Henry J. Kellermann Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954

The question that needs to be answered, is whether and to what extent the investment made by the United States in American-German exchanges during the postwar period benefited both countries, indeed whether there was any tangible, lasting, and traceable effect. This was, of course, the principal question which representatives of the Department of State were asked time and time again when justifying the program budget at the annual hearings before Congress in the early fifties. In those days effectiveness could be measured only in terms of instant visible results, such as direct personal actions taken or opinions voiced by participants upon their return home. Much of the evidence available then was spotty and inconclusive. Moreover, long-range effects were hard to predict with any degree of assurance. In the absence of a systematic year-by-year follow-up record, it has now become difficult to establish with any degree of certainty the causal connection between the exchange experience and institutional or attitudinal changes in Germany.

Nevertheless, in the, case of the U.S.-German exchange program of the post-World War II period, evidence documenting the effectiveness of the program is more substantial than that accumulated for other country programs. It exists in the form of testimonials by high public officials in Germany and in the United States; of institutional evaluations; of reports and letters written by sponsors and participants; and quite especially of government-sponsored evaluation studies and opinion surveys conducted by HICOG's special survey staff under the able direction of Leo Crespi. In fact, it may be, said that no other exchange program of the U.S. Government has been the subject of such intensive efforts to collect systematic evidence to measure and evaluate its results in terms of the goals it set out to accomplish.

The U.S. Government-sponsored surveys, in particular, were of major value not merely in assessing the effectiveness of the program, but also in administering and occasionally, when the evidence so indicated, in modifying it. The surveys and evaluation studies were made during the short span of time when the program was at its peak, in the late forties and early fifties. They reflect changes which were, observed during that period, but they do not provide firm conclusions about the lasting effect.

There are other factors to be kept in mind. In the case of institutional changes, such as political, social, and educational reforms, any attempt to identify specific change agents is compounded by a variety of intangible, often elusive, factors.(1) Many of the institutional innovations in postwar Germany adapted from American models have by now become an integral part of German life, to the extent that a search for causes and effects would be a difficult and problematical task. Personal as well as national pride in their accomplishments may keep German reformers from sharing the credit with outsiders. To be sure, many institutional changes that may have been stimulated by external influence were not simple copies of foreign models but required major adaptations based on extensive research and development, with the result that the new model could claim as much originality as the one on which it was patterned.

Current German literature dealing with the problem of educational reform (Bildungsreform), for instance, practically ignores the immediate post-World War II influence of American or, for that matter, British and French reorientation and exchange programs. There is a distinct tendency on the part of German educators to date the current reform movement back to the creation of the German Educational Council (Deutscher Bildungsrat) in 1965, or even later.(2) The mid-sixties indeed witnessed the beginning of a systematic overhaul of the structure of the educational system under wholly German auspices. A report issued in 1974 by Inter-Nationes, the government-financed information agency,(3) contains not a single reference to earlier reforms stimulated by the U.S. reorientation program. In fact, it stresses the absence of any such initiatives prior to 1960, pointing out that the first 10 or 15 years after 1945 were devoted to repairing the war damage, to restoring school buildings, and to remedying the teacher shortage. Only after physical reconstruction had been completed, the article says, "could thought be given to further development and internal reforms." Substantive reform, according to other sources, was patterned on German experience, namely, the democratic model of the Weimar Republic.(4) Only occasionally can a reference be found to the "accelerating" influence of the exchange experience with "Anglo-Saxon" countries upon certain innovations such as the development of "comprehensive schools."(5) Yet, in private conversation, German educators as well as others, including important government officials now in office, who remember the American effort in the late forties and early fifties, acknowledge the influence of American experts, of their own experience in the United States or that of others, on the emergence of new ideas and new programs, indeed, on the movement toward educational reforms that now preoccupies the Federal Republic and its Laender.

The relationship between the exchange experience and institutional reform then is, for reasons indicated above, a delicate question. To answer it satisfactorily would require an investigation far beyond the scope of this study. The random samples of evaluation surveys and studies used in this chapter have been selected to illustrate short- and long-term effectiveness. They do not tell the whole story. For measuring attitudinal changes among German participants in the program, the evaluator had to deal with the problems of predictability and constancy. He was dealing with the factor of constant change.(6) To be more specific, the exchange program was based on the following assumptions: first, that exposure to a different environment would produce changes in the views and attitudes of the visitors, enrich their knowledge and skills, and, with it, raise prospects for personal improvement; second, that these changes might cause them to share their (favorable, one hoped) impressions with others, thus contributing to better understanding and improvement of relations between host and home country; and, third, that the German participants would apply the benefits of their experience by initiating or stimulating actions upon their return which, in turn, would generate political, social, and educational changes. The last assumption was, of course, a major one in the rationale of the postwar German reorientation program, and one which made the exchange program an important instrument of U.S. policy.

The surveys conducted under the auspices of the Department of State and HICOG in the early fifties indicate that these assumptions were basically correct. Substantial numbers of Germans changed their views of the United States and some of them took specific actions that confirmed this change upon their return to Germany. Criteria used to verify such changes were growth of political concern, appreciation of democratic concepts, understanding of the United States and its foreign policy, awareness of the educational, scientific, and cultural achievements of other countries, sense of international cooperation, contribution to the common (Western) defense effort, and the like. That the changes in attitudes were caused by the exchange experience was tested in two ways: by comparing the views of Germans who came to the United States and returned home with those of so-called "eligibles," that is, persons who were qualified but were not selected for participation in exchange visits;(7) and by examining the views of participants at the beginning and after completion of their visit.(8) The first type of study established clearly that those who participated in exchange visits, most of whom had by then been back in Germany for 2 or 3 years---some more than 5---exhibited more favorable views of the United States than "eligibles." The questionnaires used in the second case ("before" and "after" the exchange experience) showed distinct shifts in the direction of more democratic and more pro-American attitudes.

There were exceptions. In a few cases the exchanges produced effects that were not intended and others that were wholly undesired, such as unqualified criticism. But these instances were rare, as were those of exchangees who returned to Germany with, on balance, unfavorable impressions. True in some cases visits to the United States, far from changing attitudes, simply reinforced prejudices held previously. But conversely, some young exchangees, greatly attracted by conditions in the United States, refused to return to their homeland or, upon their return, emigrated to America or to other countries. While all these cases were relatively insignificant in number, they demonstrate the unpredictability of personal reactions to the exchange experience.

Even more important in assessing attitudinal changes are factors that subsequently modify the intensity and the nature of the impact achieved. How high, indeed, is the probability that impressions gained during a relatively short period of exposure will not fade over time, be altered or altogether erased by new, possibly conflicting experiences? A survey made in 1,955 of students and information specialists who returned from exchange Visits(9) showed that approximately 25 percent of the students and a smaller percentage of the specialists after short visits had revised their judgment about the United States downward (from favorable, to unfavorable) or upward. While "relapses" or other changes of mind do not invalidate the overall effectiveness of the exchange experience, they indicate an element of instability that must be taken into consideration in determining long-range effects. Follow-up programs instituted by HICOG in the form of conferences, workshops, "alumni clubs," bulletins, organized correspondence with overseas contacts and hosts, and the use, of returnees on screening committees for the selection of new candidates and in public media---all did a great deal in prolonging the impact, in extending the benefits of the exchange experience and in improving the quality of the overall effort. But the effectiveness of this sort of postprogram activity, unless actively pursued over a long period of time, was bound to wane.

There were other factors, apart from time lapse, which precluded facile generalizations and which made for considerable variety in both the durability and nature of changes produced. Most of those modifiers, as the surveys show, were age, professional and social status, and background of the individual exchangee. High school students, as expected, were the most impressionable group. Studies made of teenagers' reactions(10) showed that their visits had a profound personal effect upon nearly all of them. Largely uninformed and in some cases strongly biased concerning things American when they started their visit, they returned to Germany with a universally favorable view of the United States, so much so in fact, that some of them began to draw invidious comparisons between the United States and their home country, unfavorable to the latter, which resulted in serious problems of readjustment. Shifts to more positive attitudes toward the United States during their visits were far more pronounced among teenagers than among any other group. Unquestionably, the malleability of this age group that was more intimately and more consistently exposed to American community and family life than any other, was chiefly responsible for the close and friendly relations engendered by the teenage program, but it was also the very factor which raised doubts about the longevity of the impact. Evaluators cautioned that the volatility of this age group, the controls of their home environment where steadily improving conditions gradually began to match the magnetism of America, and the growing distance from the exchange experience, in some cases may have combined to dim the memory of the American impressions.

With respect to age, a study conducted by the National Social Welfare Assembly(11) which grouped the degree of acceptance of democratic values by persons between the ages of 19 and 69 on a plus or minus scale, found the highest aggregate of pluses in the oldest age group, i.e., 51 to 69 years of age (87 percent), and the highest minus aggregate in the youngest age group, i.e., 18 to 23 (38.1 percent). The majority of the critical 24 to 31 year age group were in the plus category but mostly on the lowest "average plus" level. When applied to social and professional groups, the scale gave the highest plus rating to journalists, artists, and architects (83.3 percent). Industrialists, civil service employees, white-collar workers and laborers ranked next, and the majority of teachers and ministers represented an average plus in the evaluation scale.

The minus showing of the lower age group (18 to 23) in the study is largely borne out by other surveys which examined the attitudes of university students. In many instances, involving judgments of democratic concepts, American institutions and practices, students emerged, at least in the beginning, as critics and skeptics and occasionally as outright rejectionists. Their criticism was leveled at American "materialism," certain personal characteristics of Americans, the "mechanization" of human relations, racial and religious discrimination, the predominance of technology over culture, and standards of education on all levels. These, however, were the opinions of only a few.(12) The majority of students were positive in their evaluations and became even more so during the time of their stay. Curiously, some of the aspects of American life that received the strongest criticism by some were the very same that were singled out by others for highest praise, such as American social life and human relations, the American "way of life," and the American educational system. Group solidarity on the part of the Germans---"sticking together"---seems to have produced occasional tendencies to maintain and reinforce rejection and criticism. Those who after a period of self-imposed segregation broke ranks and went out on their own to study and observe frequently turned into ardent enthusiasts.(13)

Student criticism, no less than evident contradictions in judgment, must be attributed in part to the heterogeneous character of a group of young adults, most of whom had spent their formative years under the Nazi regime, had been exposed to Nazi propaganda aimed at the United States and other democracies, and, above all, had been left totally without choice of alternatives to National Socialist indoctrination. Their concept of democracy rarely went beyond theoretical definitions and scarcely ever included notions of a way of life. Their visit to the United States was the first encounter with a free, democratic society. Prepared to embrace the virtues of democracy, their criticism of conditions in the United States was often directed not so much at the United States or its political system as at its failure to live up to its promises and to their own expectations, e.g., social justice, nondiscrimination, and the like. At the, same time, conscious of the recent past, they were, highly defensive, i.e., determined to disclaim any association with nazism, and eager to extol what they considered Germany's best traditions and cultural achievements against American "materialism," anti-intellectualism and egalitarianism. They were suspicious of programs that smacked of reorientation. In part, their criticism reflected disillusionment with the old and distrust of new "systems." In part, this reaction was the result., of misunderstanding or sheer ignorance of the broad spectrum of American life because of relative isolation on the campus.

Unlike teenagers who were integrated into the American community, and specialists and leaders, who were continuously on the road, students were by and large confined to a controlled environment. Despite occasional trips outside the campus, their exposure to the American community was more circumscribed and their impressions therefore more limited, that is, conditioned by their immediate surroundings.

Leaders, on the other hand, by virtue of their status at home, emerged as the group with the highest potential for applying American models to their home environment but with a relatively low showing of attitudinal changes. This was not altogether surprising. Being an older and more mature group, their views, some of which had been formed by experiences predating the Nazi period, were on the, whole more balanced and more impervious to external influence. Their predisposition toward the United States was mostly positive from the outset, needed less adjustment, and therefore underwent only marginal changes. Resolved to demonstrate their democratic convictions, leaders, however, assumed a more critical stance with respect to such issues as racial discrimination. On the positive side, American patterns of social conduct impressed them most favorably and prompted nearly half of the leaders to revise original preconceptions. A special study examining the views expressed by leaders(14) confirmed them as the relatively most stable group. Changes in attitude occurred, mostly in a positive direction, but on the whole were slight and limited to a minority.

Geographic background appears to have been a factor of relatively minor weight, except in the case of Berlin. Exchange visitors from Berlin, more militantly pro-American and anti-Soviet from the start than the rest of their fellow countrymen, showed a definite tendency to adopt more favorable attitudes toward the United States and its policy.(15) The reasons are understandable. A strong democratic tradition dating back to pre-Nazi days, a frontline position in the cold war, and military protection guaranteed by the American presence, e.g., the airlift, had created especially close ties between the United States and the people of Berlin.

Making due allowance for modifications of effects caused by all of the above factors, the following comments on the analyses and conclusions of evaluation studies and reports, which attempted to measure the effectiveness of the exchange program up to 1955, summarize evidence of changes in the light of desired objectives. Questions which these studies attempted to answer were: In what way did the program contribute to the reorientation effort? Did it contribute to institutional changes? How did it assist in projecting the American image? Did it lead to a better understanding and support of U.S. policy toward Germany? Did this understanding and support extend to the population at large? Did the program benefit the individual German participant, for instance, by enhancing his prospects for personal advancement? Finally, was the program appreciated on its own merits as a means of improving relations between the United States and Germany?

To what extent the exchange program contributed to the growth of democratic attitudes and democratic institutions in post-Nazi Germany is the question that is hardest to answer. Germans, as we noted, take justified pride in having created, out of the ashes left by nazism and World War II, a viable political system which is economically sound, firmly allied with Western democracies, and well respected by the international community. German leadership, to an overwhelming extent, recognizes the role that American assistance has played in accomplishing these results, but it would reject, quite understandably, any suggestions that "the German miracle" of postwar reconstruction had been the achievement of outsiders. Assertions to that effect would, indeed, be offensive inasmuch as they would be considered to deny to German democracy the title to a self-chosen and self-made system of government and way of life. The fate of the Weimar Republic that fell victim to charges of external interference and of being a carbon copy of alien models is still alive in the memory of many members of the older generation.

Yet, evidence of American contributions is equally undeniable. Traces can be detected everywhere, in the governmental system, in national legislation, in administrative procedures, in academic life, in educational institutions, in social welfare, in women's, affairs, in the new architecture, in business, in advertising techniques, and so on. Some of these innovations are attributable, directly or indirectly, to OMGUS and later to HICOG initiatives, specifically to the influence of American experts and specialists who visited Germany during the early years of the occupation. Examples of those, set in motion by American experts are the promotion of civil liberties and of citizen participation in public affairs, notably of women; the creation of new institutions of learning, such as the Free University and the American Memorial Library, both in Berlin; the emergence of the so-called "comprehensive school" (Gesamtschule), an experimental new school type that broke with the two-track or multitrack system in German education; the "studium generale" which made the study of the liberal arts and humanities a prerequisite to professional training; the introduction of. "Politologie" (political science) as a legitimate and fully recognized subject for serious study in the curriculum of universities; the emphasis on social studies in elementary and secondary school curricula; the trend toward the elevation of "other" (sonstige) institutes of higher learning, e.g., for pedagogics, social work, arts and music, to the status of full academic accreditation; the increase of the student population to about twice its former size; and the introduction of the open-shelf library system. This list is by no means complete, but may suffice to illustrate the wide range and the fundamental nature of reforms that can be ascribed to external, especially American, influence.

Reflecting on the long-range effects of the educational program, James M. Read, who served as chief of HICOG's Education and Cultural Relations Division during the early years of the program, later offered a cautious and perhaps unduly modest appraisal. "I do think," Read states,(16) "[that] the educational effort made a dent." As to institutional changes, Read felt that university reform in his days made great strides forward, an opinion shared by many observers. Granted certain exceptions, the "two-track" system was not abolished, but then, Read points out, it is a system practiced in other European countries and notably in Great Britain. While Read is right in saying that some of the most fundamental objectives were not achieved under HICOG, it is an undeniable fact that the efforts of Read and his colleagues began trends toward reform, which gripped the educational community in Germany and have not come to rest to this day.

An even larger series of innovations was initiated by Germans who visited the United States under the program after their return to Germany---a point also made by Read. For example, one of the first groups of Bundestag members to visit the United States studied the Legislative Reference Service(17) of the Library of Congress with a view to its possible adoption by the Bundestag (see Chapter IV). The group was convinced that the establishment of an institution of this kind would insure greater independence of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive branch. As pointed out earlier, German legislators had to rely on the resources and cooperation of the executive branch even in the exercise of their constitutional prerogatives, such as the preparation of bills. The visit gave fresh impetus to frequent demands "to restructure and expand the Research Division" of the Bundestag on the model of the U.S. Congress. It was argued that the Bundestag could only hope to exercise its constitutional prerogatives as "the" legislator and supreme organ of control of the Federation, if it were to perform its functions in complete, independence of the branch. Pending approval of a more fundamental revision of the existing system, the "Research Division" was to concentrate, on the buildup of the library, the archives, the service for "legislative materials," and the press and information office.(18)

An even more important project was the visit of the Bundestag Security Committee which in 1954-1955 was drafting new defense legislation (see Chapter IV). The author developed the proposal to invite members of the Committee, to study the American defense system, not so much from the military point of view but rather from the angle of its constitutional requirements, such as civilian control, service regulations, judicial provisions, and the like.(19) The, group, consisting of eight members of the Bundestag Committee and three officials of the Federal Defense Ministry, was given a thorough briefing by high-level civilian and military authorities in Washington, and thereafter inspected a number of military installations across the country. It ended its tour with a full-day discussion with American political leaders and experts under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Chairman of the Committee, Vice-President of the Bundestag, Richard Jaeger, declared that the group had come to the United States to find out by studying the American model how to build a democratic army. He said: "We Germans had a good army in the past. We hope to have a good democracy. Our tragedy has been that we have never been able to have both simultaneously. You Americans have both. We are here to find out how to work it."(20) Upon their return to Germany, members of the group set out to defeat the so-called "Blitz" bill for the creation of a new army then pending before the Bundestag, which, they pointed out, did not guarantee sufficient civilian control of the armed forces as they had observed it in the United States. Largely on the strength of their testimony, the Bundestag rejected the proposed bill. Alternative legislation was prepared which finally emerged in the form of two laws, the Defense Service Law (Wehrpflichtgesetz) and a law concerning the Legal Status of Soldiers (Soldatengesetz). The laws regulated the duties and rights of the members of the German defense forces in a manner that was exemplary in terms of the protection of individual rights and democratic procedures. Neither law was an exact replica of American policies or regulations. Yet the drafters would have been the last to deny that they had benefited substantially from their American experience.

For reasons indicated above, institutional changes in such fields as public administration, education, and social welfare introduced by German exchange visitors are more difficult to trace. In the early fifties German authorities and, in particular, returning visitors were far less reticent, often eager to point to changes which they had initiated as a result of observations made during their stay in the United States. We noted earlier the enthusiastic endorsement of the "Basic Principles for Democratization of Education in Germany," enunciated in Control Council Directive 54, by a leading German educator. HICOG's reports during these years record a substantial number of innovations introduced by leaders, specialists, and students, based on their own testimony on observations made in the United States.

Franz Meyers, Minister of the Interior for North Rhine-Westphalia in 1952, for instance, initiated upon his return a far-reaching administrative reform program in his own jurisdiction reflecting his appreciation of the American system.(21) Police officials remodeled traffic systems and improved training for traffic control.

Examples of changes in the field of education are more numerous. Professor Hellmut Becker, Director of the Max Planck Institute for Educational Research at Berlin, points out that the whole idea for his institute was developed as a result of his first visit to the United States after the war.(22) As a member of the National Educational Planning Association of the Federal Republic, Professor Becker recommended: (1) the introduction of comprehensive school systems on an experimental basis, (2) increased autonomy of schools, and (3) greater participation of teachers, students and parents in the administration of school s.(23)

Other educational leaders returning from their visits introduced significant innovations in their immediate sphere of competence. Eva Richter, teacher at Ruedesheim, introduced courses in political science over the protest of faculty members. The President of the Free University of Berlin, Freiherr von Kress, instituted night school extension courses to provide academic training and the obtainment of degrees for daytime workers. Dr. Anton Fingerle, inspector of the Munich school system, established a school test institute, a home economics institute, and a social studies institute patterned after models he had studied during his 3-month visit to the United States. Other innovations promoted by exchange participants included courses in civics and women's education, and extension courses for the rural population.(24)

In the field of law and law enforcement, high officials from different states (Laender) who had studied American prison, parole, and correction practices, launched a series of reforms tending toward a liberalization and improvement of the German system, including new investigative, supervisory, parole planning and probation methods, and the use of new psychometric techniques in prison welfare work.(25)

Labor leaders established training courses for workers in industry, first on the state and later on the federal level.

Women exchange visitors founded nonpartisan women's organizations along the lines of the League of Women Voters preparing and disseminating information to educate women in civic affairs.

Health and welfare officials, greatly impressed with American physical and mental hygiene practices, introduced corresponding methods within their respective areas of jurisdiction, e.g., medical examinations for school children and for grocery store and meat market personnel, using physical, visual, and oral tests observed in the United States, and team methodology.

Journalists and other media specialists instituted new programs in citizen education---discussions of public issues aimed specifically at youth audiences. Newspaper publishers and editors established compulsory training courses for editorial staffs to improve journalistic techniques, as stated by one editor, "on the basis of the knowledge I gained in American schools of journalism and of discussions with American newspapermen in 1951."(26)

A social worker from Munich arranged courses for coworkers in which she introduced them to the techniques of the American "casework" method. Later she was selected to organize child guidance programs in Bavaria.

Upon his return the city architect of Bremerhaven built a new playground with distinctive American features.

Students, inspired by American examples, wrote new constitutions for their student bodies, formed advisory groups to orient foreign students, and established workshops on "democracy in action."

U.S. attempts to stimulate citizen initiative and cooperation in community affairs through so-called "Cooperative Action Teams" deserve special mention. The composition of their membership emphasized the cooperative nature of community work in the public and private sector. They met with varying degrees of success. Some of the returnees, inspired by what they had observed in the United States, instituted a series of innovations on the local level, such as traffic safety councils, parent-teacher organizations, state-wide teachers' organizations, civics courses for young and old, associations for civic participation, groups concerned with special interests of women, and the like. City councils opened their sessions to the public.

Some members of the teams were more successful than others in getting community reforms under way. The teams which studied community conditions and institutions in American cities gave special attention to schools, welfare institutions, family life, housing, and the like. The impressions they gained were predominantly positive and, although in general favorably disposed to the United States before their departure, there was a measurable increase of affirmative attitudes at the time of their return. Moreover, the results of a survey of 135 such team members showed clearly that they were more inclined to believe on the basis of their American experience that Germany could learn from America in matters relating to labor-management relations, government and municipal administration, and education.

Yet, not all teams were equally successful in introducing significant changes on their return. While their impressions were positive, some remained unconvinced that their experiences were applicable to conditions at home. Also, quite often, there was little evidence of a concerted effort to recommend or initiate democratic reforms as a means of solving community problems. This failure to transfer their new knowledge and to convert it into constructive action may have been the result of lack of individual initiative or of community resistance. But it may also have been due to defective selection and organization of the team itself. In an effort to achieve a broad range of representation, teams had been composed in many instances of persons who had never formed a closely-knit group before their departure, never achieved a team. spirit during their visit, and never cooperated as a team upon their return.(27) Except for the teams from Krefeld and Giessen, who carried out some of the above-mentioned reforms, most changes that were accomplished on the community level were attributable to the initiative of individual team members rather than to a cooperative effort by all.

The aforementioned examples of institutional reforms, it should be emphasized once again, do not give more than a fragmentary picture of the efforts made by German participants, least of all of the long-range and fundamental effects of the program. On the other hand, more comprehensive evidence of the psychological impact on the participants is available in the form of a series of studies conducted in the early fifties under the auspices of the Department of State and HICOG. The studies provide occasional glimpses of changes of attitude toward the concepts and merits of democracy, but they focus mainly on impressions about the exchange program and its purposes, American policy in Germany, and American institutions and attitudes.

A survey conducted in 1950 and 1951, by the Institute for Research in Human Relations, through the use of two questionnaires, checked the attitudes of 49 leaders, 258 university students, and 85 secondary school students (teenagers), before and after their visit to the United States. This survey probed into the prevalence of elitist-authoritarian versus democratic-equalitarian attitudes. It established marked shifts from the authoritarian to the equalitarian pattern in all three groups. The changes were most pronounced among high school and university students with one-third of the former and one-half of the latter switching from "slightly authoritarian" to "slightly equalitarian" or "equalitarian" views. Changes among leaders were less drastic with most of them exhibiting equalitarian attitudes from the outset. Nearly 90 percent ended up in the "equalitarian" (45 percent) or "slightly equalitarian" category (42 percent).(28) These observations tally with reports quoted earlier in this chapter that found the older age groups (32 to 69 years) far more ready to accept democratic values than the younger ones.

Changes toward more democratic attitudes became apparent in response to deliberately provocative statements such as "leaders are born, not made;" "it is wasteful to make secondary education available to everybody, because some cannot benefit from it;" "if important decisions for an organization can be made quickly by one person, it is unnecessary to put up with the delay involved in committee deliberation and voting;" and "the government should have the right to ban newspapers which consistently distort and attack government policy." When they arrived in the United States, the majority of respondents in all three groups disagreed with the views expressed in the statements (except that a majority of teenagers felt at the beginning of their visit to the United States that leaders were, "born, not made"). After the visit, the number of those who had originally agreed with the statements declined substantially. The total of those who disagreed increased. Most of those who had pleaded ignorance or had failed to give an answer in the first questionnaire committed themselves to a definite position in the second. (In the case of teenagers, the ratio of dissidents and consenters: to the first question was reversed.) The change of basic beliefs had an interesting practical implication. A majority of teenagers (81 percent) and students (68 percent) felt that the exchange experience would change their future role as German citizens.(29)

While the influence of the exchange program on attitudes is undeniable, the evidence is not always conclusive.(30) On balance though, subsequent events have demonstrated that exchangees returned with new knowledge, that in the light of new insights gained many revised their attitudes, and moved by their experience, applied the benefits they had reaped in the pursuit of their political, professional, or personal goals. Therefore, quite often institutional changes did occur as a result of attitudinal changes. In other cases they may have been the result of a combination of factors.

The presentation of American democracy and the American "way of life" stimulated, at least during the period covered in this study, domestic innovations. It had, in fact, been hoped that independent on-the-spot observations by German exchangees might lead to a greater appreciation of, and the voluntary adoption or adaptation of certain features of American democracy and life. There, is good reason to believe, as indicated above, that this occurred. Documentary films recently produced by Germans to picture the "Americanization of Germany" are impressive but not always favorable and in some instances quite critical. None of them, however, attempts to relate these changes to any aspect of the exchange program.

The studies made under State Department and HICOG auspices which examine the impressions gained by German exchangees during their stay in the United States were more conclusive. By no means were all of them positive and some too were highly critical, but on balance favorable views seem to have prevailed. A study, conducted in 1959-1960, upon the request of the United States Educational Commission in Germany, and based on a sample, of 647 Fulbright grantees, both students and senior scholars,(31) showed that nearly two-thirds had changed their opinion about the United States to a more positive one. An earlier 1951 study, in which grantees of all categories, academic and nonacademic, were queried, had tried to refine similar findings by focusing the views of the German participants on specific aspects of American democracy and life.(32) They were asked to sort out favorable and unfavorable impressions of such features as American democratic concepts, and practices (especially with respect to everyday conduct), governmental structure, exercise of individual rights and freedoms, American institutions, and above all the qualities of Americans as hard-working and friendly people of good will ("not so much different from Germans"). Their reactions were largely favorable, although never quite reaching 50 percent in all cases.

Some of the subjects, covered in these two studies, made 10 years apart, namely, government, democracy in actual practice, institutions, and stereotypes about personal qualities of Americans (superficiality, naiveté vis-a-vis Germany, materialism, lack of culture, and zest for fun) evoked also the highest percentage of stereotyped negative judgments from German participants. Racial and other types of discrimination were cited prominently among the unfavorable impressions.(33) On the whole, differences of opinion among the three groups---leaders, students, and teenagers---were rather slight except that leaders, as noted earlier, were more outspokenly critical of the treatment of minorities, notably the black population. Surveys conducted in and since 1955 revealed a higher percentage. of favorable impressions among students and information specialists with respect to such aspects as American social life and human relations. Favorable views of outlook on life and way of living far outweighed negative judgments.(34) Fulbright grantees listed those areas in which they developed more positive opinions about the United States, as "character and behavior of Americans," "characteristics. of Americans as individuals," "educational system," "Americans as citizens," "the American way of life," "cultural life," "family life," and "openmindedness of Americans toward Germany and other countries."(35)

The years between 1951 and 1960 were years of progressive rapprochement in German-American relations. More Germans had seen more of the United States and, on balance, liked what they saw. Increasingly, returning Germans were ready to concede that Germany could learn from America in such matters as democratic concepts, "melting pot" philosophy, and personal freedom. Early surveys conducted in 1951 showed a slow growth of such opinions, eventually exceeding 50 percent.(36) A survey made in 1953 revealed that more than two-thirds of those interviewed responded that their country had "a lot" to learn from the United States in fields such as government, municipal administration, and other features of political life, and labor-management relations.(37) Yet another survey showed that the enthusiasm of many appears to have faded upon their return when they came once more, face to face with traditional German apathy and suspicion toward civic cooperation ("groupism") as a threat to individual initiative. Some concluded that the application of American methods to German civic life was simply not practical.(38)

It had been the hope of those who had fashioned the U.S. program that the projection of the American image would generate reactions that went beyond mere acknowledgment of the merits of a democratic system. They were not disappointed. "My way of thinking which at the beginning was still nationalistic," wrote, a student, "has now changed to an international or universal one." He added that this was "due to the study of the political pattern of the U.S.A., effected by contact with many Americans ... "(39) Internationalism, according to one evaluation study,(40) became indeed an issue of increasingly personal importance to the visitors who reported that they had become more cosmopolitan. So did democracy, in the sense that they felt that they had become more independent in forming their opinions, more tolerant, and more flexible. Also, their attempts to bring about democratic reforms at the national level reflected a stronger commitment to democratic values, although they did not necessarily use ideological labels in introducing political and administrative innovations.

The emergence of a more positive and, at the mine time, more. realistic view of the United States is evident when impressions are related to specific facets of American democracy. As far as concepts of the government's functions were concerned, the various surveys indicated that students and leaders changed their views from a more idealistic or extreme to a more moderate position. For instance, few, if any, expressed the view that Americans saw the role of government primarily as that of protecting life and property. But while they conceded that Americans accepted some governmental control in the economic sphere, they also preferred to see such powers limited. By the same token, the number of those who at the beginning thought that the American economy was operating under an unrestricted "laissez-faire" system decreased in favor of a substantial majority who concluded on the basis of their observations, that there was some regulation of business, although basically the "laissez-faire" principle prevailed.

Education was the most highly admired but also the most severely criticized feature of American life. As indicated in the findings of a study made in the mid-fifties, German students and leaders seemed especially impressed with the goals of a system in which "the development of the total personality" and "the development of an inquisitive mind" appeared to be the highest, and the "teaching of discipline and obedience" one of the lowest goals. "Acquisition of factual information and of special skills," the ability "to earn money," and "preparation for good citizenship" ranked somewhere in the middle.(41) A later study indicated that nearly one-third of the Fulbright grantees found that conditions in the field of American education exceeded their expectations, with the highest percentage (52) among postgraduate students. Among the most positive aspects cited were "relationships between professors and students," "academic level of universities and schools," "industry, seriousness of purpose and discipline of American students," "scientific and educational standards of Americans," "university facilities and scientific equipment," "training and working methods," and "social and civic education."(42)

Members of the German cooperative action teams, as evident in studies made in 1953 and 1954, expressed themselves favorably about such matters as training for citizenship, the flexibility of high school curricula, the, quality of school buildings, the quantity and diversity of teaching equipment, the informality of relationships between teachers and students, and the cooperation among parents and teachers.(43) At the same time they felt that these very advantages in the U.S. school system were obtained at a price. American school children, they concluded, learned less than their German counterparts---a fact stressed also by German teenagers enrolled in public schools.(44) Opinions were mixed, though, with respect to the applicability of features of the American system to German education, even of those that were much admired.

A relatively small percentage of Fulbright students thought that certain features of American education lent themselves to suitable adaptation in Germany. Among those most frequently mentioned were: teaching methods, research equipment, group and team work, and ratio of students to professors.(45) While, many exchangees, especially teenagers and specialists, stated their estimates of transferability in more generalized terms by saying that Germany had "a lot" to learn from the United States in the field of education, and a substantial additional number thought that "something" could be learned, university students maintained a more reserved posture.(46)

It was the democratic structure of American education that elicited some of the highest praise. In the mid-fifties a teacher trainee at Southwest Texas State Teachers College put it this way:(47) "I got a feeling for two things which were new to me, two things I will never lose in my life: the idea of equal education for everybody, regardless of class or his parents' position; secondly the idea of real freedom . . . I confess that I got another point of view about the education we are so proud of in Germany . . . The world of the Twentieth Century in which we live requires more than a small well-trained and educated group of people who may work for the benefit of their nation---but who can also misuse their intelligence by authoritative means . . . I found the key to American democratic life. We teach democracy today---your children live democracy. I recognized the entire American way of life reflected in American education, and I think from that Germany has a lot to learn."

Exposure to the American system of education, specifically higher education, however, also produced controversy and, in some cases, negative results. The most articulate critics of American standards, particularly in higher education, proved to be a minority of German university students who, for reasons of their own, were critical and least cooperative. Their reactions to American institutions, national characteristics, and political attitudes, often ranged from negative to hostile.(48)

The special university-student leader projects on student government of the early and mid-fifties evoked some of the most critical comments. German students argued that there were fundamental and seemingly unbridgeable differences between American and German standards. (It should be noted that some of these were short-term observation visits.) In some instances the German students were careful to limit their critique to the host university, but often it was sweeping and uncompromising, aimed at the American university campus system in its totality. In essence, objections of visiting teams of German students could be epitomized as an indictment of American acceptance of college discipline as against German espousal of "academic freedom" as they conceived it.

"The [American] student," in the words of a member of the German student team observing student government at the University of Minnesota, "is deprived of very specific freedoms: the freedom of having a responsibility; the freedom of thinking and acting independently; the freedom of thinking critically; the freedom of cooperating in the solution of his real problems; the freedom of learning from his own mistakes. The student is denied the opportunity of expressing himself critically on the needs of his education ... He is educated to be a subject instead of a citizen. He is forced into a system that ... offers all characteristics ... usually found in a police state [sic] . . . "(49) This statement was, of course, extreme, but it tallied with the views of other students, if not in tone, at least in substance. To a degree, it reflected once again the high level of sensitivity of a generation which had suffered the trauma of authoritarianism at its worst and which, now moving in the opposite direction, had begun to suspect and reject any kind of control, even guided teamwork, as a manifestation of political or social coercion. As a student put it, "They were jealous of their democratic rights." More fundamentally, though, the criticism revealed a clash of philosophies and traditions which predated the Nazi period and contrasted the German elitist with the American democratic system of education.

"The German-European university," argued a woman member of the same team,(50) "is a school for a selected group and there is no desire to change this situation, because it is appropriate to the function of the university and of university trained people within European society." Coupled with this concept of elitism was that of the German student concept of "academic freedom" which entrusted to the German student the choice of subject matter and left him in sole control of his studies, without external supervision and guidance. The twin concepts of elitism and freedom, the student added, make "the atmosphere at a [German] European university much more 'academic' and .... as a rule, an intellectualism is prevalent which would very likely be considered snobbism. at an American institution."(51) The American university, on the other hand, was expected "to train masses," as one student put it. It was, as another phrased it more positively, a "university of the people" which "everybody or almost everybody can and does attend" and where emphasis was placed on "training for citizenship, the development of an all-round personality, and responsible attitude toward the community." In the German view neither definition was meant to be wholly commendatory. Both were meant to suggest an American tendency toward "anti-intellectualism." The same tendency was believed to be the cause for greater emphasis on the utilitarian purpose of university training, that is, a high degree of specialization and preference for applied sciences rather than for the humanities. Yet, emphasis on the "pragmatic and the palpable" and on technical expertise seemed to some students to contradict, if not undercut, the declared purpose of citizenship training. According to one student, the system actually made it impossible for the American student to become, like his European colleague, "a factor in the public, cultural and political life" of the nation.(52) "The German team and the American university," the student concluded, "were speaking within two entirely different frames of reference which could hardly ever be reconciled to a common denominator."

The summary report prepared by the faculty of the University of Minnesota did not enter into a discussion of the fundamental issue here, namely a real conflict of values underlying the German and American systems. Instead it treated the problem as a disciplinary one. In its view, as stated in their report, "some regulation is required in order to have freedom."(53)

Views expressed by the German student team observing student government and the role of the American student on the University of Minnesota campus were mixed. Some of the critics seemed to regard student government as a sham and a farce. They pointed out that only a minority were active in campus politics, the rest seemed apathetic; that few were elected to representative bodies, most were appointed; and that the so-called student Congress had merely marginal, mostly organizational, responsibilities. In short, it was their view that there was no self-government and no democracy. What was more, the American student appeared to be constantly administered, advised, counseled, and pampered by an over-solicitous administration that kept him in a steady state of dependency. In contrast to his German counterpart who represented his country's "future elite," was more respected, and who might take a stand as a citizen of his university on major controversial issues, the American student and student government were "not an equal partner of the administration and faculty." The students could not make their own policy in administering student government because ultimate responsibility for student activities resided with the administration.(54)

Notwithstanding the negative reactions of this group, it should be recorded that a large body of German students was genuinely impressed with some of the principal features of the American university and with some of the campus institutions. The larger number of students who spent a full academic year in the United States spoke more often of the benefits they had gained from their stay. The accent on citizenship education, personality development, human relations featuring strong anti-elitism, equalitarianism, and extracurricular pursuits, was viewed as a challenge to the German system and produced many positive comments and reluctant recognition of its validity for American society. Student government was recognized as a training ground for democracy and was credited with considerable success in preparing students for their future career in public and professional life.(55) There were favorable comments on the informality and frequency of relations between faculty and students, as exemplified by the office of the Dean of Students, on the value of extracurricular activities, and on the institution of the faculty or student adviser (although to some it seemed to represent an encroachment on student independence). Other aspects of the American university that came in for commendation by German students were the student union, the student loan fund, and the foreign student adviser. The Coffman Memorial Union at the University of Minnesota inspired the German team to address a memorandum to the University of Frankfurt recommending it as a model for the new Student House in that city.(56) The use of committees by student governments evoked both negative and positive reactions; some denounced them as inefficient tools of operation, while others were impressed with their very effectiveness and proposed that here was something that "we can and should adapt to our own situation."

The Minnesota student project from which most of the above illustrations were gleaned may have been an extreme case with both sides stubbornly clinging to their prejudgments. Conceivably, the university administration and faculty, in sponsoring the project, took their responsibilities as "trustee of the American Government" too seriously and refused to play the part of a "passive host" in preference to that of a strict supervisor and guide. The German team, on the other hand, insisting on their rights as "free observers," refused to recognize that some measure of control and regulation was required to have freedom and, in a mood of fighting resistance, accused the university of rank authoritarianism.(57)

Reports by German students in other universities, such as Antioch, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, and Syracuse, where teams were engaged in the same type of project, were, on balance, less critical, although occasional references were made to American proclivity for emphasis on social activities at the expense of academic, pursuits, a practice disdained by German students who admittedly were fated to become "brilliant scholars" but to miss out on human relations.(58) Some students discovered that generalizations were of dubious value, when they discovered that there were completely different types of student governments at various campuses.

The Minnesota experiment, incidentally, was not a total failure. Both Americans and Germans acknowledged that they had profited from the visit, citing the academic aspects of the program, the social functions and contacts on and off campus and, in the case of the Germans, knowledge of the country acquired through travel.

It should be recalled in this connection that the experience of American students on German campuses presented the other side of the coin---it was the exact reverse of their German counterparts. While the latter resented being "trapped" in a net of rules and regulations, the American student, accustomed to the advisory services of the American college or university, found himself hopelessly adrift in a system that left the initiative to each individual student and provided few, if any, controls to measure scholastic performance. In the absence of any form of supervision or evaluation, American students often left the campuses for varying periods of time spending more time on sightseeing trips than at the institutions with which they were formally registered. American Fulbright professors, who looked into the situation to ascertain how well the students were doing, reported that few had established contact with their professors and that most of them could not be located.(59)

Here, too, the results were not altogether negative. A number of reports submitted by American students prior to their return to the United States show that those who applied themselves seriously to their studies profited from their work. Their outstanding performance netted some Fulbright students awards and prizes and even faculty appointments. Many participated actively in the extensive programs of the America Houses, as the, USIS-sponsored, cultural centers were called in Germany. Some attended international conferences. Music students gave concerts and others led or attended discussion groups---once they realized, as one of the students put it, that university study in Germany posed demands similar to those in an American graduate school rather than in a college.(60) The discovery came as a surprise to many who complained that this type of information had not been provided in briefings prior to their visit.(61) Failure to furnish data on the host institution in advance, in particular, referred to at the time as one of the failings of the early years of the Fulbright Commission, was evidence of the continuing need for more timely and accurate information about each other's educational system.

The student exchange experience has been described in some detail, because it seems to epitomize the limitations of exchange Programs initiated without full appreciation by the participants of the character of national systems which are fundamentally different in philosophy and structure and whose continued validity is vigorously defended by the advocates of each. If the tone of the German students at times sounded defensive and even shrill, it was not simply because they felt challenged by the American model but also because they were under attack from within the German academic community. Reform-minded educators in Germany and some of their returning colleagues had begun to question the merits of their own system, the latter in the light of their new experience on American campuses, and were comparing a different educational system with their own, often to the latter's disadvantage. The exchange program offered them a chance to test their national values and institutions against certain alternatives. The minimum result that could be expected and, in fact, did come about, was a better understanding of each system by the other party. As experience showed, this minimum was exceeded by those who, in the words of one of the spokesmen, "won new conceptions of the principles of education.(62)

Impressions of other aspects of American life varied. Given traditional German emphasis on cultural achievements ("Kultur") and a deep-rooted bias against a civilization often denounced and more often suspected of serving primarily the cause of material growth, the odds appeared to have been against any significant changes in attitude. In actual fact, a number of German visitors under the program indicated at their departure that they had been impressed by the musical and other artistic presentations they had witnessed, and especially by the museums they had visited.(63) Students and media specialists admitted that what they had observed by way of cultural activities had not only exceeded their expectations but actually had ranked among the most favorable impressions they had gathered in the United States.(64) "Cultural life" was also singled out by a majority of librarians, museum experts, lawyers, and by a substantial number of women leaders and political leaders as an impressive aspect of American civilization. According to one of the earlier survey,(65) teenagers, students, and leaders, when asked to evaluate impressions some of their compatriots had at home of American propensity for monetary gain, excessive materialism and lack of culture, stated that these all were unjustifiable criticisms.

Professional fields that came in for special commendation were those in which Germany lagged behind the United States in professional experience. American social work methods, especially casework and group work, drew the admiration of many German experts who decided then and there to put their experience into practice at home. Information specialists appear to have been reasonably well-impressed with the American press but substantially less with film, radio, and television. Here, too, it was not merely the methods and techniques of professional performance in the United States, but rather the underlying philosophy that exerted the strongest influence on German visitors. A young social worker who later became a member of the Bundestag expressed his feelings in the following rather revealing way:

"I got a totally new conception about the aims and implications of group work ... The conscious use of group work will ... give us in Germany a real chance to help our young generation out of the present mood of apathy and distrust ... In Germany there exists a dire need for experience in practical democracy. Especially the youth should have many opportunities to experience a democratic group life to have them overcome the feeling of being a lost generation."(66)

In trying to strike a balance of the net effect of a large scale, first-hand view of the American scene as a result of the exchange experience, it may be said that the program was successful in furnishing the German visitors with a fair and realistic picture of the United States and in causing many of them to revise faulty preconceptions. As we noted in a number of cases, impressions gained during the visit changed views and attitudes in a decidedly favorable direction. Some of the visitors, no doubt, were moved to adopt American models and to apply them to German conditions.

German visitors in all categories, as noted earlier, admitted that they had learned a great deal and that they felt, on the strength of their own experience, that Germany could learn "a lot" or at least "something" from the United States. Areas named for transfer of experience included democratic concepts, features of the governmental system, and structure and functions of public and private institutions. Unquestionably, experiences of this kind provided the impulse for many of the aforementioned institutional innovations set in motion by returning exchangees. In any event, they served as a corrective not only of their own misconceptions but conceivably of those of many thousands of their fellow countrymen to whom they communicated their impressions upon their return, thereby contributing further to better understanding and cooperation.

In contrast, changes of view formed by American exchangees about Germany were less pronounced. On the whole, cliché images prevailed. Among the most positive impressions gained by Americans during the early phases of the exchange program were those produced upon their American hosts by German teenagers who proved to be exceptional ambassadors of good will.

A remarkable development of the postwar period in U.S. relations with the Federal Republic of Germany has been the close cooperation of both nations in the area of foreign policy. Several factors must be considered in evaluating this phenomenon. Cooperation during the early stage of relationships was involuntary. Germany had no policy of its own and in the words of the late Kurt Schumacher, leader of the Social Democratic Party in the early postwar period, could have no foreign policy for a long time to come. The Occupation Statute of 1949 reserved powers for the conduct of foreign affairs for the occupation authorities. However, largely under the pressure of external developments, notably the cold war, the Federal Republic was given, in an ever-accelerated measure, greater latitude in determining the conduct of affairs, foreign and domestic, leading eventually to the restoration of full sovereignty and to Germany's alliance in political, economic, and defense matters with the Western nations. The pace of events overtook and invalidated the earlier predictions of Schumacher and public expectations everywhere, including in Germany.

The German Government under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was quick to realize the opportunity and fell readily in line with Allied and especially U.S. policy. Public opinion in Germany, on the other hand, was slower to grasp and to adjust to the change of pace. After a phase of rigorous demilitarization, which they had heartily welcomed---perhaps more generally than any other aspect of the occupation policy---Germans, notably the. young, found themselves once again in 1950, to wit, 5 years after ultimate military defeat, faced with a call to arms. Not surprisingly, the Western Allies were charged with inconsistency and duplicity. "This is not what you taught us before," young Germans said. Ironically, their resistance, in a way, proved the effectiveness of the postwar reorientation effort.

Studies made of the attitudes of exchangees confirmed a noticeable lag between official policy and public opinion, particularly in military matters. The study of youth and community leaders conducted in 1951 by the National Social Welfare Assembly(67) showed that respondents fell into five major categories. Less than half (47 percent) favored remilitarization, and of those who did two-thirds thought that Germany "owed" it morally to the Western world, whereas one-third believed that circumstances would force Germany into it. The rest was neither for nor strongly against it. But even those who were not outrightly opposed feared that remilitarization was highly problematical not to say dangerous, because it could bring reactionaries and militarists back into power. Others were unconditionally against it, stating that they had "had enough" of war. Only one-fifth expressed no opinion. Very few respondents were prepared to strike a bargain: they were in favor, but on condition that Germany be given full independence.

Opposition or qualified support of American defense policy was paralleled by a marked tendency on the part of some to question the stated purpose of U.S. foreign policy and to impute selfish and material reasons or still other ulterior motives to American intentions in world affairs. In 1950 a substantial minority of respondents (notably high school and university students; less so, leaders) declared upon arrival in the United States that one of the principal aims of U.S. foreign policy was to develop markets for U.S. exports. Even the Marshall Plan was suspected by a small number of serving such purposes.(68) In the course of their visits these groups changed their opinions by considerable margins, adopting less critical attitudes.

In the following years, with the escalation of the cold war and the growing success of the Marshall Plan, German opposition to defense softened. Now a substantial majority (72 percent) favored a German contribution to European defense, although more than one-half expressed the view that Germany should do everything in her power to avoid getting involved in war in Western Europe. Simultaneously, German conceptions of U.S. foreign policy had become somewhat more sophisticated. In 1950 and 1951 most German visitors under the program (more than 90 percent) had said that the principal objective of U.S. foreign policy was "to encourage the democratic forces in other parts of the world."(69) Objectives such as peace, foreign aid, and anticommunism received only marginal recognition.. Two years later, however, 84 percent said that anticommunism was one of the chief aims of the U.S. foreign policy, and 46 percent responded that "to help improve living conditions all over the world" and "to attain peace" were also priority U.S. objectives.(70)

There was also a growing appreciation of the improvement of German-American relations manifest in what was thought to be genuine American concern with Germany's welfare and security. Up to three-fourths of all respondents (81 percent of leaders and specialists) declared that the United States was "very much" concerned with Germany's welfare, and nearly 90 percent were convinced that the United States would go all out to aid Germany in the case of a Soviet invasion. Yet, only 50 percent believed that the United States was doing all she could or should to prevent war. On the question of right or wrong, German exchangees sided overwhelmingly with the United States as against the Soviet Union.(71)

An almost inevitable corollary of the acceptance of American foreign policy by German exchangees was a critical review of Germany and German politics, especially Germany's role in international affairs. A majority of students (61 percent high school and 52 percent university students) declared that, as a result of their experience in the United States, they had changed their opinion about the image and role of Germany. A third of the students and a fourth of the leaders saw their homeland now in a more favorable light, but about a fourth of the students and a tenth of the leaders had changed their rating to unfavorable. Critical judgments were made specifically in regard to politics. In many instances, the critique took the form of suggestions of changes that needed to be made. With respect to international affairs, membership in a United Europe and in the United Nations was named by a plurality of students as an important goal. Leaders among the visitors to the United States recommended closer political ties with the United States and other Western powers and a larger role for Germany in international affairs.(72) Others mentioned a contributory effort by Germany to world peace, unification of East and West Germany, and education for democracy.

To sum up, although the impact of U.S. foreign policy appears to be undeniable, a word of caution is in order. In contrast to impressions of American institutions, American life, and the American people that were gained as a result of direct exposure and first-hand observation, the impact of American policy must be considered to be the result of a multitude, of cumulative influences of which the exchange program was only one, although perhaps a crucial one. OMGUS' and HICOG's communication media activities, from press and radio to America Houses, supported by German media and by a German Government wholly committed to a pro-Western and pro-American posture and, above all, the omnipresence of the cold war combined to produce strongly pro-American reactions in the early fifties. By that time the vast majority of the German visitors who came to the United States were familiar with the basic tenets of U.S. policy and disposed to find positive corroboration. Their visit may have provided opportunities to check, reaffirm, and strengthen rather than to form new or correct existing assumptions. It is therefore not surprising that studies comparing the views of returning exchangees, all of whom had been exposed to the influence of the media, with that of their fellow nationals who had not visited the United States showed relatively little differences when it came to acceptance or rejection of U.S. foreign policy.

Of critical importance was the spread of the exchange experience through communication of the newly gained knowledge to fellow citizens at home, beyond the circle of the participants. This multiplier effect of personal communication has often been regarded as a "crucial criterion" with which to measure the value of the exchange program, as long as mutual understanding remained the basic goal.(73) As stated by HICOG, it considered the dissemination of favorable attitudes as the "primary condition of effectiveness."(74) A common assumption particularly popular with members of Congressional appropriation committees, has always been that the measure for "effectiveness" should be the degree to which favorable foreign attitudes toward official U.S. foreign policy are multiplied. Over-emphasis on short range program benefits, however, tends to overlook other equally important policy objectives, including that of using exchange experiences as stimulants for emulation upon return.

There is, in fact, ample evidence that upon their return home the German visitors lectured, spoke publicly, and wrote extensively about their impressions, using public media, including the Voice of America, in trying to reach a variety of audiences. To solidify and perpetuate the impact, they organized their audiences frequently in the form of discussion groups or committees, in order to provide a continuing focus of attention on problems observed in the United States. Surveys conducted by HICOG disclosed that by 1953 slightly over 60 percent of the returnees were reported to have discussed some significant areas of American life with their fellow countrymen.(75) Each of them was believed to have talked personally to anywhere from 150 to 300 people,(76) which meant that about 2.7 percent of the population (590,000 to 1,200,000 people) had talked to returnees.(77) By 1955, estimates of the number of persons contacted by adult exchangees had risen to 3 million, or 8 percent of the population.(78) These figures do not include audiences reached by mass media nor those reached by news stories that were submitted regularly by journalists in the course of their visits to the United States for publication in newspapers and magazines in Germany.

Subjects discussed by returning Germans covered nearly every important aspect of American life. Education, religion, culture, "way of life," and family living appear to have been among the most popular topics. Leaders devoted a great deal of their presentations to economic problems and politics, and understandably to discussions of subjects falling within their special field of concern. Comments were mostly favorable, particularly on "way of life," American personal characteristics, education, employer-employee relations, and family life. Significantly, leaders and experts were nearly always highly complimentary in their evaluation of conditions within their own areas of interest, e.g., church leaders on religious life, educators on education, labor leaders on employer-employee relations, librarians and museum experts on cultural life, and so on. This was important because their judgment had greater credibility due to their expertise and more intensive exposure to problems in their fields through first-hand observation. In contrast, unfavorable judgments passed on some of the same aspects, e.g., family life, social conditions (racial discrimination), cultural standards, television, and a few more, represented a small minority opinion.(79)

What, then, was the effect of a dissemination effort so massive and, on balance, so favorable in its results? Did the message get across to the German population? A study made in 1955(80) suggests that with all due reservations the impact on the German public was wide and positive. On the basis of a control sample of 1,269 exchangees who returned to Germany and of 315 who returned to West Berlin, and of interviews with 462 persons with whom the returnees came in contact, the study found that the "contacts" were far more pro-American than any other group in the population. Although the study conceded that this might not be due entirely to their exposure to exchangees, the latter were believed to have constituted a vital element in promoting attitudes that were pro-American to the point of being "highly opinionated." The study concluded that there was substantial evidence that the exchange-of-persons program was indeed successful in creating a pro-American orientation among those exposed to dissemination efforts, and that dissemination in turn was creating an ever-widening circle of sympathizers among the general population. The study showed, furthermore, that 54 percent of those who had personal contacts with exchangees claimed that they had been favorably influenced in their attitude toward the United States. Of the 54 percent, three out of five contacts, which approximated 5 percent of all West Germans, said that they had received new ideas with respect to problems of education, "way of life," and technology, and admitted that "it would be a good thing to adopt quite a few of their practices over here." A comparison of strengths of impressions gained by exchangees with those conveyed to their contacts revealed marked evidence of positive contagion. In other words, exchangees succeeded in presenting to their friends, families, and contacts a positive picture of the United States and found a substantial number ready to accept it.

Again, while shifts in attitudes were less pronounced in the case of persons contacted by returned visitors than in that of the returnees themselves, responses by contacts revealed a markedly more favorable attitude after exposure to the views of exchangees than before. They were also strikingly more positive than those found to be shared by a cross section of the population in the returnee's home community. This was true with respect to views on the American scene as well as on American foreign policy. For instance, favorable opinions on American hospitality, charity, and lack of class consciousness nearly doubled. Also, respect for American family life rose among local contacts, whereas there was little evidence of change in regard to education and press affairs. There was a noticeable increase of favorable views among such contacts with respect to certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy, particularly American intentions to promote cooperation with other nations to encourage democracy and peace.

An earlier study made in 1954, based on interviews with members of Cooperative Action Teams, had produced similar evidence.(81) The strong dissemination impact is not too surprising in the case of the Teams, whose members occupied key positions and commanded wide contacts within their home communities. Their effectiveness could doubtless have been even greater, had they continued to operate as a team after their return to Germany.

The acquisition of new knowledge and skills, as previously noted, has never been considered the overriding objective of official exchange programs. However, it proved to be a prerequisite to the attainment of the ultimate goal of the individual visitor---that is, application of such knowledge and skills in the mutual interest of the countries involved. The probability of this outcome naturally increased when a satisfactory exchange experience led to improvement of career prospects or to promotion to positions carrying higher responsibilities and, with them, greater influence potential. Although a complete record of the German returnees has not been kept, there is ample evidence that their stay in the United States benefited most exchangees, although in varying degrees and in different ways. There are further indications that a substantial number moved to positions which enabled them to break now ground in their fields of specialization.

As far as scholastic improvement was concerned, university students and young academicians were the chief beneficiaries. Instructions from the Department of State to the universities had placed emphasis on "extensive experience and the acquisition of general knowledge rather than a thorough formal education." (82) Accordingly, German students were given a special status. Yet many universities arranged for a regular academic program as part of the total plan and even graded performances. The results showed appreciable degrees of progress. Reports submitted to the Institute of International Education for the academic year 1954-1955 by American universities showed that of 75 students, 37 were rated as "excellent," 33 as "good," 5 as "fair ," and none as "poor." One straight "A" student received his A.B. degree cum laude and was awarded the "Class of 1875 Prize in American History." Ten other students completed work for a Master's degree. A number of these grantees were successful upon their return in obtaining important positions in academic and political life.(83) The record of German Fulbright students in the following year was even more impressive. Of those graded, 57 percent were rated "excellent," 37 percent "good," 6 percent "fair," and less than 1 percent "poor." One student graduated summa cum laude, another received his B.A. magna cum laude, and a third completed his Master of Comparative Law at Columbia. University Law School with almost a straight "A" average.(84) A number of them were given special recognition by American universities in the form of extensions of their study period or of faculty appointments.

Beyond academic achievements, many reports indicate that the totality of impressions gathered on and away from the campus changed the outlook of the visitors with respect to their professional goals and in some instances deepened their conceptions of their field of specialization. "It seems almost unbelievable to me," wrote a teacher trainee at Bryn Mawr College, "how much my capacity has increased ... Key interest in education is greater than it ever was and I feel now much more prepared to work in this field ... "(85) An economist studying at Harvard had this to say: "While I cannot put the finger on any individual aspect, I feel that the past year of study in the United States has been of a value that can hardly be exaggerated. I learned more than I could have learned anywhere in Germany, and this I mean with reference to my special field of study. The many possibilities for first-hand views of America have opened up new intellectual and emotional vistas. I am more mature and balanced than before. The recognition at Harvard has boosted. my professional recognition at home. In fact, nothing has helped my career as an economist in Germany more than my work here ... I must repeat: my career in Germany is made here."(86)

Making due allowance for the fact that exchangees may not always be able to assess accurately the effect, in particular the long-range impact, of their visit and study, it is worth noting that by 1960 nearly three-fourths of German "Fulbrighters" interviewed (73 percent) stated that they received professional or personal advantages from their stay in the United States, with the highest percentage (76 percent) among senior research scholars.(87) Characteristically, a majority of the respondents named personal and intangible benefits as against those that had any immediate consequences for their professional careers. Twenty-seven percent indicated that their professional knowledge had been enlarged; 20 percent stated that their career prospects had been improved or that they had actually launched upon a promising career or had been promoted to higher positions. Other more personal advantages mentioned included increase of general knowledge, greater proficiency in English, enlargement of contacts with Americans, better knowledge of Americans, and the like.(88)

Inquiries into the plans of trainees upon their return, made in 1953 and 1954,(89) showed the group fairly evenly divided between those who planned to use their experience for their personal and professional benefit, i.e., to improve their position or to finish their training, and those who wished to share it with others and use it to ameliorate conditions in Germany or to work toward better understanding. There appeared to be a slight decline of social motivation in favor of self-serving intentions. There were also, as we noted above, a number of "turn arounds," in this case, of participants who after their return decided to emigrate, mostly to the United States, and a few to other countries. The total percentage was low (3.2 percent of the total; 6.6 percent of the teenagers).(90)

Available information on individual status changes of returned German exchangees is exceedingly scarce and, on the whole, inconclusive. Studies show that within a relatively short period after their return about two-thirds of the students had moved into influential positions on varying levels. Many social workers and social work students assumed positions of considerable importance as high level public servants, presidents and professors of social work schools, directors of public or private agencies, even members of the Bundestag.(91)

Most impressive is the number of German participants in the program who over the years were, appointed to high office, e.g., to key positions in federal, state or local administrations, or who were elected to the federal or state legislatures. To give a few examples: Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic of Germany was one of the political leaders who came to the United States in 1951 under the auspices of the exchange program. So were former Chancellor Willi Brandt, and the present Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and at one time 7 of his 16 Cabinet members. Other former visitors under the program include, in recent years, one of the leading members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the current opposition party, Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, Gerhard Stoltenberg; the former National Secretary of the CDU, Kurt Biedenkopf; the National Chairman of the Federation of German Trade, Unions, Heinz Vetter; the National Chairman of the Union of Civil Service Transport and Traffic Employees, Heinz Kluncker; and the National Chairman of the German Metal Workers Union, Eugen Loderer. Seven of the State Secretaries, the ranking civil servants in each ministry, were participants, as were four of the so-called Parliamentary Secretaries in various ministries. The Minister Presidents (Governors) of five states, the future Governing Mayor of Berlin, and the Presidents of the Senate and Mayors of Hamburg and Bremen were also exchange visitors to the United States. This list could be expanded to include a large number of ranking officials in the Office of the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Press and Information Office, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Economics, Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, and Science, as well as state government officials and a very substantial number of Bundestag members from all parties, including a President and two Vice Presidents of the Bundestag and others who at one time or another had been Chancellors or Ministers of the Federal Republic, such as Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Ludwig Erhard, Franz Josef Strauss. The presiding judge of the Constitutional Court was an early visitor. Equally impressive is the number of top academicians, i.e., presidents of universities and institutes, scientists, representatives of public bodies, publishers and editors of key newspapers, correspondents, and directors of radio and television who participated in the program.(92) Most of their visits took place during the period covered by this report, but the process has continued to this day.

Tempting as it is, the, claim cannot be made that the attainment of high office was always the result of the exchange experience, although the latter was often undoubtedly a contributing factor. In holding positions of influence which involved the responsibility of breaking new ground in public and professional fields, a number of the participants stated that they had drawn on their American experience as visitors to the United States under the program. Far more significant, however, is the fact that by occupying high offices in public life, many were able to translate their personal experience into policies and programs which benefited both countries and over the years contributed to the good relations existing today between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Americans and Germans alike. have criticized and praised the immediate postwar exchange program on innumerable occasions. Criticism has been leveled at specifics, but appreciation has been general, attesting to the value of the program as a whole. U.S. officials in Washington and in Germany, as we noted earlier, considered it a most important instrument of policy. The Congress appropriated year after year without strictures the funds requested by the executive branch. Support by the private sector was generous and enthusiastic. The leader program, in particular, was singled out by observers as especially effective.

Tributes paid by German officialdom and the public were unstinting. During a Bundestag debate in 1952 speakers from all major parties rose to praise the exchange program as a most constructive and progressive undertaking and as "an effective way gradually to transform the unproductive relationship of victor and vanquished into a partnership of equality." Prominent German leaders wished to see the program continued and, if possible, expanded.(93)

In 1953, as a token of appreciation the President of the Bundestag, Eugen Gerstenmaier, introduced a motion to invite 100 American civic leaders to visit Germany for a month. The Bundestag passed unanimously (except for the Communist members) the legislative authorization, and 100 public servants, educators, journalists, and representatives of other fields, toured Germany for a month as guests of the Federal Republic.(94) Dr. Alois Hundhammer, Minister of Education and Culture in Bavaria, who had been a severe critic and opponent of educational reform, after visiting the United States established scholarships for ten American students at the University of Munich.(95) Returning Germans attested time and again to the contribution the exchange program had made not only to their own professional growth but to the welfare of their communities. "I am convinced," a student wrote, "that this student exchange does more good to Germany's future than any other help which has been given to Germany."(96)

Rather significantly, there was no misunderstanding on the purpose of the program. The vast majority of German participants appreciated it precisely for the reasons for which it had been devised. Neither leaders, students, nor teenagers saw as its prime purpose professional or scholastic benefit. They knew that its purpose was the promotion of international understanding and peace, better understanding of the United States, and of democracy.(97) Very few believed that its objective was to "propagandize Germans"(98) Nearly all thought that the aims of the program were achievable and a high majority thought that they bad been achieved.(99)

The least-contested fact was the popularity of the program. Its scope and content may have been obscure to some and controversial to others, but the program as such was widely known and generally appreciated as HICOG studies revealed.(100) By 1955 no less than 55 percent of the German population had heard of the program (in West Berlin 70 percent stated that they were aware of it). An overwhelming majority considered the program beneficial for the participants and for Germany as well. (75 percent in West Germany, 93 percent in West Berlin). Moreover, in the eyes of nearly half of the German public, returned participants were accepted as the most reliable interpreters of the United States, exceeding all other channels and media such as the Voice of America, press, radio, film, and resident or visiting U.S. citizens.(101)

The program indeed had become a success. It had provided an impulse for democratic reform. It had helped correct the American image in Germany although to a lesser degree the German image in America. It had gained understanding and support of American foreign policy. It had influenced not only the participants themselves but, beyond this, a large circle of persons with whom the exchangee had come in contact. It had helped individuals to achieve higher scholastic and professional standing and to increase their impact as intercultural interpreters. It had found general recognition as an effective medium of mutual understanding and binational cooperation, and it had served as a model for exchange programs launched with other countries.

In testimony before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, on February 15, 1955, James A. Conant, the U.S. High Commissioner, made the following comments on the educational exchange program with Germany:

"As you know ... the Educational Exchange Program with Germany ... has been removed from the GOA appropriation and will hereafter be included in the worldwide exchange budget ... This program remains one of my vital concerns as Chief of Mission in Germany ...

"During the 2 years that I have been in Germany, I have had a chance to assess to some degree the effectiveness of our work in various fields of public relations, as we might call it, and I am convinced that the money which has been spent on the exchange program is some of the most effective money we have ever spent in a foreign country ...

"We have sent approximately 10,000 Germans to the United States since the inception of the program in late 1947. Of this number some 55400 fall into what might, be termed the 'leader' category, that is, individuals holding influential positions in the political, economic, social, and other fields. As an example, former participants in the German exchange program comprise about 25 percent of the membership of the Bundestag, or lower House of the Federal Republic, and 17 percent of the membership of the Bundesrat, or upper House. In every significant area of German life I have encountered individuals in key positions who have participated in the exchange, experience, and whose knowledge and understanding of United States objectives has greatly benefited thereby . . .

"We have had an assessment in the past of the attitudes of various members of this group, but with particular reference to the 5,400 in the leader category, I could almost speak from personal experience I have had what might be called a fair sampling of them, because I have run into them as I have gone around the country in the period of the past 2 years, which involves people running all the way from the governors of the separate States, labor leaders, as well as members of the Bundestag. . .

"With the coming of sovereignty, the task of communicating clearly the objectives of our foreign policy vis-a-vis Germany will, if anything, increase in importance. The. role of the exchange program in this continuing effort to convince the German people of the honesty of our purpose and the mutuality of our interests will be a large one ...

"The exchange program has shown itself to be an important factor in building German understanding and support of our purposes and policies."(102)

The U.S.-German exchange program of the immediate postwar period was unique because the policies governing its objectives, its scope, and its content were unique. But it was not rigid. As has been shown, within 10 years it went through a series of remarkable adaptations, faithfully reflecting changes in U.S. policy toward Germany and the rest of the world. The experiment will probably never be repeated. Yet, out of it emerged certain features which set a benchmark for other exchange programs. The focus on critical public opinion forming groups, the merger of public and private resources, the integration of program objectives with country policy on all appropriate levels---these were innovations that have proved their merit beyond the confines of time and place. In all of these aspects the massive size of the program provided an unusual opportunity for creative experimentation and innovation.

Epilogue

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