 | Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954 |
| | Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954 |
The ascendance of educational exchange to its level of importance and to its unprecedented size under HICOG was the logical sequence of the elevation of the Reorientation Program, of which exchanges were a key element, to the rank of top priority. But, as will be shown, this achievement did not come about without a struggle. There were in fact moments when both programs (i.e., reorientation and exchange) appeared to be in jeopardy---partly due to changes in policy reflected in the legal instruments defining Allied responsibilities, and partly due to changes in attitude on the part of policymakers and program operators.
The establishment of the High Commissions by each of the Allies was one of a series of steps that manifested the transition of Germany from a country under foreign curatorship to that of a sovereign state. In General Clay's words, 1949 witnessed "the termination of the negative phase of United States occupation policy and the beginning of a constructive policy." That year also foreshadowed Germany's restoration to a position of partnership in the council of European and Atlantic nations. Secretary of State Acheson declared: "It is the ultimate objective of the United States that the German people, or as large a part of them as possible, be integrated into a new common structure of the free peoples of Europe."(1)
The legal and political framework for the new policy was created by several major agreements among the three Western Allies: on an Occupation Statute for Western Germany; on the economic and political merger of the three military governments into High Commissions; and on a revision of the reparations program.
These agreements were accompanied on the German side, in May 1949, by the adoption of a new German Constitution, the so-called Basic Law. It was promptly approved by the three Military Governors. On May 18, 1949 John J. McCloy was appointed U.S. High Commissioner in Germany; on May 19, André François-Poncet, French High Commissioner; and on June 1, Sir Brian Robertson, British High Commissioner. Konrad Adenauer was elected Federal Chancellor on September 15, and a few days later established the first postwar cabinet.
The following year (1950) saw Germany move more closely to political, economic, and military alliance with the West. 1951 witnessed the revision of the Occupation Statute of April 8, 1949, and the proposal to replace the Statute by contractual agreements. This development culminated in May 1952 in a treaty regulating the relations between the Federal Republic and the three Western Powers, the so-called "Bonn Convention."
Such changes in the political climate could not but have had a strong and significant impact on U.S. cultural relations with Germany. The Occupation Statute created an immediate problem. Until its enactment, controls over education and cultural affairs had been inherent in the supreme powers of Military Government. The controls constituted a legitimate instrument to bring about the reeducation of the German people as an integral part of U.S. policy. The Occupation Statute revised the relationship between the occupying powers and Germany opening the way toward a gradual relaxation of Allied control over internal affairs. Relaxation of controls, in turn, required a redefinition of those to be reserved and of those to be abandoned by the occupying powers. Education, cultural relations, and information were no longer listed among activities to be "reserved" to insure the accomplishment of the basic purpose of the occupation. Indeed, the policy directive to the U.S. High Commissioner confirmed explicitly that reorientation and public information were examples par excellence of those fields in which no powers of control were to be retained by the High Commissioners, notwithstanding the fact that these activities were of continuing critical concern to the, Allied Powers. Lacking authority over these educational and cultural programs, the Allied Powers had no power to direct legislative, executive, or judicial action by the German Government in these fields; nor did they have any further right to arrogate to themselves such competencies.(2)
Accordingly, the proposed Charter of the Allied High Commission did not include a committee on information or cultural affairs on a par with the key tripartite committees which determined political and economic policies under the High Commission, but rather subordinated concerns about information and culture to the Political Affairs Committee.(3) The basic philosophy behind this policy was in line with General Clay's own thinking as well as with that of policymakers in other parts of the Government who had long advocated that "reorientation," if it was to be a realistic program in the first place, had to be, left to German initiative rather than being "imposed" from without---hence, General Clay's earlier policy of restraining U.S. efforts in this field and limiting requests for Congressional. funding. The U.S. Military Government (OMGUS) in its final days actually suggested the reduction and eventual phase-out of the educational program altogether. Concentration on the exercise of the explicitly reserved powers and, in particular, on the task of economic reconstruction was declared to be paramount.
It must be recorded, though, that this change of pace. appears to have originated with officials in the entourage of the Military Governor rather than with General Clay himself. Despite his previous reluctance to accord top priority to education, and to request Congressional support for exchanges, Clay eventually modified his views. His change of mind may be attributed to Dr. Wells' persuasive powers. Not only did Clay take great personal satisfaction from the fact that he had "laid the foundation for one of the most basic reforms in our scheme of objectives," that is, for education,(4) and that the exchange program had been "one of the, great programs of Military Government,"(5) but he also expressed the hope that the educational staff would carry on its friendly advisory role as long as the occupation lasted and specifically that arrangements would be made to continue the exchange program.(6) However, in the critical spring days of 1949, General Clay's influence was on the wane. Understandably, uncertainties created by the transition then underway and speculation regarding the intentions of the Department of State produced an atmosphere of uneasiness within OMGUS about the future of the reorientation program, including cultural and education exchanges, resulted in a serious problem of morale within the OMGUS staff.
The possibility of elimination of a program which, thanks notably to the efforts of Dr. Wells, had just begun to come into its own, caused great concern in interested circles inside and outside the U.S. Government.(7) Dr. Alonzo G. Grace, Chief of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, OMGUS, protested in a letter to the educational community in the United States that "the United States cannot afford to spend billions on economic reconstruction without a more valiant effort in the field of education and cultural relations ... If we have merely an advisor to the High Commissioner and an exchange program of diminished proportions," wrote Grace, "we will have lost everything that we had planned." Grace urged a major public effort to create a favorable climate of opinion in the United States.(8)
Officials in Washington, rushing to the aid of Grace, pointed out that an earlier draft of the Occupation Statute had stipulated, quite clearly, that the occupation authorities would continue to have a specific responsibility "to observe, advise and assist the Federal Republic and its Laender (States) in regard to democratization of political life, social relations and education of the German people." This paragraph had been interpreted and welcomed by the United States educational community as a source of authority for HICOG to exercise such powers of persuasion as might be needed to assist German officials, and functionaries with their own effort to achieve a reorientation of the German education system. It was believed that the omission of this stipulation which had been given wide dissemination in Germany and in the United States would seriously retard, if not altogether scuttle, the reorientation effort. A "thorough study" of OMGUS operations was urged.(9)
Sharp protests came from the American educational community. Criticism of OMGUS' efforts in favor of a stronger education program had never come quite to rest during the OMGUS period. Such criticism now gained momentum. Dr. George F. Zook, President of the, American Council on Education and head of the U.S. Education Mission to Germany of 1946, and Dr. Herman B Wells, now representing the Advisory Committee on Cultural and Educational Relations with the Occupied Areas warned against the suggested phase-out of the program first by personal appearance in the Department of State and subsequently by a letter of April 29, 1949 addressed to the Secretary of State in which they quoted Dr. Grace's noted apprehension with "deep concern."
Drs. Zook and Wells insisted that, while they did not advocate the direct supervision of German education over a long period of time, they felt that the responsibility to "observe, advise and assist," as agreed upon previously by the occupying powers, "must be maintained for some time to come." "We believe," they wrote, "that to view the problem of Germany in purely political and economic terms is to leave out of consideration the spiritual and psychological factors which are at least of equal importance." Zook and Wells urged reconsideration of the Occupation Statute or at least as broad an interpretation of the Statute as possible, to permit the maintenance of an adequate program of education and cultural relations.(10) Subsequently, the, Commission on the Occupied Areas released a statement in which it noted with concern that neither the Occupation Statute of April 8 nor the Agreement on Tripartite Controls released on April 25, 1949 had referred specifically to the important role of education and cultural affairs in achieving a stable and democratic nation. The Commission made three recommendations: "1. that an early agreement be reached by the occupying powers emphasizing the high priority of education and cultural affairs among the continuing functions of the occupation in Germany; 2. that responsible United States agencies continue to maintain competent professional staff of at least the present size to observe, advise, and assist German educational agencies; and 3. that increased emphasis be placed upon cultural exchanges between Germany, the United States, and other countries to the end that the emerging democratic leadership of Germany may be encouraged and strengthened."(11)
The letter of April 29, 1949 to the Secretary of State, jointly with the statement of the Commission, had the desired effect and strengthened the stand of officials in the Department of State who believed strongly that the reorientation program not only needed to be continued but, if anything, had to be expanded. In his reply to the letter, the author over the signature of Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb assured Drs. Zook and Wells that the "omission of any direct reference to education [in the Occupation Statute] was not intended to reflect upon the importance of the reorientation program [nor] to prejudice the continuity of this Government's interest to observe, advise and assist the German people in their efforts to bring about in ever-increasing measure the democratization of public life." Consequently, the letter said, since the Occupation Statute did not preclude the inauguration or continuation of educational programs, a reconsideration of the Statute, was not required.
The following passages of the Acting Secretary's reply deserve direct quotation, since they laid the foundation for the policy pursued by HICOG in the years to come:
"You are assured," the Acting Secretary stated, "that there is fundamental agreement within the Department with the thesis cited in your letter that the United States cannot afford to spend billions on economic reconstruction without a valiant effort in the field of education and cultural relations. It has been the basic principle underlying this Government's policy for Germany that 'the reeducation of the German people is an integral part of policies intended to help develop a democratic form of government and to restore a stable and peaceful economy. This principle has lost none of its importance and its application must remain in force. The Department has recognized quite early and has so stated that the task of educating the German People away from authoritarianism and aggression and toward democracy and peace remains the hardest and longest of all our responsibilities in Germany and, in the long run, the most decisive. The United States Government would have failed the American people no less than the democratic elements in Germany in their justified hope for lasting security, if this task were to be regarded as consummated with the establishment of a. government by democratic processes, and if it desisted from further efforts to advise and assist the German people in the proper and effective use of their new freedom and of the democratic institutions and tools which it helped provide for them."(12) (Author's emphasis.)
The Department pointed out that democratization would have to employ methods different from those applied during the punitive and restrictive period. It proposed that this task be performed increasingly by the educator and information specialist within the framework of the reorientation program, and it expressed the hope that the role of the Advisory Committee in encouraging, sponsoring, and facilitating educational and cultural programs under private auspices would gain momentum and would supplement more and more the efforts of the Government.
To prepare for an orderly transition from military to civilian control and to pave the way for an organizational structure and program more in tune with reality, the Department of State sent two missions to Germany, one in 1948 and another in 1949.(13) The 1948 "mission" came to an abrupt halt when the Soviet Government blockaded Berlin. The group completed its report as a plan on which to draw in the case of a future transfer from military to civilian auspices, but the changeover originally contemplated for July 1, 1948 was considered "inadvisable" in the light of the situation created by Soviet conduct.(14)
The second survey mission went to Germany more than a year later, in 1949, after the blockade had ended. This time a team consisting exclusively of Department of State officials concerned with information and cultural affairs was formed. Their assignment was "to secure the information necessary for the transfer of the administration of the reorientation activities of OMGUS to the Department of State and for the preparation by the Department for the support of the reorientation program in Germany."(15) The mission was "to develop details of organizational staffing ... to be transmitted to the U.S. High Commissioner for his consideration. . . ."(16) In accordance with its mandate the second mission surveyed such programs as exchange of persons, libraries, motion pictures, radio broadcasting, news and press services from the policy and operational point of view.
The members of the mission found OMGUS in a state of considerable confusion, disarray, and low morale. A memorandum from General Clay's Assistant had recommended discontinuation of vital parts of the program.(17) On the day of the mission's arrival, 96 members of the staff had been given notice of dismissal, among them all members of the public opinion survey unit. There was considerable internal friction among members of the staff, quite specifically between the educational and the informational units. in the view of Lloyd Lehrbas, chairman of the 1949 survey mission, the organization (created by OMGUS) seemed to be disintegrating.(18)
The members of the mission soon discovered that, while some of OMGUS' operations had been deficient, others had been of high quality. They were determined to salvage as many activities as were needed to build a strong and viable, program along the lines developed in the letter of the Acting Secretary of State. The organization of HICOG had to have the required capability for continuing a broad reorientation program with a staff fully qualified to observe, advise, and assist the Germans in their endeavor to build democratic institutions.
But the mission was equally convinced that a new organizational pattern, wholly different from that which existed under OMGUS, was needed. What was required was a command structure which consolidated the multiple features of the reorientation program under firm leadership and unified control. It also proposed elevation of the program to a level high enough to assure direct access to the High Commissioner; and on a par with the other key functions (e.g. political, economic, legal) of HICOG. It recommended specifically: (1) that a Public Affairs Officer be appointed to be responsible for all reorientation programs and activities carried out by any unit of HICOG; (2) that the, Public Affairs Officer preside over the Interdivisional Reorientation Committee and that the status and functions of the Committee be reexamined from the point of view of raising the status of the Committee to that of a Reorientation Program Board responsible for overall policy and program planning; and (3) that the Public Affairs Office be responsible for insuring full and effective coordination of the reorientation program with the comprehensive policies of the U.S. Government and HICOG.(19)
Other recommendations asked for the appointment of a Survey Mission consisting of outstanding experts in the fields of education and information to study reorientation in all its aspects and to submit a report to the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner. The findings of the Mission were to be considered by the High Commissioner in directing such changes in organization and programs as he might deem necessary and desirable.(20) With the recommendations for changes of the overall structure went a proposal to integrate the reorientation budget with that of the total occupation budget for Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) of the Department of the Army.
Among the, substantive program changes proposed by the survey mission was an increased exchange program with heavy emphasis on the exchange of younger persons, especially students, and of community leaders, To extend the exchange program to the grass-roots level and especially to rural areas, the author urged the addition of the nearly 200 so-called liaison and security officers (later renamed "Kreis (County) Resident Officers") residing in counties and hamlets, to the reorientation program staff to assist in particular with the selection of exchangees.
Most of the recommendations of the survey mission were adopted. The Policy Directive for the U.S. High Commissioner explicitly instructed him to "keep informed of all important developments in these matters [i.e., reorientation and public information] and work in conjunction with the German authorities by giving them such advice and assistance as may be required." It confirmed, as the "basic purpose of the occupation," the reorientation of the German people toward democracy and peace. It enjoined the High Commissioner specifically
"to advise and assist the German people with respect to the democratization of social relations and institutions, education, public. information, and civic life, including the provision of equal opportunities for men and women in the political, economic and educational fields."(21)
The program, moreover, was extended to the two other Western (i.e., British and French) Zones of Occupation with the three Allied powers granting to each other "complete and unrestricted liberty of action" in respect to cultural activities in the three allied zones.(22)
The reorientation program was transferred from the Department of the Army to the Department of State in the summer of 1949. U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy had a perfect understanding of his mandate. He was profoundly convinced of the validity of the reorientation program as a keystone of his mission in Germany. In one of his early statements of policy, McCloy had this to say to an audience in Stuttgart on February 6, 1950:
"Let me emphasize . . . and this I say particularly to the political leaders of Germany: we Americans are, not here exclusively to feed the German people and to promote economic recovery. Nor merely to see that tanks and planes are not built. Our main purpose is to help Germany achieve political recovery. By that I mean, to help the German people establish a political democracy in which they can live as free men and enjoy the benefits of their freedom."(23)
Political reconstruction and democratization remained the basic theme of U.S. policy in Germany and the main purpose of the reorientation program throughout the HICOG period, but it underwent a series of modifications each of which reflected a deliberate and careful attempt to adapt policy and program to the now realities of the early fifties. The trend toward German sovereignty and rapprochement with Western nations was a major modifier of policies. It was now accelerated by the increasing intensity of the Cold War. In. addition to being an incentive for internal reform, democracy became a militant issue to be defended in the form of two-front resistance toward totalitarianism from the right and the left (see Chapter IV). The highlight statement of the 1950 budget presentation to Congress defined the four objectives of the public affairs program as follows: (1) to strengthen in the German people the will for and knowledge of democratic self-government and repugnance, for authoritarian rule, whether from the left or from the right; (2) to contain and counter the propaganda of Communist and extreme nationalists hostile to democracy and to Allied and United States purposes in Western Germany; (3) to explain and to gain acceptance and support of United States policy, especially as it concerns the political integration of Germany into Western Europe and the economic objectives of the European Recovery Program; and (4) to promote better understanding and friendship between the United States and a reconstituted Germany.(24)
Thus while there was no fundamental change in policy, there were changes in emphasis, scale, and methods of such significance that one could justifiably speak of an almost totally new program. When HICOG took over, some key officials of OMGUS, as was noted, felt that the job had largely been done. The Department of State, in contrast, believed that the reorientation program not only had to be continued-and so instructed the High Commissioner---but that its importance was increasing. The progressive loss of direct controls, the Department reasoned, necessitated a shift from coercion to persuasion through a strengthened and far more sophisticated public affairs program. The program had to be given greater authority, its standards of performance had to be raised, and it had to be expanded. This expansion was to be accomplished by elevating the status of the program within the organizational structure of HICOG to office level, by enlarging and improving the, quality of the staff through more careful selection, and by requesting substantial appropriations from the Congress. All this was done during the period of HICOG's existence--1949-1953.
The shift to new programs necessitated a change of criteria which eventually gave the HICOG's public affairs program its distinctive character: (1) it was massive both in terms of persons and funds to be involved; (2) it was target oriented, aimed at the critical segments of German society; (3) it was highly stratified, ranging from grassroots to persons at the summit of political and civic responsibility, in short ail strata and factions of German society; (4) it was innovative, introducing such new features into German political, social, and cultural life as would be apt to assist in democratic reconstruction; (5) it was participatory, in that it permitted increasing German influence in the shaping of the program; and (6) it was interzonal, extending gradually to the British and French Zones of Occupation, but, of course, one must be reminded, not the Russian Zone, which the Soviets were rapidly turning into the People's Republic of Germany.
Massive
Under HICOG, the Public Affairs Program, where the reorientation effort was anchored, became the largest undertaking of its kind ever conducted by the United States in any country. At its peak in 1952, 3,415 persons were involved in that Program (Appendix III) and its budget was in the neighborhood of $48 million, i.e., nearly one-half of the total HICOG budget of $102 million. Of this $48 million, $6 million went into exchange of persons. A fourth of all American staff members and almost one-half of all locals were directly engaged in public affairs activities.(25) It should be noted that these sums did not include the so-called McCloy Fund, i.e., German mark counterpart revenue from the sale of American equipment, much of which was spent for purposes directly or indirectly related to public affairs. Nor did it include voluntary contributions of private American or German organizations in support of cultural exchanges. The HICOG staff in 1951 numbered 8,511.
Target Oriented
Focus on well-selected persons was stipulated in the directive which instructed the High Commission "to concentrate increasingly on those groups, organizations and institutions which have demonstrated their devotion to democratic ideals and practices, on individuals who are in a position of leadership or are likely to take a responsible part in the reconstruction of German community life, and on individuals and groups which have been exposed to anti-democratic influence or which are in need of guidance and assistance to withstand such influence."(26)
Stratified
The broad and extensive character of the program was manifest in the choice of devices employed to reach into every geographical and social area of Germany, particularly into rural communities, and to address people on various levels of intellectual sophistication, political authority, and community activities, ranging from mass audience appeal to tailor-made projects for special groups. A most useful element in implementing this multidimensional character of the program proved to be the use of the Kreis (County) Resident Officers who helped extend its benefits to the grassroots level.
Innovative
The introduction of new political, social, and cultural concepts and practices had started under OMGUS, notably in the area of school reform. A number of program features, designed to assist German Government officials wrestling with legislative and administrative reforms and other groups dealing with pressing problems of civil rights, education, social welfare, public health, community organization, and the like, were now introduced in addition to activities begun by OMGUS.
Participatory
The participatory character of the program had its modest beginnings under OMGUS when, among other things, Germans were invited to take part in the preliminary selection of prospective exchangees. This feature was now given greater emphasis and broader scope by the Policy Directive which enjoined the High Commissioner
"with the development of Germany toward a status of self-government . . . [to] encourage and facilitate the active and responsible participation of Germans in the formulation of programs conducted so far exclusively under American public and private auspices, including projects under joint auspices."
Interzonal
With respect to interzonal activities, progress was more gradual, although here, too, informal but limited contacts had preceded the actual enunciation of policy. In accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Agreement cited above, the Directive authorized the High Commissioner
"to determine, together with your British and French colleagues, the nature of projects which may be undertaken in cooperation with them ... and to seek to obtain agreement with your British and French colleagues which will permit coordination of existing programs and services, as far as desirable, and which will allow each power to conduct certain programs in the other occupation zones."
Relationships among the three Western powers were good, and in the course of events became more active, although each zonal occupation authority maintained its separate identity with regard to policy, program, and organization. One of the main reasons for this autonomy within the zones lay in the difference in philosophy that guided each, especially with respect to educational and cultural affairs. The British assumed rather early a fairly relaxed attitude on matters of reorientation, whereas the French for a much longer time maintained a strict "reformist" approach involving direct intervention in German domestic affairs. The American position lay somewhere in between. Consequently, few joint projects resulted, although consultation became more frequent and intensive.
One of the secrets of the success of the Public Affairs Program under HICOG, and perhaps one of its most significant features, was its restructuring both in Washington and in Germany. Essentially the new structure rested on four key pillars: (1) full integration of the public affairs policy in the Department's Bureau of German Affairs, on a par with the political and economic policies; (2) day-by-day coordination of policy with the Department's organization responsible for the administration of the worldwide educational exchange program, i.e., the Office of Educational Exchanges followed by the International Educational Exchange Service under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; (3) consolidation of the scattered parts of the reorientation program of OMGUS into one Office of Public Affairs of HICOG, equal in rank to the offices for political, economic, and legal affairs and with direct access to the High Commissioner (see Appendix II) ; and (4) clear channels of command and communication between Washington and the field. It was the combination of these four elements, more than anything else, that gave the reorientation program, or as it was now increasingly referred to, the Public Affairs Program, the status of primus inter pares and, with it, higher prestige, visibility, and more impact than it ever attained under OMGUS. It must indeed be doubted whether a program of lesser rank and scope would have attracted in equal measure the attention and support of leading officials, of Congress and of the American public.(27)
The Washington setup in the Department of State was unusual in many respects, so many in fact that it has been doubted whether it could ever serve as a model for future programs. Given the special situation occurring in Germany in those years, with the U.S. Government serving first as proxy for, and later as an adviser to and overseer of, the Government of the Federal Republic, the extraordinary circumstances indeed seem to exclude duplication of the model. However, they do not necessarily diminish the value of practices such as close cooperation between geographic desks responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and others concerned with the development of cultural exchange programs.
Policy direction and planning in the Department of State was centered in the Office, later the Bureau, of German Affairs (GER), headed by a director with the rank of Assistant Secretary of State and equal in status to the other geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State. Robert D. Murphy was the first director, subsequently Henry A. Byroade, who in turn was succeeded by James W. Riddleberger. The Bureau was responsible for the formulation of policy, for interagency and intergovernmental relationships, and for the provision of policy guidance to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner. In addition, it performed a wide range of operational tasks in connection with the occupation. Furthermore, it coordinated the efforts of all Departmental offices concerned with the program for Germany.(28) The Bureau consisted of the Office of the Director, the Office of the Executive Director, the Office of German Political Affairs, the Office of German Economic Affairs, and the Office of German and Austrian Public Affairs (GAI), which was directed by the author.(29)
As a focal point for public affairs policy and program planning, the Office of German and Austrian Public Affairs discharged several key responsibilities with respect to information, education, and domestic (U.S.) public affairs activities concerning Germany. They included the formulation of public affairs policy to guide and assist the Office of the High Commissioner in the day-by-day operation of the program and the coordination of public affairs policy in Germany with occupation policy and U.S. foreign policy in general.(30) These functions, in turn, entailed a series of implementary activities, such as participation in program planning, supervision, review and evaluation in terms of program effectiveness.(31) Later the Office assisted in the briefing of German leaders on matters regarding U.S. foreign policy and German-American relations (see, below). Of these responsibilities participation in the development of total U.S. policy toward Germany and formulation of public affairs policy for Germany were, by far the most significant ones. As one of the three offices of the Bureau, equal in status to the political and economic offices, the Office of German and Austrian Public Affairs was a party to important decisions affecting U.S. policy for Germany; and it provided advice and service on many decisions. The staff of GAI in those days numbered 26.(32)
For the performance of all strictly operational functions, GAI relied on the competent offices under the Bureau of Public Affairs headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. From 1948 to 1953, George V. Allen, Edward W. Barrett, and Howland R. Sargeant occupied that office. The Bureau had overall responsibility for the development of policies governing the International Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE). This Bureau acted with the advice of the regional bureaus, in the case of Germany with GER, and other geographic offices of the Department, as appropriate; it directed the conduct of international information and educational exchange activities, subject to the review of the regional or geographic bureaus, and it post-audited the execution of the programs.(33) The key operating unit within the Bureau for exchanges was the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX) under the direction of William C. Johnstone, Jr. Of the 155 staff members assigned to work on German public affairs, 129 worked in the Bureau of Public Affairs (P) but were paid from funds appropriated to the Office of German and Austrian Public Affairs.
The arrangement insured close coordination on the policy level between German public affairs and the U.S. worldwide public affairs program. On the operational level the activities carried on by the Bureau of Public Affairs on behalf of Germany remained subject to policy guidance and overall program planning by the Bureau of German Affairs (GER), through its Office of German and Austrian Public Affairs (GAI), and the Office of Public Affairs in HICOG. Conversely, worldwide policies of the Department's Bureau of Public Affairs were gradually introduced in the German program and many established activities, including the Voice of America, informational materials, press releases, magazines, motion pictures, and the like were used with appropriate adaptation to conditions in Germany. As for exchange, the institutional resources and machinery of USIE, used for programs on a worldwide scale, proved to be major assets in conducting the stateside part of the German program. In the fall of 1949, the Division of International Exchange of Persons (IEP) of OEX assumed active program responsibilities for the HICOG exchange of persons program.
The organization in Germany did not fall as easily into place as that in Washington. On the tripartite level the Allied High Commission charter, as we noted, denied information and cultural functions equal rank with political and economic affairs and relegated the former to subcommittee status. However, within HICOG the proposal of the 1949 survey mission prevailed. The Office of Public Affairs was created directly under the, High Commissioner and on a par with the other major program offices. It united under single leadership the various aspects of the reorientation program.
The first director of this office was Ralph Nicholson, a prominent newspaper publisher, radio station director, and public relations executive from New Orleans. His deputy was Shepard Stone, assistant editor of the New York Times Magazine who assumed the directorship after Mr. Nicholson's departure.(34) His deputy in turn was Frederick Burkhardt who had been President of Bennington College and later became President of the American Council of Learned Societies.
The office had two sub-units---the Division of Education and Cultural Relations and the Division of Information. James Morgan Read, previously Foreign Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, and subsequently U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, headed the former which, among other programs, sheltered the Exchange of Persons Branch (see below for details). Field offices handled public affairs activities in various zones.
In 1950 the total staff of the Public Affairs Program numbered 1,183 persons, of whom 503 were Americans and the rest Germans.
In 1951 the total had risen to 8,511 and 567, respectively. In 1952 the American contingent climbed to 594 but the total force dropped slightly to 7,046. Thereafter both categories underwent a gradual reduction in force. The sharpest decline of nearly 50 percent occurred in 1953, because of decreases in the total program. Still, in 1954 the total was 2,538, a larger group than was serving in any other country.
The priority of its objectives, the very scale of its operations, but specifically the supportive nature of its activities, which served the interests of other offices in HICOG, made the Office of Public Affairs the focal point for reorientation on the operational side in HICOG. Taking its cue from the now defunct Interdivisional Reorientation Committee of OMGUS, the Office of Public Affairs eventually regularized its coordinating function through the establishment of an interoffice committee (PEPCO) under the chairmanship of Director Shepard Stone, on which all major HICOG offices were represented. The effectiveness of the organization established in Washington and in Germany depended on the quality of communications between the two elements, and on a clear understanding by both of their relationship and of the nature of their respective responsibilities within that framework. The instructions given the Public Affairs Office of HICOG by the Department spelled it out. They stipulated
"that arrangements be made to insure constant maintenance of closest coordination in matters of policy and program between the Department of State and the Public Affairs Officer (HICOG) and his organization under the established system. whereby the Department formulates policy, issues guidance and does broad program planning for all public affairs operations of the Department in the United States and abroad to insure consistency of policy and program in each area with those of other areas and with overall U.S. objectives."
Accordingly, they provided
"that the Public Affairs Officer (HICOG) establish procedures whereby policy and program recommendations may be transmitted from the field for the consideration of the Department,"
and, in turn,
"that the Department, in cooperation with the appropriate government and private agencies and organizations, assume responsibility for and provide such backstopping services as will be required by the Public Affairs officer in the performance of his functions."
Furthermore, the instructions made it clear that in conformance with these arrangements the long-range and day-by-day programs under the jurisdiction of the Public Affairs Officer "continue to be performed in accordance with policy guidance issued by the Department" and that the Department "will make available to the Public Affairs Officer guidances which will reflect the official position of the Department."(35)
The arrangements proved to be sound and effective. They profited in no minor degree from the high caliber of leadership shown by the Public Affairs Officer and his staff and the excellent personal relations that existed between key personnel in the Department and HICOG. Furthermore, officers in Washington and in the field were in constant working contact with each other, facilitated by almost daily telecons(36) and frequent visits. Arrangements were kept flexible to permit changes in policy, programs, and procedures as demanded by a political situation that remained in constant flux.
It should be noted for the record that some HICOG officers had viewed the takeover by the Department of State with a degree of concern They had feared that the Department's preoccupation with problems of global reach would work to the disadvantage of the German program and reduce it in importance and size to the level of other country programs. But after having touched base, with the key policy and program planners in the Department in December 1949, Sam H. Linch, one of the principal officers on the staff of the late Dr. Ralph A. Burns, the chief of HICOG's exchange program, sent home this message: "We do not need to worry about the Department considering Germany in the same way as it does the rest of the world. They fully realize here, that the occupation areas represent particular and unique reorientation problems."(37) It was indeed the quasi-governmental nature of the U.S. Government's authority in Germany vested in the Bureau of German Affairs and in the High Commissioner's office that gave GER and HICOG powers of control not exercised by any other bureau and that correspondingly required policies different from those developed for other countries.