "Theory and Operation of Municipal Government," "Observation of Prisons and Parole Systems in Europe," "Medical and Public Health Practices," "Farm Cooperatives," "Home Economics," and various subjects in the field of education.(18)
Despite its declared intention to cede greater responsibility to German authorities and agencies, in the case of the inter-European exchange program HICOG was reluctant to relinquish control and to assign to its German counterparts more than a minimum of functions. Considering the urgent political purpose of the program, HICOG officials felt that the basic philosophy and traditions of German agencies engaged in inter-European exchanges, with their emphasis on academic and recreational Programs, would simply not permit rapid enough adjustments to the objectives of U.S. policy.(19) The, division of labor between HICOG and its German counterparts was thus heavily weighted in favor of American sponsorship. HICOG's exchanges staff retained responsibility for approval of projects, selections and clearance of exchangees, coordination with local German sponsors, transportation of selected German participants from point of origin to point of departure, and participation in the briefing of exchangees. German agencies, on the other hand, were expected to obtain the necessary visas, to arrange round-trip transportation from the point of departure to the foreign country, to issue grants and instructions, to participate in the briefing of exchangees, to evaluate the effectiveness of each project from the German exchangee's viewpoint, and to render financial and evaluation reports to the exchanges staff of HICOG. As regards financial arrangements, HICOG retained sole fiscal control of the $277,000 set aside for European exchange projects, although grants were made available to selected agencies to, cover administrative expenses amounting to ten percent of total project cost.(20)
It was anticipated, however, that by 1953 all project proposals and selections would come from German agencies. Funds for 1953 would be used in the following manner: part would be given as subsidies to German exchange agencies to strengthen their administrative capabilities, including program planning, selection, and evaluation; another part would be made available to these agencies to broaden the exchange programs, notably through the increase of European exchanges; and the balance would be used for financing specific pilot projects deemed desirable and important to the accomplishment of the HICOG mission.(21)
Two German agencies were handling the majority of the projects, the Institute of Public Affairs, Inc. (Institut zur Foerderung Oeffentlicher Angelegenheiten, EV.), and the International Council for Youth Self-Help (Internationaler Rat fuer Jugendselbsthilfe, EV.). Other agencies included the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the German-British Exchange Office, the European Exchange Service, the Institute for Social Research, and the Auxiliary Service of the Evangelical Church in Germany. Most of these were concerned with the facilitation of exchanges. The Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt concentrated on public opinion surveys evaluating the result of exchanges, whereas the Auxiliary Service of the Evangelical Church assisted in the screening of candidates.
In keeping with the trend toward normalization of relations, certain features which had been characteristic of the German exchange program were now found to be increasingly incompatible with the changed situation and gradual downgrading was recommended. One of these features had been the "project approach" which, although not totally abandoned, was largely replaced by a more individualized treatment of exchangees. As the result of extensive discussions within the Department, it was decided that bringing Germans to undergo group training was inconsistent with a policy that placed emphasis on personalized procedures. Participation in "package deals" with tight travel schedules and preplanned programs requiring firm commitments for fixed periods of time seemed no longer in tune with the new relationship and besides in many cases had proved impractical. It had often become rather difficult for program organizers to recruit the most qualified candidates. Many of them, because of their prominent position in public or professional life, could not adjust their schedule sufficiently to avail themselves of the experience. The change to more personalized and shorter leader visits was expected to improve the quality of the participants and thereby of the, program. This expectation was confirmed by State Department officials who attested in 1953 to the fact that the elimination of group projects, together with the simplification of selection procedures, had resulted in an average caliber of German leader grantees "substantially above that in any previous year."(22) Actually, though, the group project approach was never fully abandoned and in some special cases proved to be still highly beneficial.(23)
To assure compliance with the new trend the State Department had issued, as early as March 1952, a guidance to primary and local sponsors which emphasized the need for an individualized treatment of foreign leaders and for a tailor-made approach.(24) Sponsors were advised that visits should be planned with consideration being given to the leader's "own desires and interests" which, in fact, had to be "the determining factors," even where such interests lay outside his or her professional field. Visits had to provide for extensive opportunities to see American home and community life, with 2 or 3 weeks as a minimum spent in at least one community. Sponsors were particularly alerted that "every American who provided information and assistance to a visiting foreign leader under this program is contributing significantly to United States foreign policy."(25) These guidelines again, brought the program into closer conformity with the program as it was carried out worldwide.
The gradual return to normalcy in the early fifties necessitated organizational changes, both in Washington and in Germany, in the administration of the exchange program. The general pattern was responsive to the worldwide requirements at that time. In the special case of Germany these changes constituted progressive steps leading to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. Eventually the Office of the High Commissioner (HICOG) was replaced in May 1955 by an Embassy and James A. Conant, the U.S. High Commissioner, was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Germany.
In the Department of State, the administrative structure for operating the exchange program with Germany remained largely unchanged until 1952, with the Bureau of German Affairs through its Office of German Public Affairs (GAI) discharging policy and planning responsibilities, and the Bureau of Public Affairs, through its Office of Educational Exchange (OEX), and under it its Division of Exchange of Persons (IEP), performing all program functions.
But in 1952, the educational exchange and information elements of the Department's Bureau of Public Affairs were reorganized as the International Information Administration (IIA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department. More stress was placed on overseas information goals, as the title of the agency indicated. IIA continued to handle both the exchange program functions and those of overseas information through its International Information Service (IIS) and International Educational Exchange Service (IES), the latter, an enlarged successor to IEP under Assistant Administrator, and later Director, Russell L. Riley. The German exchange program was only one, but remained by far the largest, of the growing worldwide exchange activities in which IES was engaged. In 1953, the Bureau of German Affairs was integrated with the Bureau of European Affairs and became the Office of German Affairs under Director Cecil B. Lyon. All but the policy and planning functions handled previously by GAT moved to IES. Then, in another major reorganization in the summer of 1953, the overseas information activities: of IIA, the fast media and the cultural centers and information libraries programs, were removed from the State Department and established as the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), an independent agency of the executive branch. The staff administering the exchange program at posts overseas, U.S. Information Service (USIS), was also placed under USIA. IES, which administered the exchange of persons programs, and the UNESCO relations staff, remained in the Department, returning to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, where they had been prior to the ephemeral IIA appearance.(26)
The organization in Germany underwent corresponding changes. In January 1952 the Education and Cultural Relations Division became the Division of Cultural Affairs. The branches for education, religious affairs, public health and welfare, community activities, etc., were transformed into advisory staffs. Public affairs functions, until then performed by other HICOG offices, e.g., political, labor, and legal, were transferred to the Division of Cultural Affairs. Later that year, the exchange program, previously handled by the Exchanges Division, was incorporated as the Exchange of Persons Branch in the Division of Cultural Affairs. At the end of 1952 the Office of Public Affairs consisted of the Office of the Director, headed eventually by Alfred V. (Mickey) Boerner, the Mutual Security Act Information Staff, the Policy Staff, the Information Division, and the Division of Cultural Affairs which included the Projects Staff that administered grants-in-aid, the Exchange of Persons Branch, the Information Centers Branch, and the Cultural Liaison Staff.(27)
Although certain budgetary and managerial controls for exchanges were handled at the division level, the Exchange of Persons Branch retained most of the administrative and all of the substantive program responsibilities. The major functions of the branch chief were to advise the chief of the Division of Cultural Affairs on policy matters and to control, administer, and evaluate the program. Other duties included the development of procedures and the allocation of exchange opportunities among the various consular districts.(28) Selection of high level government leaders was made by the Division of Cultural Affairs in concert with other offices and divisions. Field exchange of persons officers selected the qualified leaders at the local level in all phases of cultural, political, and social life. These administrative changes did not have any noticeable effect on the field operations. The pattern established under HICOG, especially the infrastructure, prevailed by and large and assured continued interoffice and interdivisional coordination.
Procedures underwent a series of modifications which manifested the increasingly binational character of U.S.-German relationships. Selection procedures were brought under the general criteria governing the State Department's worldwide programs. Some criteria previously applied in practice were now made explicit. Potential emigrants or children of emigrants were barred from participation, as were persons with dual citizenship, persons convicted of a felony, and members of the Communist Party or of any organization affiliated with or controlled by it. Categories of eligible candidates were even more carefully defined.(29)
The new instructions listed, aside from leader categories, urban youth, farm and rural youth, and trainees. Grants were directly administered by the Division of Cultural Affairs through the Exchange of Persons Branch. Leaders, in particular, were still to be selected with a view to their capability by virtue of their position to "insure positive impact upon the German community."(30) If circumstances so recommended, English language knowledge could be dispensed with. Urban and rural youth were to be given preference, if they had demonstrated "an active interest in extracurricular and community activities."(31) In their case as well as in that of trainees a basic or adequate knowledge of English was held "essential."
Students and other academic exchangees now became the responsibility of the binational Fulbright Commission, under the Fulbright program officially established by the two governments in 1952 (see Chapter VII). The Exchange of Persons Branch thereafter assumed only such duties as were delegated to it by the Commission. While special objectives and supplementary eligibility requirements were established for each category, perhaps the most significant change in procedure was the increase in the extent of German participation in the selection of German candidates in the academic categories, under the Fulbright program, which was now declared to be of "paramount importance." Under the Fulbright program, candidates applied in open competition, and preselection of candidates was delegated to screening committees that included representatives of the competent ministries and organizations in the individual Laender. One of the immediate benefits was that grantees whose applications were thus processed by German authorities, found it easier to obtain leave of absence and reemployment guarantees.
German participation in the exchange program was no longer to be limited to proposals of projects, nomination of candidates, and administration and evaluation of the program, but was to include "the assumption of financial responsibility through voluntary contributions."(32) The economic recovery in Germany and the new currency conversion now permitted stronger German participation in the financing of exchange projects. German funds, through private contributions, were used mainly to defray the costs of visits by Americans to Germany. By the end of 1953 HICOG reported that both German governmental and private agencies had activated projects to bring U.S. citizens to Germany on planned itineraries wholly at German expense e.g., 48 experts in local government, welfare, religion, and architecture, and 200 teenagers. Informal talks with labor leaders had disclosed the possibility of organizing exchange programs financed by trade unions.(33) The latter prospects were developed in addition to private projects sponsored directly by American and German private organizations, such as the American Field Service and the Experiment in International Living.